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This dissertation contains ￿ve independent chapters dealing with wage dispersion and unemploy-
ment. The ￿rst chapter deals with the explanation of international changes in wage inequality
and unemployment in the 80s and 90s. Both theoretically and empirically, social bene￿ts and
its link to average income are blamed for the di￿erent experiences across countries. The second
chapter discusses the search framework, to explain residual wage inequality and ￿nds that insti-
tutional wage compression has ambiguous e￿ects on employment. In the third chapter, we apply
the theory to German data. We show that job-to-job transitions are important in explaining
both frictions and career advances. In the fourth chapter, we empirically assess the relationship
between wage dispersion and unemployment for homogeneous workers. We ￿nd that neither a
frictional nor a neo-classical view in explaining this relationship are convincing. Unemployment
within cells is not negatively correlated with wage dispersion. Finally, the last chapter builds
a theoretical model which treats heterogeneous individuals in a production function framework
and a frictional labor market. The model generates both wage dispersion within and between
skill groups and both frictional and structural unemployment. In sum, the dissertation stresses
the importance of modelling frictions to understand di￿erent types of wage inequality and un-
employment.
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Introduction
Wages and employment as labor market outcomes
In modern societies, most households depend on market work to make their living. Labor market
outcomes, thus, concern many members of the society in an important way. Two central tasks of
labor markets are the allocation of employment and earnings across labor market participants.
This dissertation deals with the allocation of employment and earnings as equilibrium outcomes
of frictional labor markets and with the in￿uence of other institutions.
Economic theory helps to understand and to explain those employment and earnings distributions
which are realized. In addition, it helps to quantify the costs that arise if the distribution(s)
obtained di￿er from a suitably de￿ned optimum. As far as the allocation of employment is
concerned, an extreme unequal allocation is unemployment. A failure of the labor market of
providing individuals that are willing to work with jobs causes economic costs, because it is
ine￿cient as long as these matches produce a positive surplus. An improvement of the situation
in a Pareto-sense is conceivable.
If the distribution of earnings across individuals is too unequal, this causes costs as well. On
the one hand, most people have some notion of fairness, and if the realized earnings distribution
deviates from this norm, social costs arise. On the other hand, one might want to maximize
the welfare of a society in terms of a social welfare function, aggregating individual utilities.
When choosing an egalitarian form for this function, costs of a distribution of incomes, being to
unequal, consist in the fact that the realized allocation does not maximize this function, or, put
di￿erently that the marginal utilities of consumption are not equated.
Clearly, the social, psychological and economic costs of unemployment and an uneven distribu-
tion of wage incomes are far beyond the economic costs discussed above. For example, further
economic costs of unemployment include depreciation of human capital, or the deadweight loss
caused by taxes required to ￿nance unemployment. Psychological costs of unemployment exist,
for example, because ￿People need to be needed￿ (Layard, Nickel, and Jackman (1991), p.1).
Social costs of inequality arise, for example, if high inequality is accompanied by high criminality
(Morris and Western (1999)). In the happiness research, it seems that unemployment is the most
important single factor a￿ecting life satisfaction (negatively). A high income inequality reduces
life satisfaction as well. (Frey and Stutzer (2002))
These arguments justify the enormous interest of social sciences in recent international develop-
ments of wage inequality and unemployment. This development is brie￿y sketched here. After
12 Introduction
having diminished in the 1970s, wage inequality between high-skilled and low-skilled workers rose
dramatically in the US and the UK in the 80s and the 90s (see Katz, Loveman, and Blanch￿ower
(1995), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and Katz and Autor (1999)). In these countries, similar
trends can be observed for overall and residual wage inequality. There also was a modest increase
in the college wage-premium and in overall inequality in Australia, Canada and Japan.
In Continental Europe, there was no such clear-cut increase in neither overall wage inequality,
nor in within-skill or between-skill inequality in the same time span (see Katz and Autor (1999)).
Instead, unemployment increased dramatically in most countries of Continental Europe in this
period (see Bean (1994), Saint-Paul (2004) and Blanchard (2006)).
The larger part of the literature on wage inequality is concerned with wage inequality between in-
dividuals with comparable skills or with overall wage inequality rather than with wage inequality
within skill groups. This may be due to the fact that from a traditional economic point of view,
di￿erences such as education premiums and their changes are easier to interpret than changes in
residual wage inequality. Alternatively, it may be due to data limitations which until recently
prevent a reasonably detailed de￿nition of groups. However, there are good reasons to put a
higher weight on understanding wage di￿erentials between observationally equivalent individu-
als. First, empirical studies show that residual variation is important in wage level equations.
Usually, half of the variance is left unexplained.1 Second, in terms of wage changes, the empirical
literature ￿nds that a considerable part of the overall increase in inequality has been due to an
increase in residual inequality (see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Katz and Autor (1999)
and Cholezas and Tsakloglou (2007)). In addition, although wage dispersion both between and
within groups have been rising, developments in the two kinds did not happen in a parallel
fashion. For example, empirical studies for the US and for Germany show that the timing of
the increase of residual wage inequality is di￿erent from the timing of the increase of the wage
inequality between groups (see e.g. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Katz and Autor (1999)
and Fitzenberger (1999)).
Against this background, this dissertation consists of ￿ve self-contained articles about wage in-
equality between groups, wage inequality within groups, and the evolution of unemployment.
Chapters 2 and 5 are theoretical and assume a search-theoretic perspective to labor markets.
Both chapters devote special attention to residual wage dispersion, whereas one of the two
chapters models wage dispersion between groups as well. The two chapters demonstrate that a
formalization of a framework that includes search frictions and where we allow for heterogeneities
and eventually non-constant marginal productivities o￿ers interesting insights, but proves di￿-
1 Wage regressions rarely explain more than a third of the wage variance when including standard human capital
variables (see Lemieux (2006)) and rarely more than 50% of the variance of wages when including explanatory
variables beyond human capital theory (like ￿rm side variables, see e.g. Van den Berg (1999)).Introduction 3
cult. The two chapters 3 and 4 are empirical and are also based on a search-theoretic background.
Both articles provide evidence for the importance of search frictions in the German labor market.
Job-to-job transitions are an important determinant for wage growth, and there is no evidence
for the conjecture that a low residual wage dispersion causes unemployment to be high. Finally,
the ￿rst chapter of this thesis is both theoretical and empirical and has, di￿erent from the other
papers a neo-classical theoretical background.2 It argues that labor market institutions are cru-
cial for labor market outcomes and demonstrates that social bene￿ts are a driving factor for
wage inequality and unemployment and for their international development.
Wage dispersion between groups and unemployment
The ￿rst chapter (Weiss and Garlo￿ (2005)) analyzes reasons for the diverging incidence of
between-group wage inequality and unemployment between Anglo-Saxon and Continental Euro-
pean countries. The chapter supports the view that labor market institutions, and in particular
di￿erent concepts of poverty reduction, contribute to these di￿erences. Governmental poverty
reduction can follow di￿erent philosophies. One philosophy de￿nes poverty in absolute terms, by
specifying amounts individuals need to be prevented from poverty. Since social legislation in the
US and the UK is oriented towards this concept, we refer to it as the Anglo-Saxon concept. In
the other philosophy, poverty is de￿ned in relative terms, i.e., with respect to the average living
standard of the society. Referring to the social legislation in these countries, we call that the
European concept.
In a model with a neo-classical production function, two skill groups, and inelastic labor supply,
a labor union is assumed to set wages for low-skilled employees. In order to prevent poverty,
social bene￿ts are linked to the average income in the European case, but not in the Anglo-
Saxon model. Skill-biased technical change exogenously increases the demand for and thus the
wages of high-skilled workers. Ceteris paribus, the average income increases and social bene￿ts
in the European model raise as well. In the European model wage inequality increases only
weakly, because the wage of the low-skilled rises as well, as the fall back option (i.e., social
bene￿ts) increases. Thus, it counteracts the initial increase of the high-skilled wages. By the
same reasoning, unemployment among the low-skilled is higher, since their equilibrium wage is
raised above the market clearing level. By contrast, in Anglo-Saxony skill-biased technical change
causes a strongly increasing wage inequality while leaving unemployment rates unchanged. The
reason is that the higher demand for high-skilled labor does not a￿ect social bene￿ts and thus
2 In the literature the term neo-classical has been used to separate mainstream economics from the neo-
institutionalist approach (Boyer and Smith (2001)). In this use, this complete thesis would be neo-classical. I
use the term neo-classical, however, to distinguish standard labor supply, demand and human capital results
under complete information from the new information-theoretic approaches.4 Introduction
leaves the wages of the low-skilled unchanged. In the empirical analysis, the relationship between
average income and social bene￿ts in 14 OECD countries is studied. In the relevant period social
bene￿ts were indeed linked to the average income in European countries and not in the US or
UK. The above reasoning is thus consistent with stylized empirical facts about central di￿erences
between the European and the Anglo-Saxon system over the last 20 years.
Residual Wage dispersion and unemployment
The second chapter (Garlo￿ (2007)) reviews recent theories which are able to generate wage
inequality within a group of individuals with identical marginal productivity, and it emphasizes
the role of labor unions. Equilibrium search theory as introduced by Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) explains wage di￿erentials between identical individuals by search frictions. The unique
equilibrium generated by the standard model is dispersed. Identical ￿rms pay di￿erent wages to
identical workers because there is a tradeo￿ between the number of workers and the pro￿t per
worker. The traditional framework is designed for homogeneous workers, thus neglecting hetero-
geneity and generating a wage density which is increasing over the support. These results are
in contrast to empirical observations. More recent search models hence allow for heterogeneities
on either side of the market. In particular, model extensions are presented and discussed that
allow the productivities of ￿rms and individuals and the reservation wages of individuals to be
dispersed. Resulting wage densities are often hump shaped with a long right tail, and thus in
accordance with stylized empirical facts.
In addition, labor unions are introduced to the search framework. Unions are assumed to set
minimum wages. The impact of minimum wages on employment is not unique, though, as
the complete wage distribution may be below marginal productivities of the individuals. In
this case, a binding minimum wage lowers the pro￿ts of the ￿rms and redistributes this to
workers, while the labor demand of the ￿rms is unchanged. Negative employment e￿ects of
union-set minimum wages exist in a model allowing for both heterogeneous ￿rm productivities
and heterogeneous individual productivities, where some matches get unpro￿table with increasing
minimum wages. In a model with identical ￿rms and individual productivities but heterogeneous
reservation wages, employment e￿ects can even be positive, when an increasing minimum wage
results in an increasing probability that a randomly drawn wage o￿er exceeds the reservation
wage of a randomly drawn individual. Across models, generally, the complete wage density reacts
to increases of the minimum wage, the average wage increases while the dispersion decreases.
In the light of the theoretical framework for residual wage dispersion, the third chapter (Fitzen-
berger and Garlo￿ (2007b)) analyzes empirical implications based on German administrative
data. Labor market transitions are interpreted as indicators of labor market frictions. Impor-
tant indicators are the transition rates from employment to unemployment (job destruction rate),Introduction 5
the transition rate from unemployment to employment (job ￿nding rate) and the transition rate
from job to job (job changing rate). They jointly characterize the amount of frictions in the
market and the amount of ￿rms’ monopsony power. As predicted by search theory, transitions
vary with certain demographic characteristics. Further, search theory implies that individuals
change jobs to improve their wage. This view challenges human capital theory in which human
capital accumulation in the form of experience drives individual wage growth without reference
to mobility decisions. In fact, the desire for higher wages is a driving factor of direct job-to-job
changes: Most job changers have wage gains and their wage gains are considerable on average.
By contrast, there is also a remarkable amount of job-to-job transitions which come along with
considerable wage losses. So, wage gains are a central but not the only determinant of job
changes. This, in turn, challenges the simple search-theoretic framework, in which wage gains
are the only determinant of job-to-job transitions. For people changing jobs with an intervening
unemployment spell the share of winners slightly decreases with unemployment duration while
for the gain of winners there is no clear trend. Job changes are also important in explaining
why people move up or down in the relative position of wage distribution, most importantly for
younger individuals.
In the fourth chapter (Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005b)) con￿icting hypotheses between wage
dispersion on the one hand and labor market dynamics and unemployment on the other hand are
deduced from equilibrium search theory and the neo-classical labor market model as antagonistic
approaches. In the neo-classical view, the wage structure that results in market equilibrium is
compressed from below by institutions. Thus, the wage dispersion is too small. Wages, above
market clearing level, are then responsible for unemployment.3 This reasoning implies a negative
relationship between wage inequality and unemployment. Instead, the search-theoretic approach
predicts an opposite relationship, as search frictions cause both wage dispersion and unemploy-
ment to be high. Thus, a positive correlation between unemployment and wage dispersion for
individuals with similar observable attributes is expected. A labor union compressing the wage
distribution from below would then leave the unemployment rate una￿ected. Further hypothe-
ses concerning the relationship between wage dispersion and labor market dynamics are deduced
from the two approaches.
The hypotheses are tested based on German administrative data. Central variables from Min-
cer equations (age, education) are used to stratify the data. Using the corresponding cells as
observation units, the chosen approach allows for unobserved heterogeneity. The mutual reverse
causality predicted by the two hypotheses is taken into account, using the time structure for
identi￿cation. The results for the respective approaches are mixed. One stable ￿nding is that
3 This is one of the predominant explanations for the high unemployment in Europe and has been discussed in
the literature under the terms ￿Krugman-hypothesis￿ (Krugman (1994)) and ￿uni￿ed theory￿ (Blank (1997)).6 Introduction
there is no negative connection between residual wage dispersion and unemployment. This con-
tradicts the conventional wisdom that the ￿unbearable stability￿ (Prasad (2004)) of the German
wage distribution be responsible for unemployment.
Search theory and neo-classical theory: A synthesis?
The ￿fth chapter (Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2007a)) reconciles residual wage dispersion and
wage dispersion between skill groups and also models determinants of di￿erent types of unem-
ployment. Structural unemployment due to minimum wages and frictional unemployment due
to search frictions are jointly modelled, by means of an equilibrium search framework in the
spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) which is linked with a neo-classical production function
allowing for two distinct labor inputs. Under some restrictions an analytical solution for the
dispersed wage o￿er distribution within skills is obtained. The optimal behavior of the ￿rms
can be described by their position in the continuous wage distributions for the two skill groups.
Resulting equilibrium wage o￿er and (cross-sectional) wage densities are increasing in the wage.
This must be the case in order to guarantee the employment to be increasing enough. For cases,
where there is no analytical solution, simulation methods are used to characterize the result-
ing wage distribution. Under most parameter constellations the wage densities explode at the
upper bound. At the resulting mass point, wages equal marginal productivity. The standard
mechanism of the equilibrium search model is destroyed at this point, since the rent for an addi-
tional worker reduces to zero. Still, cutting the wage distribution in the continuous part of the
distribution at some minimum wage does not have any employment e￿ects.
In an extended setup, labor demand e￿ects are introduced by endogenizing the contact frequency
between ￿rms and workers. The contact frequency is interpreted as a result of ￿rms’ hiring
e￿orts, which are costly to the ￿rm. Under comparatively weak parameter restrictions it is shown
that increasing minimum wages, in this case, lead to decreasing labor demand, thereby causing
structural unemployment. This happens because ￿rms must utilize their pro￿ts to insure enough
worker contacts in order to replace all terminated matches. A minimum wage, however, decreases
pro￿ts and thus reduces hiring e￿orts. Even in cases where we can calculate an analytical form
for the moments of the wage distribution, e￿ects of the increasing minimum wage on the moments
are ambiguous. The reason is that the whole distribution and not only the lower bound reacts on
a change of the binding minimum wage. Finally, the labor unions’ objective function in choosing
a minimum wage is considered.1 Unemployment and wage dispersion: The
neo-classical view
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we develop a model that is able to account for the di￿erential employment and
wage dynamics in Europe and the U.S./UK. It is based on Weiss and Garlo￿ (2005).
The well documented increase in wage inequality in the U.S. and the UK in the 1980s and early
1990s is attributed to an increase in the demand for skills that has been faster than the increase
in skills supply. Predominantly so-called skill-biased technological change is blamed for the rapid
increase in the demand of skills.1 In most of Continental Europe, wage inequality increased much
less if at all; instead it experienced a signi￿cant increase of unemployment, especially of the low-
skilled.2 As an illustration, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 draw the development of wage inequality and
low-skilled unemployment, respectively, for the U.S. and for Germany.
Mainly, three arguments have emerged in the literature to explain the di￿erences in the evolu-
tion of wage inequality. First, some authors argue that the supply of skills increased faster in
Europe than in the U.S./UK (see Nickell and Layard (1999), Card and Lemieux (2001), Leuven,
Oosterbeek, and van Ophem (2003) and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005)). This approach is
not able, however, to account for the di￿erential evolution of unemployment.
The second, and maybe most important, approach argues that collective bargaining and labor
market institutions kept the wage structure compressed in Europe so that skill-biased techno-
logical change has been leading to increasing unemployment.3 This approach has been given the
label ￿Krugman-hypothesis￿ (Krugman (1994)) and ￿uni￿ed theory￿ (Blank (1997)). The role
of labor unions has obtained considerable attention (e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (2001)). Labor
market institutions as the unemployment insurance system and employment protection (e.g.,
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)), or minimum wages (e.g., Gautier and Teulings (2006)) have
1 See, e.g., Gottschalk (1997), Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998), Katz and Autor (1999), and Acemoglu
(2002). Other factors a￿ecting the relative demand for skills that have been identi￿ed in the literature are
organizational changes (e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (1996) and Caroli and van Reenen (2001)) and globalization
of goods and labor markets (see, e.g., Fenstra and Hanson (1996), Wood (1998), Baldwin and Cain (2000),
and Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996)).
2 Italy is an exception and shows a pronounced increase in overall wage inequality especially in the beginning
of the 90s, but not so in the college wage premium (see, e.g., Brunello, Comi, Lucifora, and Scarpa (2005)).
3 See, e.g., Krugman (1994), Krugman (1995), Katz and Autor (1999), Blau and Kahn (1996), Freeman (1996),
and Acemoglu (2002). Fewer authors argue that both, the stylized di￿erences between the U.S. and Europe
and the labor market rigidities used to explain these di￿erences are overstated in the above literature (see,
e.g., Nickell (1997), Gregg and Manning (1997), Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) and Nickell, Nunziata, and
Ochel (2005)).
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Figure 1.1: Wage inequality in the U.S. and in Germany
Data sources and de￿nitions in appendix A.1.2.
also obtained attention in the literature. The major theoretical drawback of the institutional
approaches is that they mostly explain di￿erences in the level of unemployment and the level of
wage dispersion. Only few4 can explain a widening gap of wage dispersion and unemployment
as long as the institutions are unchanged.5
Thirdly, and more recently, it has been argued that the demand for high-skilled increased less
in Europe, because there, high wages for the low-skilled workers create an incentive for ￿rms
to invest in unskill-biased technologies, implying that technical progress is on average less skill-
biased in Europe (see Acemoglu (2003)). Similarly, Beaudry and Green (2003) argue that it
is the choice of the capital-intensity of production that makes the di￿erence in skill-bias in the
presence of a capital-skill complementarity.
Our paper contributes to the view that it is the institutions that matter for the diverging evolution
between the U.S./UK and Continental Europe. Our model is able to reproduce the di￿erential
4 Krugman (1995) is such an exception. He uses the ad hoc assumption that￿due to labor market institutions,
the wage for low-skilled labor is proportional to the wage for skilled labor.
5 Admittedly, it has been noted in the literature that institutions have changed in reaction to shocks, such as
skill-biased technical change. There has been a tendency towards deunionization in the U.S. and UK while,
at least in the beginning of the 80s in Continental Europe employment protection was strengthened and
bene￿ts of the unemployment insurance have become more generous (see Siebert (1997), Saint-Paul (2004)
and Blanchard (2006).)Chapter 1 9
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Figure 1.2: Low-skilled unemployment rates in the U.S. and in Germany
Data sources and de￿nitions in appendix A.1.2.
dynamics of unemployment and wage inequality and not only levels. We argue that in Europe,
skill-biased technological change has adverse e￿ects on employment of low-skilled workers because
their wages are linked to the skilled workers’ wages. This link is established by the indexation
of social bene￿ts to per-capita income.
Modern welfare states usually possess social protection systems including schemes that provide
needy people with subsistence bene￿ts.6 Often, the level of bene￿ts is linked to the evolution
of wages or per-capita income. The reason for this is that bene￿ts are paid to avoid poverty so
that their level must be closely related to the ￿subsistence level￿. But the subsistence level is a
relative concept and so is poverty.7 In Germany, for example, the subsistence level is de￿ned in
the social legislation (Bundessozialhilfegesetz ￿12 BSHG, Sozialgesetzbuch ￿27 SGB XII). Both
articles explicitly state that the subsistence level does not only consist of su￿cient food, housing,
clothes, furniture, etc: but also of participation in social and cultural life. Social contacts and
6 Names for these schemes in the di￿erent countries are ￿social assistance bene￿t￿, ￿welfare allowance￿, ￿right
to the social integration￿, ￿minimum income, public assistance￿, ￿guaranteed minimum income bene￿t￿, ￿social
bene￿t￿, ￿subsistence allowance￿, ￿social insertion income￿, ￿bene￿t in material need￿, etc. In the remainder of
the paper, we use the label ￿bene￿ts￿ as an umbrella term for all these schemes.
7 See, e.g., Foster (1998): ￿Absolute versus Relative Poverty￿ and the other contributions to the session on ￿What
is Poverty and Who are the Poor?￿ in the AEA Papers and Proceedings Issue of the American Economic
Review of May 1998.10 Chapter 1
participation in cultural life perhaps more than food, housing, and the like depend on the average
wealth of a society. In societies where most of the people can a￿ord video cameras, mobile phones,
￿ights to distant countries, etc., a life without electric light, running water or even without a
television set is considered unacceptable.8 Therefore bene￿ts in general depend on the average
wealth of a society. The strength of this link, however, varies across countries. We ￿nd that in
most of Continental Europe the level of bene￿ts is tied closely to per-capita income while in the
Anglo-Saxon countries the bene￿ts level has been kept constant in real terms and has not been
adjusted to per-capita income over the last 20 years.9 We show that this institutional di￿erence
is able to explain the transatlantic di￿erences in wage and employment dynamics.
Endogeneity of the level of bene￿ts with respect to the average income is important for labor
market outcomes because it establishes a link from skilled workers’ productivities to low-skilled
workers’ wages: Changes in skilled workers productivities a￿ect average income and thereby
the level of bene￿ts. This increase in the fallback income improves the bargaining position of
the low-skilled workers. In general this will result in higher wages and￿for lack of respective
productivity gains￿higher unemployment.10
To demonstrate the mechanisms, our baseline model considers a ￿European￿ economy with skilled
and low-skilled labor. Following papers on related issues (see, e.g., Davis (1998) and Krugman
(1995)), we assume that the market for skilled labor clears, while the market for low-skilled
labor does not. This is justi￿ed by the fact that the low-skilled workers are by far more likely
to be unemployed which is evident from Table 1.1.11 In the baseline model the wage for low-
skilled labor is determined by a monopolistic labor union while employment is determined by
competitive ￿rms.12 These assumptions are for simplicity. The focus of this paper is on the
8 The German right-of-distraint legislation considers a television set as indispensable and excludes it from
seizure.
9 Note, that in Germany the explicit link between pensions and bene￿ts has been kept in the new social legislation
(the Hartz IV reform), for the so called Arbeitslosengeld II (￿20 SGB II,(4)).
10 In fact, most bene￿t systems have unemployment insurance elements that depend on the level of past earnings
rather than the general income level of the economy. But for two reasons, we think that unemployment
insurance is not the proper measure for the fallback income of workers:
1. Unemployment insurance bene￿ts are generally limited in duration. After a certain time limit, eligibility
for unemployment insurance expires and unemployed workers receive social bene￿ts. So, in the long run,
it is social bene￿ts that constitute the fallback income.
2. For low-skilled workers, unemployment insurance bene￿ts may easily fall short of the level of social
bene￿ts. In this case, the payment is increased to this level. So, the level of social bene￿ts rather than
the level of unemployment insurance bene￿ts constitutes the lower bound to unskill wages.
11 Wages are generally less ￿exible at the lower end of the distribution. For Germany, for example, B￿ttner and
Fitzenberger (1998) (p. 1) ￿nd that ￿... employees with low wages have signi￿cantly lower wage ￿exibility
than high wage employees. This e￿ect is particularly relevant for the lower educational groups.￿Chapter 1 11
Table 1.1: Unemployment rates by education, Euro-zone, average: 1995 - 2004
Low Educationa Medium Educationb High Educationc
13.42% 9.38% 6.43%
Source: Eurostat; ISCED 1997 classi￿cation a) lower secondary education or less (ISCED
0-2), b) upper secondary education, post-secondary, non-tertiary education (ISCED 3-4), c)
￿rst or second stage tertiary education (ISCED 5-6).
(strikingly large) extent to which the low-skilled workers’ rate of unemployment exceeds that of
the skilled workers. The fact that unemployment also exists among the skilled workers might
indeed be explained by considerations of insider-outsider relations, search frictions, e￿ciency
wages, or the like. These theories might be seen as complementary rather than contradictory to
this paper.
The ￿ndings of the baseline model (and its generalizations) are consistent with the evolution of
wages and employment of low-skilled workers in Europe over the past decades. Wages for all
skill levels have risen over this period and, by and large, the employment prospects of the less
skilled workers have deteriorated.13 There has been increasing consensus among economists that
asymmetric technological progress and possibly increasing trade with low-wage countries have
led to a substantial shift in demand away from low-skilled workers toward skilled workers during
the 1980’s and the 1990’s.14 In the United States (and the UK), it seems, this demand shift has
led to an increase in wage inequality while in (Continental) Europe, where the wage structure
has remained fairly stable, it resulted in a rise in unemployment, in particular among low-skilled
workers (see, e.g., Krugman (1994), Freeman (1995), Siebert (1997), and Davis (1998)).15 This
12 In the discussion paper version of this paper, this assumption is relaxed in three ways. Similar results are
obtained when the wage is determined in negotiations between a labor union and ￿rms, modeled as the
generalized Nash-Bargaining solution. We also consider the case where the wages for both, skilled and low-
skilled workers are determined by unions and unemployment occurs at both skill levels. In addition, a modi￿ed
version where markets on all skill levels are assumed to be competitive is examined. All three modi￿cations
do not a￿ect the results substantially.
13 See, e.g., Siebert (1997), Katz and Autor (1999), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 2.6, or Acemoglu
(2002). For Germany a detailed analysis of the employment and wage development is performed in Fitzenberger
(1999).
14 Levy and Murnane (1992) and Gottschalk (1997) give surveys of the empirical literature on this subject.
15 We are aware that the view that increasing unemployment in Continental Europe and increasing wage inequal-
ity in the U.S. and the UK are two sides of the same coin (namely skill-biased technological change) is not
beyond controversy (see, e.g., Nickell and Bell (1996), Gregg and Manning (1997) and Krueger and Pischke
(1998)). Yet, there seems to have emerged a large consensus among many economists that this view explains
at least parts of the intercontinental di￿erences (see, e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 10 or Borjas
(2005), Chapter 11). Empirical support is given by, e.g., Puhani (2003). Zwick (2006) o￿er an interesting
interpretation of the di￿erences between the U.S. and Germany that is related to training costs.12 Chapter 1
coincidence of rising wage inequality in the United States and rising unemployment (at rather
stable relative wages) in Europe suggests that the kind of feedback mechanism described in the
baseline model has been an important feature of labor markets in Continental Europe but not
in the U.S. and the UK. We show that, on the basis of only one institutional di￿erence, namely
the link between bene￿ts and per-capita income, we can explain this di￿erence in employment
and wage dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the contribution of
collective bargaining to the explanation of the changes in wage dispersion and unemployment.
Section 1.3 deals with the question whether and how tightly di￿erent countries link their bene￿t
payments to the average income for a selection of OECD countries. The model is set up in section
1.4. Comparative static results and the implications of our model with respect to the transatlantic
di￿erences in the social legislation are discussed. Section 1.5 summarizes and concludes.
1.2 Union, wages, and employment
There is a huge literature on unions and their contribution to the assumed wage in￿exibility.
Most of the literature agrees that labor unions compress the wage structure (see Katz and Autor
(1999), see Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003) for a survey on empirical wage e￿ects of unions
in the US, UK and Canada and Kahn (2000) for evidence of 15 OECD countries). The so called
uni￿ed theory (Blank (1997)) on the high unemployment in Europe argues that institutional
rigidities and labor unions as a part of these institutional rigidities play a signi￿cant role for the
wage structure and therefore also for unemployment (see, e.g., Krugman (1994), Siebert (1997),
Katz and Autor (1999), Kahn (2000), Blau and Kahn (2002) and Blanchard (2006)).16 Another
strand of the literature argues that di￿erent developments in the supply of skills are responsible
for the international di￿erences in wage inequality. The basic argument is that the supply of
skills rose faster in Europe than in the U.S. (see Gottschalk and Joyce (1998), Nickell and Layard
(1999) and Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van Ophem (2003)). When suggesting labor unions as an
explanation for wage in￿exibility and high unemployment in Europe, most of the literature seems
to rely implicitly on a sort of textbook monopoly union model (as set out, e.g., in Booth (1995)).
An exception for Germany is Fitzenberger (1999), who models union behavior with wage and
wage dispersion aims explicitly and analyzes the e￿ects on wage dispersion and employment. In
16 Note, however, that the connection between wage (in)￿exibility and unemployment is not uncontested. First,
there are labor market models which posit that labor unions in￿uence could be employment neutral (see,
e.g., Garlo￿ (2007)). Second, the empirical literature is controversial on this topic (see, e.g., Card, Kramarz,
and Lemieux (1999), Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005a), M￿ller (2004) and the controversial literature on
employment e￿ects of minimum wages, see, e.g., Brown (1999) and Neumark and Wascher (2007)).Chapter 1 13
the literature on e￿ects of union wage setting on the wage structure, the degree of centraliza-
tion and coordination of wage negotiations has been considered an important determinant (see
Calmfors and Dri￿ll (1988), Franz (1994), Nickell (1997), Fitzenberger and Franz (1999) and
G￿rtzgen (2003)), implying that according to this union e￿ects on the wage structure across
European countries could be quite di￿erent, since both coordination and centralization degrees
di￿er considerably across European countries (see Calmfors, Booth, Burda, Checchi, Naylor, and
Visser (2001) and Flanagan (2003)).
In addition, the theoretical models we are aware of, generate di￿erences in the level of unemploy-
ment and wage dispersion but are not able to account for the development over time observed
in these variables. Siebert (1997), Saint-Paul (2004) and Blanchard (2006) argue that the insti-
tutions changed over time and that ￿ as a reaction to the oil crises ￿ the system at least in some
European countries has become more generous by the beginning of the 70s.17 Clearly, this trend
was reverted later. In addition, concerning unions we observe a tendency towards deunioniza-
tion in most European countries (see, e.g., Calmfors, Booth, Burda, Checchi, Naylor, and Visser
(2001) and Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)) and thus unemployment should have decreased.18
The tendency towards deunionization seems to be strongest in the U.S. and the UK (see Card,
Lemieux, and Riddell (2003)), which might explain part of the increase of the wage inequality
in these countries (see Machin (1997) for the UK and Card (2001) for the U.S.). But, why did
the wage inequality in those European countries that experienced a decline in unionization rates
not react accordingly? Koeniger, Leonardi, and Nunziata (2004) develop a simple model and use
OECD data to assess whether the observed changes in institutions are able to account for the ob-
served changes in wage inequality across countries. They conclude that the interplay of assumed
exogenous institutions is able to explain the developments in wage inequality in the 11 OECD
countries for 1973-1999 they look at. However, both the data and the assumption that the e￿ect
of institutions is identical over countries are not innocent. Similar in spirit, Nickell, Nunziata,
and Ochel (2005) try to explain changes in unemployment by the changes in institutions. They
conclude, relying on union densities, that unions play only a minor role in the explanation of the
development of the European unemployment. The reason is that there seems to be no persistent
e￿ect of unionization on unemployment.
There is a large empirical literature on the e￿ect of unions on wages and employment for speci￿c
countries. However, there are only few structural models that model union behavior explicitly
and derive low wage dispersion and high unemployment as a solution to this model. One of the
17 The idea is that the policy reaction on the increasing unemployment was to design a more generous system
to help the new unemployed.
18 Recognize, however that this is not a uniform trend over all European countries and that some countries even
experienced increases in unionization rates, as e.g. Spain and the Netherlands (see Visser (2003)).14 Chapter 1
notable exceptions is Fitzenberger (1999). In a structural model for Germany he ￿nds that labor
unions in deed compress the wage structure by decreasing the wage dispersion within groups.
This low wage dispersion involves unemployment, although according to his results unions put
a high weight on employment; but it does not imply increasing unemployment. Other empirical
studies for Germany include B￿ttner and Fitzenberger (1998), B￿ttner and Fitzenberger (2003),
Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006), Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke (2007) and G￿rtzgen (2006).
Using administrative data B￿ttner and Fitzenberger (2003) shows that union wage setting is
responsible for a low wage ￿exibility in the lower part of the wage distribution. Fitzenberger
and Kohn (2006) and Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke (2007) ￿nd that a higher net union
density is associated with lower average wages and lower wage dispersion. They interpret the
lower average wage as stemming from an insurance premium that workers are ready to pay for
a lower (residual) wage risk. Using linked employer-employee data with time-series variation,
G￿rtzgen (2006) concludes that a huge part of the observed compression through unions is a
selection e￿ect. She further concludes that there is a small and statistically signi￿cant premium
for industry-level contracts in Western-Germany. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003) survey
wage e￿ects of unions wage setting in Canada, the U.S. and UK. They conclude that unions
compress male wage inequality.
The uni￿ed theory has been criticized on various grounds. First, a part of the literature has
pointed out, that di￿erences in institutions might explain di￿erent levels of unemployment and
wage dispersion, but that, especially in face of the situation in the 60s, they do not su￿ce to ex-
plain the di￿erent developments. Changing institutions are necessary to explain the development
(see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Hildreth and Oswald (1997), Saint-Paul (2004) and Nickell,
Nunziata, and Ochel (2005)). Institutional changes, however, are endogenous with respect to the
result (see Ebbinghaus and Kittel (2005)). Secondly, a literature argues that a mere supply and
demand framework can explain the changes in wage inequality, accounting for the fact that the
human capital content of years of schooling and school leaving certi￿cates is not the same and
accounting for the fact that the education expansion was faster in Europe than in the U.S. (see
Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van Ophem (2003) and the literature cited above). Thirdly, Freeman
and Schettkat (2000) argue that the low wage dispersion is not the main reason for the low em-
ployment in Germany, they argue that it is a lack of demand for low-skilled jobs that is unrelated
to wages. Fourth, Ebbinghaus and Kittel (2005) argue that the experiences in Europe are too
heterogeneous across countries to allow for an easy opposition of European and Anglo-Saxon
countries. They argue that institutions are reactive to labor market conditions and thus that it
is critical to use them as exogenous determinants of wage ￿exibility in empirical analysis. They
argue that there is no easy deregulatory way out of unemployment but that strategies to ￿ght un-
employment must be country- and context-speci￿c. Finally, Blank (1994) note that it is di￿cult
to judge the e￿ect of one institution or institutional change on labor market outcomes withoutChapter 1 15
observing the complete institutional framework, since each country has his own traditions and
speci￿cities, which in￿uences the e￿ectiveness of political reforms.
Summarizing, concerning the in￿uence of collective bargaining on the increasing European unem-
ployment the fact remains valid that in most European countries there was a tendency towards
deunionization and thus, it is di￿cult to identify labor unions as responsible for low wage dis-
persion and increasing unemployment. We o￿er an interpretation for these phenomena that is
connected with the institution of social bene￿ts in the following sections.
1.3 Transatlantic di￿erences in the social legislation
In this section we analyze the legal situation both in Continental Europe and in the U.S. and the
UK to demonstrate how bene￿ts depend on per-capita income in di￿erent welfare systems. We
￿nd that in the United States and the UK bene￿ts have not been adjusted to average income
in the last 20 years, while in most European countries this adjustment is automatic and by law.
Having observed this, in the next section our model shows that it is precisely this institutional
di￿erence that can account for diverging experiences in the evolution of wage inequality and
unemployment.
We are aware that this binary classi￿cation into European and Anglo-Saxon countries is crude.
There is substantial variation in the social legislation within these groups of countries.19 But,
when it comes to the evolution of bene￿ts over time, the similarities within and the disparities
between these two groups of countries are striking: In most European countries, these bene￿ts
depend on per-capita income by law, while this is not the case in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Let us consider the European countries ￿rst. In some countries, the adjustment of the bene￿ts
level over time is automatic by law, i.e., there is a clear adjustment frequency and there are
clear rules to what the bene￿ts level is to be adapted. In other countries the legislation gives
more scope to the government or the parliament to act and adjustments are discretionary. In
some countries where there exist rules for the adjustment of bene￿ts, the evolution of bene￿t
payments is linked to the evolution of wages and/or income while in others, bene￿ts are linked
to consumer prices. Figure A.1 in the appendix contains a synopsis of the social legislation in a
selection of countries. In most European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, and Portugal), welfare bene￿ts are automatically linked to the evolution of average
19 There have been several attempts in the European Union to harmonize social legislation - without much
success, though. Two of the more successful attempts have led to the European Social Charter of 1989 and
to the social protocol annexed to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 - both not signed by the United Kingdom. If
compared to other policy areas of the European Community, the treaties on social standards remain vague.16 Chapter 1
wages, average income or public pensions (which on their part are linked to the evolution of
average wages or average income) by law. Exceptions are Belgium, France, Greece and Spain.
In Greece a general income support scheme does not exist. We discuss the remaining three
countries in appendix A.1.1 and provide empirical evidence that is in accordance with our main
hypothesis.
In Anglo-Saxon countries, on the other hand, bene￿ts are not linked to average wages or income.
In the UK, ￿income support￿ is tied to the evolution of consumer prices only. 20 In the U.S., the
institutional and legal situation is more complex.21 At the federal level, the Food Stamp Program
is the only program in the overall social safety net that is not restricted to certain eligibility
groups. The maximum amount of food stamps that an entitled person can get is indexed to the
costs of the Thrifty Food Plan, a nutritious low-cost diet (see Gundersen, LeBlanc, and Kuhn
(1999), page 3). In addition, there exist special schemes for special groups: Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) provides cash payments primarily to poor single mothers.
Not eligible are for example poor families with employed principal wage earners (even if they
were ￿nancially eligible). The program has been replaced in 1996 by the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) which is more restrictive in terms of duration and eligibility. The
amounts granted to families have been adjusted only infrequently and very little. Between
1970 and 1993, for example, payments to a family of three have dropped by nearly 45% in
real terms (see Gundersen, LeBlanc, and Kuhn (1999)). The Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) is designed to help aged, blind, and disabled people, who have little or no income. The
level of these payments is indexed to the COLA-Index (￿Cost of Living Adjustments￿).22 Finally,
Medicaid provides medical assistance to poor persons, but eligibility is generally tied to eligibility
for SSI or AFDC.
On the state level, the General Assistance (GA) provides income support to those poor persons
who are not eligible for federal programs. Despite the common name, there is great variation
across states with respect to availability, eligibility, form of bene￿ts (cash vs. vendor pay-
ments/vouchers), duration, and the level of bene￿ts. The program is not very generous. In all
states but Nebraska, the maximum cash bene￿ts are below the federal poverty threshold for 1995
published by the Bureau of the Census ($7,763 for one person).23 Adjustments are rare and very
20 There were no additional discretionary increases between 1979 and 2001 (see Cantillon, van Mechelen, Marx,
and van den Bosch (2004) and Goodman and Shephard (2002).
21 For a concise overview, see Uccello and Gallagher (1997) from where most of the following information is
taken.
22 The adjustment to the cost of living index is automatic and based on the CPI-W, the consumer price index
for urban wage earners and clerical workers. In the period between 1975 and 2005, there is only one change
that is above the COLA (in 1983), a legislated increase which corresponds to changes in the taxation of social
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low. ￿Eight states have enacted nominal bene￿t increases since 1992, but none of these have
exceeded the rate of in￿ation. Thus, real bene￿t levels have remained stagnant or fallen. Six
states have actually reduced nominal bene￿ts.￿ (Uccello and Gallagher (1997), p.5)
In summary, we can conclude, that none of the U.S. income support programs links bene￿ts to
the evolution of average income or wages. In fact, in many cases, amounts are not even adjusted
for in￿ation.
Figure A.1 in the appendix summarizes the institutional setting. It shows that welfare bene￿ts
are linked to average wages or income by law in most of Continental Europe but not in the U.S.
and the UK. In appendix A.1.1, we take a closer look at those European countries, that have
no legal automatic link between bene￿ts and wages or income and provide empirical evidence
that is in accordance with our assumptions. The next section containing the baseline version
of our model demonstrates that this institutional di￿erence in the determination of bene￿ts can
account for diverging experiences in the evolution of employment and inequality.
1.4 The model
1.4.1 The baseline case: Europe
Consider an economy with a continuum of mass 1 of homogeneous ￿rms producing a single
good. The good is produced using two input factors, low-skilled and skilled labor. There is
a continuum of mass 1 of workers of each type. Each worker supplies one unit of labor. For
simplicity, the model is essentially static. There is no capital in the model so that consumption
equals production at any point in time.24
Technology
The ￿rm produces according to the production function
Y = (au ¢ lu)
½ + (as ¢ ls)
½ , 0 < ½ < 1, 0 < au < as, (1.1)
where Y is the quantity of the ￿nal good, lu and ls are the levels of employment of low-skilled
and skilled labor respectively, and ½, au, and as are productivity parameters. This speci￿cation
has the following properties:
23 The average percentage is 39%. Missouri pays the lowest amounts (12%).
24 This allows us to focus on di￿erences in employment and inequality that do not stem from di￿erent capital-
labor ratios, as, e.g., in Beaudry and Green (2003).18 Chapter 1
² The elasticity of substitution between low-skilled and skilled labor is ¾ = 1=(1 ¡ ½) > 1:
We restrict the analysis to substitution elasticities larger than one because only in this case
does skill-biased technological change have adverse e￿ects on the relative position of the
low-skilled workers. Furthermore, the majority of the empirical estimates are between 1
and 2: See, e.g., Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) who argue that a consensus estimate is
a value around 1:5.
² The marginal productivities of low-skilled and skilled workers are independent of each other
and the cross wage elasticities of the factor demands are zero. We make this arguably strong
assumption to guarantee that any relation between the wages for the two kinds of labor
that arises in the model can be attributed solely to the institutional peculiarities.
These restrictions are also for simplicity. In Weiss and Garlo￿ (2005), we consider the case of a
more general CES (constant elasticity of substitution) technology. The results are shown to be
independent of these di￿erent speci￿cations.
Demand for Low-skilled and Skilled Labor
Firms sell their products on the world market at the world market price P = 1 (by choice of the
numØraire). At given wage levels, ￿rms choose the level of employment so as to maximize their
pro￿t
¼ = Y ¡ wu ¢ lu ¡ ws ¢ ls. (1.2)
The demand for low-skilled and skilled labor is respectively
ld
u (wu) =
µ
½ ¢ a
½
u
wu
¶ 1
1¡½
and ld
s (ws) =
µ
½ ¢ a
½
s
ws
¶ 1
1¡½
, (1.3)
where wu and ws are the wages for low-skilled and skilled labor respectively.
Bene￿ts
The model involves unemployment of low-skilled workers. All unemployed individuals are as-
sumed to receive bene￿ts, ~ w. In accordance with the reasoning in the introduction, the bene￿ts
are assumed to depend on the net average income
~ w = ¹ ¢ (1 ¡ t) ¢
Y
2
, (1.4)Chapter 1 19
where Y=2 is the per-capita income, t is the income tax rate, and ¹ 2 [0;1] is a proportion-
ality factor. The bene￿ts are ￿nanced through a proportional income tax. The tax rate t is
endogenously determined by the government’s budget constraint:
(1 ¡ lu) ¢ ~ w = t ¢ Y . (1.5)
The Union’s Objective Function
All low-skilled workers are assumed to be members of a labor union. The union chooses the wage
to maximize the expected labor income of its members.
U = E [net labor incomejwu] = lu (wu) ¢ (1 ¡ t) ¢ wu + [1 ¡ lu (wu)] ¢ ~ w (1.6)
The ￿rst term in expression (1.6) represents the probability for any union member to become
(or remain) employed (conditional on the wage level) times the net wage of employed low-skilled
workers. The second term represents the conditional probability to become unemployed times
the alternative income (i.e., bene￿ts).
Wage Determination
We assume that the market for skilled labor clears. This determines the wage for skilled labor
ws = ½¢as. The wage for low-skilled labor is assumed to be determined by a monopolistic labor
union whereas the ￿rm has the ￿right to manage￿. The union maximizes its objective function
taking into account the e￿ect of the wage level on employment. We assume that, out of idleness
or lack of comprehension of the economic system, the union does not consider the second-round
e￿ects the wage has on the level of bene￿ts and on the tax rate.25 In the formal model, this
means that the objective function (1.6) is maximized subject to (1.3) but taking the level of
bene￿ts ~ w and the tax rate t as exogenously given. Solving the maximization problem yields the
following result which is familiar from the literature.26
Lemma 1.1 Under the above assumptions, the wage for low-skilled labor, wu, is an increasing
function of the level of bene￿ts, ~ w :
wu =
~ w
½ ¢ (1 ¡ t)
: (1.7)
25 This assumption is also for simplicity. In Weiss and Garlo￿ (2005), we consider the case where the union takes
into full account the e￿ects of the wage level on the level of bene￿ts and the tax rate. The results are virtually
una￿ected.
26 See, e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 7, Muthoo (1999), Chapter 2.5, or Borjas (2005), Chapter
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The Interdependence of Wages and Bene￿ts
In contrast to standard union models (and in contrast to what the union takes into account),
in this model, the level of bene￿ts is a function of the net average income which, in turn, is a
function of the wage for low-skilled labor. Accounting for this endogeneity in (1.7) yields27
w¤
u =
1
2
¢
¹
½
¢
"µ
½ ¢ au
w¤
u
¶ ½
1¡½
+ a½
s
#
: (1.8)
The equilibrium wage for low-skilled labor, w¤
u, is implicitly given by this equation.28 It is easily
veri￿ed that under the above assumptions, an equilibrium, w¤
u (au;as;¹;½), exists and is unique.
29
1.4.2 Comparative statics
The comparative static properties of the equilibrium allocation are presented in the following
propositions:
Proposition 1.2 An increase [respectively decrease] in the low-skilled workers’ productivity, as
measured by the productivity parameter au; leads to an increase [respectively decrease] in both,
the equilibrium wage and the level of employment of low-skilled labor.
@w¤
u
@au
¢
au
w¤
u
=
´Y;lu
1 ¡ ½ + ´Y;lu
> 0 (1.9)
@l¤
u
@au
¢
au
l¤
u
=
½ ¡ ´Y;lu
1 ¡ ½ + ´Y;lu
> 0 (1.10)
where ´Y;li = @Y
@lu ¢ lu
Y .
A decrease in the low-skilled workers’ productivity leads￿via a decrease in the average income￿
to a decrease in the low-skilled workers’ wage. But this decrease is less than would be required
by the productivity loss because the wage is linked to the average income level which decreases
27 Equations (1.7) and (1.8) are two di￿erent ways of writing down the same result. In equation ( 1.7) the focus
is on the dependency of the low-skilled workers’ wage on the level of (endogenous) bene￿ts while in equation
(1.8) the low-skilled workers’ wage is shown as a function of the exogenous parameters of the model.
28 Throughout the paper, the term ￿equilibrium￿ will be used to refer to the allocation which results from union
wage setting, given the other institutional features of the model.
29 Existence: For wu su￿ciently small (resp. su￿ciently large), the right hand side of the equilibrium condition
(1.8) is larger (resp. smaller) than the left hand side. As both sides of the equation are continuous in wu
there must exist at least one value of wu; w
¤
u; for which both sides are equal. Uniqueness: The left hand
side of (1.8) is strictly increasing in wu whereas the right hand side is strictly decreasing in wu. Therefore, if
a solution to (1.8), w
¤
u; exists, it must be unique.Chapter 1 21
by less than the low-skilled workers productivity. Therefore unemployment of the low-skilled
increases. This failure of the wage to fully adjust to changes in productivity can be seen as a
rigidity in the relative wage wu=ws.
While the wage for skilled labor always adjusts to clear the market, the wage for low-skilled labor
depends on the productivities of both, low-skilled and skilled workers. In other words, the wage
for low-skilled labor is linked to the wage for skilled labor. The relative wage cannot fully adjust
to changes in the relative productivity. This rigidity leads to an increase in unemployment in
response to a decrease in the productivity for the low-skilled workers. Similar results are obtained
in standard union models where the reservation wage of the workers is exogenous.
Proposition 1.3 An increase [respectively decrease] in the skilled workers’ productivity, as mea-
sured by the productivity parameter as, leads to an increase [respectively decrease] in the wage for
low-skilled labor and a decrease [respectively increase] in the level of employment for low-skilled
workers.
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1 ¡ ½ + ´Y;lu
> 0 (1.11)
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The increased productivity of the skilled workers leads to a rise in the average income. This in
turn increases￿through higher bene￿ts￿the low-skilled workers’ reservation wage and thereby
their wage. Since the productivity of the low-skilled workers remains unchanged, unemployment
increases.
While the result in Proposition 1.2￿that the wage falls too little in response to a fall in the
productivity of the low-skilled￿is also obtained in standard union models, the result in Propo-
sition 1.3￿that the wage increases too much in response to a productivity gain of the skilled
workers￿is unique to this model where the feedback mechanism from income levels to wages is
accounted for. In this model, the driving force behind both e￿ects is the above mentioned rigidity
in the relative wage.
Propositions 1.2 and 1.3 consider cases where only one type of labor becomes more productive.
Depending on whose productivity increases, unemployment increases or decreases. Since in
reality, technological change tends to a￿ect the productivities of di￿erent types of labor at the
same time, the question naturally arises which of the two opposite e￿ects dominates. The
following Proposition answers this question.22 Chapter 1
Proposition 1.4 Technological change leads to a decrease [respectively increase] in employment
of the low-skilled and an increase [decrease] in wage inequality whenever it leads to an increase
[decrease] in as
au.
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Skill-biased technological progress favoring the skilled workers’ productivity in a way that leads
to an increase in as=au has a negative e￿ect on the relative demand for low-skilled labor, ld
u=ld
s.
Since the relative wage for low-skilled labor, wu=ws, cannot fully adjust to this shift in labor
demand, unemployment of low-skilled workers increases.30 On the other hand, if the productivity
of low-skilled workers grows faster [or falls more slowly] than the skilled workers’ productivity,
the wage for low-skilled labor increases [respectively falls], but by less [respectively more] than
would be justi￿ed by the shift in the relative productivity so that the employment of low-skilled
workers increases. Any technological change that leaves the ratio as=au una￿ected has no e￿ect
on the level of employment.
This result is consistent with the view that it is the same factors that boost wage inequality in the
U.S. and the UK and result in higher unemployment in Continental Europe. In a model in which
the welfare system is less generous and wages are to a greater extent market-determined￿the
alleged features of U.S. and UK labor markets￿skill-biased technological change (in the form
of an increase in as=au) leads to a stronger increase in wage inequality while unemployment is
a￿ected less or not all. Appendix A.1.2 provides some descriptive evidence for this result.
Increasing trade with and outsourcing to low-wage countries have been cited as a second culprit
of the rise in wage inequality in the United States.31 In fact, in a two-sector version of this model,
it can be shown that increasing trade with low-wage countries (as modeled by a decrease in the
relative price of the import good￿whose production is assumed to be intensive in the use of low-
skilled labor) has exactly the same e￿ect on wages and employment as skill-biased technological
change (as modeled by an increase in as=au). Increasing trade with low-wage countries also
30 It is easily veri￿ed that
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is unambiguously smaller than ½, the respective
elasticity that prevailed if wages were perfectly ￿exible.
31 See, e.g., Fenstra and Hanson (1996), Wood (1998) and more recently Baldwin and Cain (2000).Chapter 1 23
leads to a (downward) shift in the relative demand for low-skilled labor. As the relative wage for
low-skilled labor does not fully adjust, unemployment of low-skilled labor rises.
1.4.3 Wage and employment dynamics: Anglo-Saxony vs. Continental Europe
In this section, we explore the implications of our model for the di￿erences in wage and em-
ployment dynamics between Anglo-Saxon countries (AS) and Continental European countries
(EU). For ease of presentation, we denote as
au ´ ® and ws
wu ´ ! and normalize the productivity
parameter of low-skilled labor to 1. The technology is thus given by Y = l
½
u + (® ¢ ls)
½. Bene￿ts
are given by
~ w = ¹ ¢
µ
(1 ¡ t) ¢
µ
Y
2
¶¶»
, (1.15)
where » = 1 in Europe and » = 0 in Anglo-Saxon countries. As expounded in Section 1.3,
bene￿ts are tied to the evolution of average income in Europe, but not in the U.S. and the UK.
In both regimes, the wages for low-skilled and skilled labor are given by wu = ~ w
½¢(1¡t) and
ws = ½ ¢ ®½. Taking into account the di￿erences in the determination of bene￿ts the relative
wage for skilled labor is given by
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¹
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in European and Anglo-Saxon countries respectively. The e￿ect of skill-biased technological
change on wage inequality is given by
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It is easily shown that
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AS as long as ½ < 1. The e￿ect of skill-biased
technological change on wage inequality is smaller in European countries, where the linkage of
bene￿ts to the evolution of average income keeps the wage distribution compressed.
The e￿ects of skill-biased technological change on unemployment in European countries have been
discussed in Subsection 1.4.2. In the Anglo-Saxon regime, employment of low-skilled workers is
given by lu (wu) =
³
½
wu
´ 1
1¡½ =
³
½2
¹
´ 1
1¡½. Thus (un-)employment does not depend on the relative
productivity parameter ®. In summary, skill-biased technological change leads to an increase
in unemployment in European countries and has no e￿ect on unemployment in Anglo-Saxon
countries: µ
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We end this section by noting that a di￿erence in bargaining power on the side of labor unions
does not su￿ce to explain the di￿erential unemployment and wage inequality dynamics between
the two sets of countries in the presence of skill-biased technological change. If as in the model
AS, the outside option does not react in response to an increasing demand for high-skilled labor,
unemployment is unchanged irrespectively of the market power of labor unions. An explanation
of the transatlantic di￿erence that is linked to the bargaining power of labor unions requires a
change in the bargaining power. In our model, it is the interaction of an increasing outside option
and (an unchanged) bargaining power of the workers which cause the unemployment to increase.
Of course, we do not negate the importance of the observed deunionization in the U.S. and UK
(see, e.g., Blanch￿ower and Bryson (2004)) and see our paper as complementary to studies that
link the transatlantic di￿erences to a change in bargaining power.
1.4.4 Robustness
In order to assess the robustness of our results we considered a wealth of alternative speci￿cations.
These include:
² generalized Nash-Bargaining instead of monopoly union wage setting,
² risk averse rather than risk neutral workers,
² rational expectations with respect to the e￿ects of wage-setting on the level of bene￿ts and
the tax rate,
² unemployment at the low-skilled and the skilled level,
² CES technology,
² bene￿ts as a function of the average wage rather than average income,
² competitive market for low-skilled labor, and
² a two-sector version of the model where increasing competition from low-wage countries as
another potential source of wage inequality/unemployment is considered.
Our results turn out to be robust to all these di￿erent speci￿cations. For a detailed presentation
of these robustness checks, the reader is referred to the discussion paper version Weiss and Garlo￿
(2005).Chapter 1 25
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the e￿ects of skill-biased technological change on unemployment and
wage inequality when bene￿ts are linked to per-capita income. This link to per-capita income
introduces a tie between the wages for di￿erent skills.
In standard models of union wage setting, wages￿especially at the lower end of the wage
distribution￿depend on the level of unemployment or social security bene￿ts (which consti-
tute the workers’ reservation wage). As a consequence, these wages are downwardly rigid. This
rigidity causes unemployment when productivity falls and wages do not adjust su￿ciently. In
our paper, bene￿ts are endogenous and depend on wages. The interdependence between wages
and bene￿ts yields an allocation where the wage for low-skilled labor depends positively on the
wage for skilled labor. The obtained wage rigidity is a rigidity in the relation between the wages
for low-skilled and skilled labor. The wage for low-skilled labor is too rigid with respect to
the low-skilled workers’ productivity and it is overly sensitive to changes in the skilled workers’
productivity.
If￿as a result of skill-biased technological change￿the productivity of the skilled workers rises
faster than that of the low-skilled workers, the wage of the latter increases by more than would
be justi￿ed by their productivity gains because it is linked to the skilled workers’ wage via the
bene￿ts. As a result, unemployment of low-skilled labor increases. The matter of concern here
is not that the low-skilled workers’ wage falls too little￿as in standard union models￿but that
it rises too much.
The ￿ndings of this paper are consistent with the evolution of wages and employment of low-
skilled workers in Europe over the past decades. Wages for all skill levels have risen over this
period and, by and large, the employment prospects of the less skilled workers have deteriorated.
Comparing the social legislation in the U.S. and many European countries, we ￿nd that bene￿ts
are linked to the evolution of average income or wages in Continental Europe but not in the U.S.
and the UK. Given this institutional di￿erence, our model predicts that skill-biased technological
change leads to rising unemployment in Continental Europe and rising wage dispersion in the
U.S. and the UK.
We can deduce interesting policy implications from the model. Any increase in the relative
productivity (or more generally in the relative ￿market value￿) of skilled workers leads to a
higher rate of unemployment the European model￿even if the absolute productivity of low-
skilled workers increases as well, but less than proportionately. From the point of view of the
model, we can blame two factors for the high unemployment of the low-skilled. First, bene￿ts are
tied to the average income and second, bene￿ts are a determinant of the wage of the low-skilled.26 Chapter 1
So, any policy measure that aims at weakening either of these links will decrease unemployment.
It is to be noted, however, that our model does not alter a principal insight in the literature,
namely the tradeo￿ between wage inequality and unemployment. A decrease in unemployment
would come at the cost of higher wage inequality. There might be possibilities, however, to
overcome this dilemma. One way might be the introduction of a negative income tax. Such a
tax scheme allows the uncoupling of gross from net wages. Gross wages (and thus wage costs for
￿rms) are determined by market forces and re￿ect productivities and at the same time, inequality
in net wages can be kept from growing. These wage subsidies to low-skilled workers would have
to be ￿nanced of course, but as these workers would not earn bene￿ts anymore, the government’s
budget might even be relieved.2 Unemployment and wage dispersion: Equilibrium
search and heterogeneity
2.1 Wage dispersion and unemployment: Alternative views
This chapter reviews the equilibrium search literature, discusses extensions that include hetero-
geneity, introduces labor unions in this framework and thus builds a framework for analyzing
residual wage dispersion. It is based on Garlo￿ (2007).
Since labor unions compress the wage structure, they contribute to the high unemployment,
especially for low-skilled individuals. This hypothesis is common in the economic literature in the
context of the di￿erent experiences in the US and Continental Europe regarding wage dispersion
and unemployment (see e.g. Siebert (1997), Blau and Kahn (2002) and Blanchard (2006)).
Krugman (1994) states: ￿...that growing U.S. inequality and growing European unemployment
are di￿erent sides of the same coin￿ (ibid., p.62). Many observers argue that skill-based technical
progress, reorganization processes or globalization have decreased the demand for low-skilled
work, thereby lowering the market wage. However, in Europe, and particularly in Germany,
strong unions have prevented wages from falling (enough), causing a reaction via the amount of
labor employed and thereby increasing unemployment of the low-skilled.1 One problem with this
explanation is that changes in the employment rates in Europe were quite similar across skill
groups and changes in the employment rates of the low-skilled were quite similar in Europe and
the US (see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)). In this article they argue that the reason for the high
European unemployment is more likely to be found in institutional restrictions on the side of
the product market. Another strand of the literature argues that the di￿erences between the US
and Continental Europe could be interpreted in the context of a choice of di￿erent technologies,
the European being more capital-intensive than the American (see Beaudry and Green (2003)).
For a more comprehensive discussion of the literature, see chapter 1, especially sections 1.1 and
.
Most of the literature that considers unions as a culprit for the high unemployment seems to be
based implicitly on a sort of monopoly union model. In general it is assumed that the pivotal
determinant of wages is marginal productivity. If people di￿er in their marginal productivity,
in equilibrium, they obtain di￿erent wages. The wage distribution is entirely determined by
the distribution of marginal productivities. If unions can in￿uence wages, e.g. in collective wage
1 There are further institutional reasons that can imply wage compression as bene￿t payments and the like (see,
e.g., Weiss and Garlo￿ (2005)). However, the focus in this paper is on minimum wages, which in the German
context is set by labor unions (see, e.g., Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke (2007)).
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bargaining, and if they have a preference for equality, they might compress the wage distribution.
In this chapter, labor unions are supposed to compress wages via a binding minimum wage.2
Then, if the minimum wage is binding, there are individuals with marginal productivity below the
minimum wage. Depending on substitution elasticities at least part of these individuals become
unemployed. This implies that labor unions wage compression causes structural unemployment.
(union compression hypothesis)
The situation is di￿erent under a frictional setting. The reason is that frictions are a source of
monopsony power for employers and that wages are below marginal productivity (see Manning
(2003b)). Clearly, there is potential for redistribution of rents without necessarily altering em-
ployment. Do labor unions purely redistribute rents from the ￿rms to the workers or do they
cause structural unemployment as well? I show that the answer to this question is ambiguous
and that the discussed model variants yield di￿erent results. I obtain mostly zero employment
e￿ects. In one case the minimum wage generates positive employment e￿ects, because the mini-
mum wage does not alter the incentive of the ￿rm to employ individuals but the wages are more
likely to be above the reservation wage.
Building on new information theoretic models and on the ￿change of paradigm in economics￿
(Stiglitz (2002), p.460), the basic hypothesis of this paper is that market frictions are an impor-
tant phenomenon of the labor market and therefore that the neo-classical model is insu￿cient
in describing the labor market. I focus on search frictions as a source of incomplete informa-
tion. Information is symmetric and incomplete and the process of generating information is
time-consuming. A main di￿erence to neo-classical models is that identical workers can earn
di￿erent wages. The source of wage dispersion is then not necessarily the marginal productivity
but search duration and luck in a frictional market. This is an alternative model of endogenous
wage formation and equilibrium unemployment even in the absence of state institutions and
allows an alternative view on the in￿uence of labor unions on wages and employment. (frictional
hypothesis)
If individuals possess all the relevant information, i.e. if they know all potential employers and
know the wage they would obtain, wage-maximizing individuals would always work for the ￿rm
with the highest wage. Thus, ￿rms pay the workers their marginal products. The law of one
price holds. But, it is more realistic to assume that information about jobs and wages has to be
generated in a time-consuming and costly process. Then, workers might earn di￿erent wages in
di￿erent ￿rms. This is the basic idea behind search theories. The information decision of the
individuals depends on the wage o￿er distribution, while the wage setting of the ￿rms depends
2 This assumption can be justi￿ed by the fact that wages cannot fall below negotiated union wages but they
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on the information decision of the individuals. For tractability reasons, basic search theories
assume that individuals are identical in their relevant characteristics. In addition their marginal
productivity is assumed constant. Under some assumptions an endogenous equilibrium wage
distribution for identical employees can be derived. A central result of these theories challenges
the neo-classical framework: rising wage dispersion is associated with rising unemployment. Low
wage dispersion is associated with low unemployment. This contradicts the basic idea of the
union compression hypothesis.3
To put it somewhat stronger: in this framework labor unions have in general no in￿uence on
unemployment. From the point of view of this theory the labor market is characterized by
monopsony power of the ￿rms, so that it might even be desirable from a normative point of view
that unions exist, since their minimum wages do not a￿ect employment but redistribute simply
monopsony rents from the employers to the employees.4 Here, unemployment and wage disper-
sion are simultaneously determined by the amount of search frictions, as long as the minimum
wage of the labor unions does not exceed marginal productivity.5
In what follows, I present di￿erent search models of increasing complexity and examine the
e￿ect of labor unions on wages and employment. Since heterogeneity is an important feature of
labor markets, a focus lies on the integration of heterogeneity in search models. In the following
section, I present some stylized facts, that should be accounted for by the theory. Subsections
2.3.1 and 2.3.2 establish the theoretical basis on which most models are built upon. In subsection
2.3.1, I present basics from partial search theory with exogenous wage dispersion and derive the
reservation wage property. In subsection 2.3.2, I establish the baseline model, a model with an
endogenous wage distribution and homogeneous individuals and ￿rms. In order to introduce
heterogeneity in the model, I look at model extensions that allow heterogeneity on one or the
other side of the market and which serves to check the sensitivity of the results of the baseline
model.
3 This idea is taken as a test between the frameworks presented in Weiss and Garlo￿ (2005).
4 Search frictions are not the only source of monopsony power. For a more extensive treatment of monopsony
power, compare Manning (2003a).
5 In principle this is not so much di￿erent in neo-classical models: employment only reacts if the minimum wage
exceeds marginal productivity. The di￿erence, however, is that a binding minimum wage in the sense that
some individuals are paid below this wage means always that this wage exceeds marginal productivity of a
part of the employees, which implies a reaction of employment.30 Chapter 2
Table 2.1: Heterogeneity in search models
Frictions Endogenous
Wage Dispersion
Heterogeneity of
employees
Heterogeneity of
￿rms
Neo-classical
Model Frame-
work
- X X -
Partial search
theory
X - X X
Burdett and
Mortensen
(1998)
X X - -
Burdett and
Mortensen
(1998) with con-
tinuous search
costs, Van den
Berg and Ridder
(1997)
X X X -
Bontemps,
Robin, and Van
Den Berg (2000),
Acemoglu und
Shimer (2000)
X X - X
Postel-Vinay
and Robin
(2002b), Holzner
and Launov
(2005)
X X X X
2.2 Stylized facts
Wage dispersion is a central attribute of free market economies. It is important to understand
whether di￿erent wages originate indeed in di￿erent productivities of individuals and ￿rms or
whether search frictions cause severe deviations from the law of one price. Human capital theory
concentrates on the human capital equipment of individuals. Instead, wage regressions that
control for a wide variety of demographic and ￿rm variables rarely explain more than 50% of the
variance of the wages (see Van den Berg (1999)). On the other hand search models concentrate
exclusively on the e￿ect of search frictions, which is not su￿cient either. If one tries to explain the
variance of wages, at least the following three factors are necessary: the ￿rst and probably most
important is the productivity of the individuals, the second factor that causes wage dispersion
are di￿erent ￿rm characteristics (see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)). Finally, searchChapter 2 31
frictions must be taken into account, since they explain a considerable amount of the variance
of the wages (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b)).
Empirical wage distributions in a cross section are skewed to the right. A model with an endoge-
nous wage distribution should be able to reproduce this. The theory of marginal productivity pay
allows for wage distributions that are skewed to the right, provided that marginal productivities
are skewed to the right. The baseline search model instead, implies a density that is increasing
on the entire support (see below). But, a mixture of such wage distributions of homogeneous
segments can replicate a wage distribution that is skewed to the right (see below). In addition,
it is demonstrated in section 2.4.2, that models which allow di￿erent productivities across ￿rms
are also capable to produce such wage distributions.
A further well documented fact is that large ￿rms pay on average higher wages controlling for
human capital (see e.g. Katz, Summers, Hall, Schultze, and Topel (2005), Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001), p.70f. ). From the point of view of the
neo-classical framework, wage di￿erentials between ￿rms should re￿ect productivity di￿erentials;
but these di￿erences themselves are not easily explained in this framework. Firms with low pro-
ductivity should be driven out of the market, at least in the long run. Search theory assumes
another perspective. First, wage di￿erentials do not re￿ect necessarily productivity di￿eren-
tials, but might originate from a trade-o￿ between the number of employees and the pro￿t per
employee. Second, search frictions imply a certain degree of monopsony power for ￿rms which
means that less productive ￿rms are not necessarily driven out of the market. Models that are
based on search frictions imply indeed that big ￿rms pay higher wages and therefore account for
this stylized fact.
Hazard rate models are concerned with the determinants of the duration in certain labor market
states. A huge part of this literature cares about the individual determinants of the duration in
unemployment. Important variables are beyond others the level and the length of unemployment
bene￿ts. Yet, the static theory of marginal productivity pay gives little advice, which variables
matter, whereas dynamic search theory explicitly models hazard rates depending on covariates.
This is one of the most important ￿elds of application of search theory (see Devine and Kiefer
(1991), Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007) for surveys). Stylized facts are that the level of unem-
ployment bene￿ts is less important than the duration of entitlement (see Cahuc and Zylberberg
(2001), p.74f.) and that job o￿ers are rarely rejected by unemployed individuals (ibid., p.77 and
Van den Berg (1999), p.F290). I will show that search models partly accommodate this facts.
Elderly individuals earn in general more than younger individuals (Topel (1991)) and wage
dispersion is higher (Neal and Rosen (2000)). Further it can be observed that senior individuals
change jobs less often than their younger counterparts (Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005a)). These
facts can partly be explained by both theories. Theories that are based on marginal productivity32 Chapter 2
pay postulate that employees accumulate human capital on the job (experience), which they are
paid for (Becker (1973)). In addition they often accumulate human capital that is only useful in
the ￿rm where they work (speci￿c human capital). Then, if on average people have more speci￿c
capital if they are older, they will change jobs less often. If wage dispersion rises with age, this
might be the case since individuals have di￿erent learning e￿ciencies in acquiring human capital.
Search theories explain the same facts by using a di￿erent argumentation. If employees obtain
job o￿ers from competing employers, then individuals that are older have obtained on average
more job o￿ers and have changed jobs more often than the younger ones. Thus, they gain more
and change jobs less often since job o￿ers from competing employers rarely exceed their wage.
However, wage dispersion for elderly individuals should then be lower.
Finally, the search framework o￿ers a common theory of labor market transitions and wage
dispersion. Equilibrium wage dispersion and equilibrium unemployment depend on the transition
rates. We construct such connections in Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005b) in the neo-classical
framework as well. However, there, causality is reversed and we argue that wage dispersion a￿ects
the transition rates. In the empirical application we show that neither direction is convincingly
found in the data.
2.3 Frictional labor markets
2.3.1 Exogenous wage dispersion: basic results
First, I present the partial search model, where the behavior of the ￿rms is not modeled. Starting
point from search theory is that working places are in some relevant way heterogeneous. From
the point of view of the job searching individuals there is an information problem which can
be decomposed in two subproblems: the search problem and the choice problem. The search
problem consists in choosing means how to search for jobs and how information about jobs is
generated. Since search is time-consuming and costly, it is impossible to collect all information
and the agents have to compare the costs of acquiring information with the expected bene￿ts.
The choice problem consists in choosing criteria under which the job is chosen under a given
information situation.
The search problem is modeled, hereafter, by an exogenous hazard rate at which individuals
receive job o￿ers. The complex choice problem is reduced to one dimension. Job seekers maximize
the present value of their lifetime income: the wage is the only relevant characteristic of the
job. The optimization problem of the job seeker to get as high as possible a wage, without
searching too long will be solved explicitly. Under the Poisson assumption search is sequential
and optimality is guaranteed by a critical wage level, where wage o￿ers above are accepted andChapter 2 33
wage o￿ers below are rejected. The critical wage is called reservation wage. The expected search
duration that depends obviously on the reservation wage determines the expected wage level.
Wages that di￿er across individuals can be explained by the luck of a high wage o￿er and by
di￿erent reservation wages.
The following illustration is inspired by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001) (chapter 1.2) and Franz
(2006) (chapter 6.2).
Assumptions
The assumptions under which the reservation wage property and the reservation wage can be
deduced are concluded in what follows.
² (A0) Environment: The model is dynamic, time will be treated as continuous and the
environment is stationary.
² (A1) Employees: Individuals exclusively either work or search, which precludes both on-
the-job search and the existence of inactive individuals. There is no choice in the number
of hours worked or searched. Individuals are risk-neutral, have rational expectations and
maximize expected present value of their life time income over an in￿nite time horizon.
Job seekers obtain z = b¡a per time unit, where b are unemployment bene￿ts and a search
costs. Employees obtain a wage w per time unit. The value of unemployment is called
WU (the expected income), while WL(w) is the value of employment at the wage w.6 The
wage o￿er distribution H(w) is constant over time and is known to job seekers, while the
o￿ered wage of a speci￿c ￿rm is generally not known.7
² (A4) Search: Search is sequential, which means that if an individual has received an o￿er,
he decides whether to accept or not and then in the case of rejection, i.e. if the wage o￿er
is below the reservation wage wR, continues search.8 This is an optimal stopping problem,
since job o￿ers that have been rejected once cannot be accepted later on. The future is
discounted at interest rate r.
6 WL(w) and WU are called value equations, which stem from the theory of dynamic programming. Often
these equations are also termed Bellmann-equations. Its principal idea is that the optimization problem of an
individual over an in￿nite time horizon can be described in formulating the optimal decision in one speci￿c
point of time, given the individual acts optimal in all other time periods. In the case of a job seeker it is the
decision to accept or reject a job o￿er at a certain point in time, depending on which choice optimizes the
expected life time income. (see also Dixit (1990), chapter 11)
7 The wage o￿er distribution is the distribution of wages when randomly drawing a ￿rm, whereas the wage
distribution is the distribution of wages when randomly drawing a worker.
8 I assume sequential search, since it has been shown that sequential search is superior to ￿xed sample search
(see McCall (1965)).34 Chapter 2
² (A6) Transition rates: At an exogenous, constant rate ¸ an individual samples independent
wage o￿ers from H(w). Individuals leave unemployment at a rate that is the product of the
job o￿er rate and their acceptance probability. Employees loose their job at the exogenous,
constant rate ± (the job destruction rate). The number of sampled job o￿ers and the
number of terminated jobs are poisson-distributed.
The basic model
The value of employment WL(w) at wage w can be derived as follows. In a small time interval9 dt
a worker obtains the wage wdt. With probability ±dt the worker looses its job in this time interval.
If losing the job the worker is left with value WU. With the complementary probability (1¡±dt)
the worker remains employed. Under stationarity the value of employment is constant over time
and therefore the worker is left with WL(w). In case of linear discounting, the Bellmann-equation
is:
WL(w) =
1
1 + rdt
fwdt + ±dtWU + (1 ¡ ±dt)WL(w)g
rWL(w) = w + ±(WU ¡ WL(w)). (2.1)
The second line can be found multiplying by (1 + rdt), subtracting WL(w) and dividing by
dt. The return to the value WL(w) in capital market must equal the return to employment
w+±(WU ¡WL(w) and, therefore, can be interpreted as no-arbitrage condition.10 Per de￿nition
the reservation wage is the critical wage above which a job o￿er is accepted. Therefore, the value
of employment at the reservation wage must equal the value of unemployment. Rewriting 2.1 as
WL(w)¡WU = w¡rWU
r+± , taking into account that
@WL(w)
@w = 1
r+± > 0 and that WU is independent
from the wage previously paid, then wR is a unique solution to WL(wR) = WU and is given from
wR = rWU as the reservation wage.11
The value of unemployment can be calculated as follows. Job seekers obtain z = b ¡ a per time
unit. At poisson rate ¸ job seekers obtain job o￿ers w as independent draws from H(w). If an
individual gets a job o￿er, the expected value is given by W¸ which consists in two components.
The ￿rst component is the share of job o￿ers that the job seeker rejects since the wage is below
9 The small time interval must be chosen such that the poisson probability that two events occur in that time
interval is zero.
10 The investment of the value WL(w) in the labor market should yield no expected gain or loss as compared to
its investment in the capital market. In the strict sense arbitrage means risk-free pro￿ts. Therefore, the inter-
pretation as no-arbitrage condition is only correct because of the assumption of risk-neutrality. Employment
is risky (±) and therefore if people were risk-averse they should be paid for that risk.
11 Of course, the value of unemployment depends on the expected wage of a future job.Chapter 2 35
Figure 2.1: Calculation of the reservation wage
the reservation wage H(wR) multiplied by the corresponding value of rejection WU. The second
part is the complementary probability, multiplied by the average value of an accepted job o￿er:
W¸ = H(wR)WU + (1 ¡ H(wR))Ew[WL(w)jw > wR] =
Z wR
0
WUdH(w) +
Z 1
wR
WL(w)dH(w).
(2.2)
With probability (1¡¸dt) the job seeker does not obtain a job o￿er in dt. The value in this case
remains WU = W¹ ¸ =
R 1
0 WUdH(w) because of stationarity. The probability that an individual
obtains more than one job o￿ers in dt is zero, because of the Poisson assumption. Using this:
WU =
1
1 + rdt
(zdt + ¸dtW¸ + (1 ¡ ¸dt)WU)
rWU = z + ¸
Z 1
wR
(WL(w) ¡ WU)dH(w). (2.3)
The second line follows solving the equation for rWU and resuming the remainder under an
integral. In analogy to equation (2.1) this equation too, can be interpreted as no-arbitrage
condition.36 Chapter 2
Recognizing that WL(w) ¡ WU = w¡rWU
r+± and wR = rWU the reservation wage is implicitly
de￿ned as:
wR = rWU = z+
¸
r + ±
Z 1
wR
(w¡wR)dH(w) = z+
¸
r + ±
[(1¡H(wR))(E(wjw > wR)¡wR)]. (2.4)
Subtracting z on both sides of the equation, the left hand side is the instantaneous cost of
rejecting a wage o￿er wR. At the reservation wage the cost of waiting must equal the expected
gains from waiting. It is given by the probability that a job seeker obtains a wage o￿er that is
acceptable ¸(1 ¡ H(wR)), multiplied with the discounted conditional expectation of the wage
given it exceeds the reservation wage (see Devine and Kiefer (1991), p.16/23).
Optimal behavior of the individuals is completely described by equation (2.4). A job seeker with
net income z, who is confronted with a job o￿er rate ¸, with a job destruction rate ±, with an
interest rate r and a wage o￿er distribution H(w) will accept any job o￿er that exceeds wR and
reject otherwise.
On-the-job search
Hereafter, I will present a ￿rst extension of this basic model, which integrates on the job search in
the partial model. For further extensions as e.g. the decision of an individual to work or not or as
the in￿uence of bene￿t claims, the reader is referred to Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001). However, I
present this extension in detail since it is empirically important (see e.g. Franz (2006)) and since
I need the results in later parts of this paper. I assume that job seekers do not have search costs
(aL = 0) and that they are confronted with an exogenous job o￿er rate ¸L.12 The assumptions
(A0), (A1’), (A4) and (A6) are assumed to hold where:
² (A1’): as (A1), but: Employees search on the job, receive independent job o￿ers at constant
exogenous rate ¸L from the wage o￿er distribution H(w) and do not have search cost.
One term must be added to the return to employment equation (2.1), which re￿ects the expected
gain from a job change. An employee accepts all job o￿ers that exceed its own wage ¹ w (Mortensen
and Neumann (1988)). It follows:
rWL( ¹ w) = ¹ w + ±(WU ¡ WL( ¹ w)) + ¸L
Z 1
¹ w
(WL(w) ¡ WL( ¹ w))dH(w). (2.5)
12 The subscript L always confers to the employed individuals.Chapter 2 37
The return to unemployment is still given by equation (2.3). Evaluating equation (2.5) at wR,
equalizing rWL(wR) with (2.3) and solving for wR yields:
wR = z + (¸ ¡ ¸L)
Z 1
wR
(WL(w) ¡ WU)dH(w). (2.6)
Equation (2.6) can be rewritten in terms of the parameters of the model (see appendix B.1):
wR = z + (¸ ¡ ¸L)
Z wo
wR
1 ¡ H(w)
r + ± + ¸L(1 ¡ H(w))
dw. (2.7)
Intuitively, the possibility to search on the job lowers the reservation wage, since this opens the
possibility to accept a low paid job and to search further on the job. If the chance to get a good
job is independent on the job seekers status (¸L = ¸) unemployed job seekers will accept every
job o￿er that exceeds net unemployment bene￿ts z. With the characterization of the reservation
wage for unemployed job seekers and the critical wage for employed job seekers, optimality in
the behavior of the individuals is guaranteed. Unemployed job seekers accept every wage o￿er
that exceeds wR and continue searching otherwise, while employed job seekers accept every job
o￿er that exceeds their current wage and continue working in their current job otherwise.
The reservation wage increases with unemployment bene￿ts b with the probability to obtain a job
o￿er when unemployed ¸, decreases with search cost a, the probability to obtain a job o￿er when
employed ¸L, the interest rate r and with the job destruction rate ±. Given the impact of the
parameters on the reservation wage, the impact of the parameters on the average unemployment
duration can be calculated, which increases itself with the reservation wage.
In the following subsection, I present a model of endogenous wage dispersion for (ex-ante) ho-
mogeneous individuals and ￿rms.
2.3.2 Endogenous wage dispersion - the baseline model
A necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium wage dispersion is a positive connection
between wage level and output. There are two arguments of why there could be such a positive
connection. First, heterogeneities could explain such a positive connection if either high wages
attract more productive individuals or if more productive ￿rms pay higher wages. Second, it is
possible that there is equilibrium wage dispersion across c.p. homogeneous workers and ￿rms.
If ￿rms have monopsony power, ￿rms make positive pro￿ts per employee. If ￿rms can attract
additional workers by setting high wages, there exists a trade-o￿ between pro￿ts per worker and
the number of workers in a ￿rm. This means that there is indeed a positive connection between
wages and production. The model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is based on this idea.38 Chapter 2
The depiction is based on Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001) (p.66￿.) and on Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1999) (p.2612￿.). On-the-job search is central for the existence of equilibrium wage
dispersion, since this implies that part of the job seekers, namely the employed, can compare
wages, a necessary condition for equilibrium wage dispersion (see Burdett and Judd (1983)).
They compare their own wage with the wage of an arriving job o￿er. Then, high wage ￿rms
attract many new workers from competing ￿rms, while loosing only little. As a result they have
a high employment, making low pro￿ts per employee. On the contrary low wage ￿rms have a
low employment level, thereby making high pro￿ts per worker.
The assumptions of the model are given by (A0), (A1￿), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5) and (A6), where:
² (A1￿), as (A1’), but all N individuals produce an identical amount y of the consumption
good per time unit, which can be interpreted as labor productivity, where y > wR holds
and z is identical across all unemployed individuals.
² (A2) ￿rms: An in￿nite amount of risk-neutral, c.p. identical ￿rms on an interval [0;1]
maximizes pro￿ts. There is nor market entrance or exit.
² (A3) wage formation: Firms determine wages ex ante from their pro￿t maximization cal-
culus.13 This wage is payed forever, provided that the match does not end.
² (A5) economy: Small open economy with two goods and an exogenous interest rate r. The
consumption good C is produced without capital (or with identical capital endowment in
￿rms without depreciation) and marginal productivity of labor is constant. The price of
the consumption good is the numØraire, while w is the price of labor.
Starting with the reservation wage for the unemployed, it is given by equation (5.1), where I
assume for simplicity that r = 0. Employed job seekers accept every wage o￿er that exceeds
their current wage. Equilibrium unemployment follows from stationarity and from equating in-
and out￿ows to and from the pool of unemployed. In a small time interval dt ¸dt(1¡H(wR))U
unemployed individuals ￿nd a job, while ±dt(N ¡ U) employees loose their job. Dividing by dt
and building the limit for dt ! 0, I obtain _ U = ±(N ¡ U) ¡ ¸(1 ¡ H(wR))U. Since ￿rms that
o￿er wages below the reservation wage make zero pro￿ts and since, as I will show, in equilibrium
all ￿rms make positive pro￿ts H(wR) = 0 holds. Therefore equilibrium unemployment is
U =
±N
± + ¸(1 ¡ H(wR))
=
±N
± + ¸
. (2.8)
13 Since ￿rms determine wages ex-ante, it is possible that there is a meeting between agents where cooperation
is pro￿table but where the match is not formed. Such a situation is called non-transferable utility.Chapter 2 39
Let g(w) denote the density of the distribution of paid wages. The equilibrium employment
of one ￿rm that o￿ers wage w is given by l(w) = (N ¡ U)g(w)=h(w). Then, L(w) = (N ¡
U)G(w) =
R w
0 l(³)dH(³) is the amount of employees, that is employed at a wage below w
and G(w) is the distribution of paid wages. Now, concentrating on employment changes in
￿rms in an interval dt that o￿er (and pay) wages above w, they have in￿ows from the pool of
unemployed and from ￿rms that pay wages below w, while they loose employees only through
exogenous job destruction. Employees that make a job-to-job transition remain in this wage
class. Unemployed job seekers obtain a wage o￿er with probability ¸dt which exceeds with
probability (1 ¡ H(w)) the wage w. Individuals that are employed at a wage below w obtain
with probability ¸Ldt a wage o￿er that exceeds w with probability (1 ¡ H(w)). From this,
total in￿ows are ¸dtU(1 ¡ H(w)) + ¸LdtL(w)(1 ¡ H(w)) = dt(¸U + ¸LL(w))(1 ¡ H(w)). With
probability ±dt exogenous shocks destroy existing jobs. The amount of jobs in ￿rms that pay
wages above w is given by N ¡ U ¡ L(w). In equilibrium, employment in ￿rms that pay wages
above w is constant because of the stationarity assumption.
Using stationarity and solving for G(w) =
L(w)
N¡U yields:
G(w) =
¸U
(N ¡ U)
H(w)
(¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + ±)
=
±H(w)
(¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + ±)
. (2.9)
The second equality follows from using equation (2.8). It shows the connection between the
distribution of wage o￿ers H(w) across ￿rms and the distribution of paid wages in a cross
section of workers G(w). 14 Since L0(w) = l(w)h(w), equilibrium employment in ￿rms that pay
wage w, is given by:
l(w) =
¸U(¸L + ±)
(¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + ±)2 =
¸±N(¸L + ±)
(¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + ±)2(± + ¸)
= ±(N ¡ U)
(¸L + ±)
(¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + ±)2.
(2.10)
Because of higher in￿ows and smaller out￿ows, employment grows with the wage: l0(w) > 0.
Thus, there is a positive connection between the wage level and the output level of ￿rms. In
equilibrium, every ￿rm pays a wage from the support of the equilibrium wage o￿er distribution
and makes expected pro￿ts of ¦(w) = (y ¡ w)l(w) =
¸±N(y¡wR)
(±+¸L)(±+¸) (see appendix B.2), which
are strictly positive. The wage o￿er density h(w) is de￿ned on the support [wR;wo], where
wo = y ¡ (y ¡ wR)
³
±
±+¸L
´2
(see appendix B.2).
Taking into account that ¦(w) = ¦(w0) = (y ¡ w)l(w) 8(w;w0) 2 [wR;wo]15 and equating
the pro￿t at the reservation wage with an arbitrary wage from the support of the wage o￿er
14 These are di￿erent, since workers climb the job (wage) ladder through job-to-job transitions in the course of
their career.40 Chapter 2
distribution, one obtains (y ¡ w)
¸U(¸L+±)
(¸L(1¡H(w))+±)2 = (y ¡ wR)
¸U(¸L+±)
(¸L+±)2 . Solving for H(w) yields
the equilibrium wage o￿er distribution.
H(w) =
8
> > <
> > :
0 f￿r w < wR
¸L+±
¸L
³
1 ¡
q
y¡w
y¡wR
´
f￿r wR · w < wo
1 f￿r w ¸ wo
9
> > =
> > ;
(2.11)
The distribution H does not contain mass points, i.e.16 PrfW = wg = 0 for all w 2 fwR;wog
(see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), p.2615f).
To show that this wage distribution is indeed the unique equilibrium distribution of wage o￿ers,
it remains to show that wages outside the support of H(w) imply strictly lower pro￿ts for the
￿rms (see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), p.2615). It has been shown above, that the pro￿t
of ￿rms in equilibrium is strictly positive. This con￿rms that wages below wR cannot be an
equilibrium (zero pro￿t). If on the other side a ￿rm o￿ering wo chooses to pay a wage wo +", it
cannot attract more workers, but pro￿ts are decreasing. This can be seen from equation (2.10)
and using that H(wo) = 1. wR is the lower limit of the support, since otherwise a ￿rm o￿ering
the lowest paid wage w could increase pro￿ts in lowering their paid wage to w ¡ ", which would
increase pro￿t per worker but would not alter the employment of the ￿rm. With an induction
argument, one shows easily that the density of the wage o￿er distribution is strictly positive on
the support: h(w) > 0 , 8w 2 [wR;wo] (see Ridder and Van den Berg (1997), p.101).17
The corresponding density can be calculated as h(w) = H0(w) = ¸L+±
2¸L
q
1
(y¡wR)(y¡w) and is
increasing in w. Plugging H(w) in equation (5.1) yields an expression for the reservation wage
for this wage distribution: wR =
(±+¸L)2z+(¸¡¸L)¸Ly
(±+¸L)2+(¸¡¸L)¸L . The reservation wage is a weighted mean
15 This is the case, since otherwise the result cannot be an equilibrium. If pro￿ts were di￿erent for di￿erent
wages, then low-pro￿t ￿rms would have an incentive to change their paid wage, since by assumption all ￿rms
are identical.
16 In this equation W does not stand for a value equation, but is a random variable, while w is a realization of
this random variable. The fact that the distribution does not contain mass points can be justi￿ed by the fact
that no wage from the wage distribution is paid with positive probability. This is the case since if a wage is
paid with a positive probability, then ￿rms that pay that wage w have an incentive to pay a wage w + " for
" ! 0. This would increase their labor costs only marginally while employment l(w + ") would be discretely
higher (see Varian (1980), p.653/658f., Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.314 and Acemoglu and
Shimer (2000), p.590).
17 If several ￿rms have paid the lowest wage before the departure from one ￿rm from the lowest price, the
deviating ￿rm has employment losses. However, this is an unlikely event in the sense that the probability that
several ￿rms pay the same wage is zero (see the above discussion of mass points) and therefore the expected
loss of employees is zero. Second there would be an incentive for all other ￿rms too to deviate from the original
wage. With the induction argument that after the price decrease to wR of the ￿rst ￿rm it would be worthwhile
for the ￿rm with the second lowest price to lower its price to a price just above the reservation wage, one
can justify that the reservation wage is indeed the lower limit of the support and that the support must be
connected, i.e. h(w) > 0, 8w 2 [wR;w
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of the net unemployment bene￿ts z and the labor productivity y (see Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999), p.2614).18 If individuals cannot change jobs (¸L = 0) the reservation wage equals z and
wo = wR and one obtains the Diamond (1971) solution. If on the other hand the job o￿er rate
on the job becomes big (¸L ! 1), then the frictions vanish and the wage o￿er distribution
collapses to a mass point at y. The same is true if there is no job destruction ± = 0 or no search
friction for the unemployed ¸ ! 1 (that is no unemployment).19 For all intermediary cases
(0 < ¸L < 1, U > 0) the wage o￿er distribution has a positive variance. The monopsony power
of the ￿rms depends of the degree of the friction. The higher the friction, i.e. the lower ¸L and
the higher ±, the higher is the monopsony power of the ￿rms and the lower is the average wage.
The wage dispersion also depends on these parameters and under some parameter restrictions is
increasing in the degree of friction (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1993)).
Discussion
The ￿rst remarkable point of this model is, that it generates an equilibrium wage dispersion
across identical individuals. Further it gives a justi￿cation of the empirical fact that big ￿rms
pay higher wages than small ￿rms and that senior workers gain on average more than their junior
counterparts. Problematic is however that the density of the distribution of paid wages G0(w) =
±(¸L+±)h(w)
[±+¸L(1¡H(w))]2 increases in w, which is di￿cult to reconcile with observed wage distributions.
In addition empirical studies point to the fact that this explanation of wage dispersion, i.e.
monopsony power of ￿rms through frictions in connection with on the job search is able to
explain only a small part of the variance of an empirical wage distribution (see Van den Berg
and Ridder (1998), p.1212 and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.348f.).
Voluntary unemployment does not exist in this model. This result follows from the homogeneity
assumption: each individual is a good allocation for each vacancy and vice versa. This result
holds as long as wages are below marginal productivity, a typical result in search equilibrium
models. This implies that a binding minimum wage does not a￿ect unemployment as long as the
marginal productivity exceeds the minimum wage.20 Employers respond on an increase or the
18 If the discount rate r is positive, the reservation wage formula can be generalized to wR =
(±+¸L)2z+±(¸+¸L)y¿
(±+¸L)2+±(¸+¸L)¿ ,
where ¿ =
¸L
± ¡ 2
r
± + 2
r(±+r)
¸L± ln
³
1 +
¸L
±+r
´
(see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.314).
19 That is also intuitive, since, in the case of no unemployment, the ￿rm with the lowest wage looses its workers
at rate ¸L while it does not gain any new workers, which implies zero employment in the long run. This
argument can be traced up to marginal productivity as equilibrium wage.
20 Obviously, the same is true in the neo-classical model of the labor market. But if a minimum wage is binding,
there are always people whose marginal productivity is below this minimum wage, since everybody is paid its
marginal productivity. So, the central point is that, under the search-theoretic perspective, people are not
paid their marginal productivity, and therefore a binding minimum wage does not necessarily mean higher
unemployment.42 Chapter 2
introduction of a binding minimum wage by raising their wage o￿ers. This reduces the pro￿t of
the ￿rms, but not labor demand since the pro￿t is positive for each individual employed.
There is empirical evidence that indeed the unemployed accept every job o￿er, which is a central
result of the model above. Many studies estimate an acceptance probability of almost one:
￿Il appara￿t que la premiŁre o￿re d’emploi re￿ue est pratiquement toujours acceptØe￿(Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2001), p.77; see also Van den Berg (1999), p.F290). But this means that the
mechanism that explains voluntary unemployment in the partial search model is not central for
understanding unemployment. From this point of view unemployment is involuntary.
An increase in the binding minimum wage alters the complete wage distribution. It is likely that
the expectation increases and that the variance decreases. Unemployment does not change. A
similar e￿ect is obtained for an increase in unemployment bene￿ts in the absence of a minimum
wage. It does in general a￿ect neither unemployment duration nor the unemployment stock.
An increase leads to an increase of the reservation wage of the unemployed, which ￿rms counter
with higher wage o￿ers. The unemployed accept any wage o￿er they obtain. This are interesting
results, compared to the neo-classical framework: an increasing (labor union) minimum wage or
increasing unemployment bene￿ts compress the wage structure but are employment neutral.
A reverse connection can be constructed from this model: a wage distribution with a big variance
is associated with high unemployment. Both phenomena have the same causes, namely a high
degree of labor market frictions (low job o￿er rates, high job destruction rates).
Clearly, a major drawback of this model is the homogeneity assumption. Note however that
Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) (p.1) conclude from an empirical implementation of the
homogeneous search model in a cross country comparison that the ￿(...) model ￿ts the data
surprisingly well￿.
2.4 Heterogeneity
In reaction on the drawback of the homogeneity assumption, several models have been developed
that introduce heterogeneity on either side of the market in the basic equilibrium search model.
For individuals heterogeneity can take the form of di￿erent reservation wages caused by di￿er-
ences in search costs or di￿erent productivities. For ￿rms the e￿ect of di￿erent productivities
has been examined.Chapter 2 43
2.4.1 Di￿erent search costs
In this subsection I present a model extension that allows for di￿erent search costs across unem-
ployed job seekers (see Burdett and Mortensen (1998)). If unemployed job seekers have di￿erent
search costs a, then z varies conditional on b.
First, notice that compared to the basic model di￿erent search costs have no e￿ect on labor
demand. Because of identical productivity every (or no) match is pro￿table. But there is an
e￿ect on o￿ered and paid wages and therefore an e￿ect on the behavior of the job seekers.
Intuitively this is the case, since for ￿rms in this case it might be pro￿table to o￿er wages below
the reservation wage of a part of the unemployed. Provided that the o￿ered wage is still above
the reservation wage of some individuals, a ￿rm has still positive in￿ows and therefore a positive
number of employees. Then, for unemployed not every contact with a ￿rm means at the same
time a pro￿table match. This is true, although the match is potentially pro￿table.
The resulting wage distribution combines the e￿ect of the informational imperfection with the
e￿ect of the heterogeneity in search costs. On the one hand, the wage distribution compensates
the job seekers for its di￿erent search costs. On the other hand ￿rms di￿er in size and they have
to pay di￿erent wages to ensure their size.
The model
Assumptions (A0), (A1￿’), (A2’), (A3), (A4), (A5) and (A6) hold, where:
² (A1￿’), as (A1￿), but N individuals di￿er in their search costs. Their net search costs
z follow a continuous distribution on [z; ¹ z], where R(z) is the share of individuals whose
search costs are below z. r(z) is the corresponding density. In addition ¸L = ¸ holds.
² (A2’), as (A2), but ￿rms know the distribution R(z), but cannot observe z individually.
Di￿erent reservation wage policies across individuals are a consequence of the assumption of
di￿erent net search costs. Note that (A1￿’) implies that wR = z. Then, equating in-and out￿ows
to and from unemployment yields the equilibrium unemployment rate for any z-type. It is given
by Uz =
±Nr(z)
±+¸[1¡H(z)].
The optimal behavior of the ￿rm can be deduced as follows. The amount of unemployed that
accepts a wage o￿er w is given by:
S(w) =
Z w
z
µ
±Nr(z)
± + ¸[1 ¡ H(z)]
¶
dz =
Z w
z
µ
±N
± + ¸[1 ¡ H(z)]
¶
dR(z): (2.12)44 Chapter 2
Let G(w) be the distribution of paid wages, then L(w) = (N ¡ S(¹ z))G(w) is the amount of
employees that are employed at a wage below w.21 In equilibrium, employment must remain
constant in ￿rms that pay wages below w. In￿ows to this group of ￿rms stem only from unemploy-
ment. dS(z) unemployed z-individuals obtain an acceptable job o￿er below w with probability
H(w) ¡ H(z). Thus, expected in￿ows are ¸
R w
z (H(w) ¡ H(x))dS(x). Out￿ows are composed of
job destruction ± and of o￿ers from better paying competitors ¸(1¡H(w)) to employees in this
wage group (N ¡ S(¹ z))G(w). Taken together:
(± + ¸[1 ¡ H(w)])(N ¡ S(¹ z))G(w) = ¸
Z w
z
(H(w) ¡ H(x))dS(x):
Solving for L(w) and di￿erentiating with respect to w, after some simpli￿cations22 the equilibrium
employment in a ￿rm, o￿ering the wage w is given by:
l(w) =
(N ¡ S(¹ z))G0(w)
h(w)
=
¸±NR(w)
(± + ¸[1 ¡ H(w)])2.
The wage o￿er distribution can be derived from the equality of pro￿ts ¦ = (y ¡ w)l(w) on the
support of H(w) in equilibrium. Let w be the lower bound of the support, then (y¡w)
¸±NR(w)
(±+¸)2 =
(y ¡ w)
¸±NR(w)
(±+¸[1¡H(w)])2 holds and it follows:
H(w) =
± + ¸
¸
"
1 ¡
s
(y ¡ w)R(w)
(y ¡ w)R(w)
#
, f￿r w 2 [w;wo]: (2.13)
w is the biggest solution to w = argmaxw[(y ¡ w)R(w)] and wo the biggest value that satis￿es
(y¡ ¹ w)R( ¹ w)
(y¡w)R(w) = ±2
(±+¸)2 (see Burdett and Mortensen (1998), p.266).
Discussion
Unemployed individuals in this extension of the basic model do not accept any wage o￿er they
obtain, and their expected unemployment duration depends on their net unemployment bene￿ts.
The resulting equilibrium unemployment S(¹ zjH) is higher than the unemployment that would
result if all ￿rms would pay a wage equal to marginal productivity S(¹ zjw = y).23 In addition
21 This is true, since S(1) = S(¹ z) is the amount of unemployed that would accept a wage o￿er of 1. Since all
unemployed individuals would accept such a wage o￿er, S(¹ z) is the amount of unemployed over all z-types.
22 L(w) is given by L(w) = G(w)(N ¡ S(¹ z)) =
¸
R w
z (H(w)¡H(x))dS(x)
(±+¸[1¡H(w)]) .
Using (2.12), dS(z) =
³
±N
±+¸[1¡H(z)]
´
dR(z) and L
0(w) = l(w)h(w) = (N ¡ S(¹ z))G
0(w) I ￿nd the above l(w)
(see Burdett and Mortensen (1998), p.265).
23 That is always true if w < ¹ z.Chapter 2 45
equilibrium unemployment depends positively on ±
¸, an indicator of the amount of frictions in
the labor market (see Burdett and Mortensen (1998), p.267). If I assume that ¹ z < y and that
H(¹ z) > 0, then every match is pro￿table in principle but not every match is formed when
employers and employees meet. This is the case since ￿rms commit ex-ante to pay some wage of
the wage o￿er distribution and since it is optimal for a part of the ￿rms to o￿er wages below ¹ z.
Still the model implies a counterfactual wage density (see Van den Berg (1999), p.F299). It
seems that di￿erent reservation wages do not strongly a￿ect the wage distribution. A model
allowing for di￿erent reservation wages has been estimated by Eckstein and Wolpin (1990).
They estimate a model that allows n di￿erent z-groups and for heterogeneity across ￿rms. The
results of the estimation are not in favor of the model. Although the observed unemployment
are accurately described in this modeling framework, the explanation of observed wages is too
weak in this model (see Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), p.799f. and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den
Berg (2000), p.307).
A labor union minimum wage has several e￿ects. A binding minimum wage does not only change
the lower bound of the wage distribution but also the upper bound (see Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), p.267). However, since the minimum wage shifts the wage o￿er distribution to the right
and since the reservation wage does in this case not depend on the wage o￿er distribution, the
average unemployment durations will decrease, since on average they obtain more acceptable
wage o￿ers; that is unemployment decreases. This is the case since labor demand does not react,
whereas job seekers accept job o￿ers more often on average. To sum up, a labor union minimum
wage has in this case the counterintuitive e￿ect that unemployment decreases.
2.4.2 Heterogeneity across ￿rms
Suppose now, that the other market side is characterized by heterogeneity: ￿rms vary in their
productivity. This subsection is divided in two parts. In the ￿rst part I will examine a market
that is characterized by search frictions and an exogenous distribution of ￿rm productivities. In
the second part, ￿rm productivity is chosen endogenously, e.g. as a decision over the capital
equipment of a job.
A priori heterogeneity and endogenous wage dispersion
There exist several models with exogenous, heterogeneous productivity in the search framework.
In a competitive setting with constant returns to scale this situation could not persist, since more
productive ￿rms would pay higher wages and employees would move immediately to the better
paying ￿rm. In a market with frictions however, this is not the case.46 Chapter 2
The model
The following derivations are based upon Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000). I will
assume that the assumptions (A0), (A1￿￿), (A2￿), (A3), (A4), (A5’), and (A6) hold, where:
² (A1￿￿), as (A1￿), but N identical individuals with productivity ~ y produce unequal amounts
y of the good C. y = ~ yt(k) is assumed to hold, where t(¢) is a positive function of k and
displays the following properties: t0(k) > 0, t00(k) < 0. k can be interpreted as capital
intensity in a ￿rm.
² (A2￿), as (A2), but there is an amount of M ￿rms, whose capital intensity is distributed
according to ¡(k) = ¡(y). The constant, exogenous random variable K realizes before
production starts and has a ￿nite expectation. There is a unique realization of Y that
corresponds to each realization of K. Realizations of Y are continuously distributed on the
support [y; ¹ y]. It is assumed that y exceeds the common reservation wage of the employees
or an eventually existing minimum wage.
² (A5’), as (A5), but the consumption good C is produced with labor and capital, and there
are no depreciations.
Equilibrium unemployment is given by equation (2.8) U = ±N
±+¸. The reservation wage of the U
unemployed is given by equation (5.1) wR = z+(¸¡¸L)
R wo
wR
1¡H(w)
r+±+¸L(1¡H(w))dw, where wo is the
upper born of the wage distributions.
Describing the dynamics of employment in ￿rms o￿ering a wage above w (wR < w < wo),
imposing stationarity and using equation (2.8) helps us deducing equilibrium employment l(w)
in ￿rms o￿ering w.
L(w)
N ¡ U
= G(w) =
U
(N ¡ U)
¸H(w)
[¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + ±]
=
±H(w)
(¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + ±)
, (2.14)
as in the homogeneous model (equation 2.9). By the same arguments as above, the reservation
wage (or minimum wage) is the lower bound of the wage o￿er distribution (see section 2.3.2).
And thus:
l(w) = ±(N ¡ U)
± + ¸L
[± + ¸L(1 ¡ H(w))]2. (2.15)
Note that we must divide by M to obtain the average amount of employment in one ￿rm o￿ering
w: ¸ l(w) =
l(w)
M .Chapter 2 47
Pro￿t maximization
Firms maximize expected pro￿ts, which are given by pro￿ts per worker times the equilibrium
employment in this ￿rm:
¦(wjy) = (y ¡ w)¸ l(w) = ±(y ¡ w)
(N ¡ U)
M
(± + ¸L)
[± + ¸L(1 ¡ H(w))]2: (2.16)
Again, the ￿rm faces the trade-o￿ between the pro￿t per employee and the equilibrium amount of
employees. If ¸L = 0 the Diamond (1971)-solution is obtained, since in this case the employment
of the ￿rm in equation (2.15) does not depend on the wage. In general, the wage a ￿rm pays
might depend on its productivity y. However, facing the results of section 2.3.2 it is clear that it
is possible that ￿rms of an identical y-type pay di￿erent wages if di￿erent wages yield identical
pro￿ts. If this is the case, then a ￿rm of type y chooses a wage randomly according to H(wjy).
Let
Ky = argmax
w f¦(wjy)jmax(wR;wmin) < w < yg
be the entity of pro￿t maximizing wages from which the y-￿rm draws one. Then, in the case of
continuous productivity dispersion it can be shown that Ky = K(y) is unique (see Bontemps,
Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.315/350). For each ￿rm of a given y-type there is only one
optimal wage, which is in addition increasing with the productivity y of the ￿rm throughout the
support of ¡. This simpli￿es the analysis considerably since then the probability H(w) that a
￿rm pays a wage lower than w = K(y) is determined by the probability ¡(y) that a ￿rm has
a productivity below y. Since K(y) = w and since K0(y) > 0 the inverse y = K¡1(w) can
be calculated. The share of ￿rms that o￿er wages below w equals the share of ￿rms, whose
productivity is below y = K¡1(w), or: H(w) = ¡(K¡1(w)).
The ￿rst order condition for the pro￿t equation can be derived by di￿erentiating (2.16) with
respect to w:
¸ l0(w)
¸ l(w)
=
l0(w)
l(w)
=
1
y ¡ w
, and (2.17)
¡± ¡ ¸L(1 ¡ H(w)) + 2(y ¡ w)¸Lh(w) = 0.
The ￿rst line follows from using the ￿rst equality and the second line from using the second
equality in equation (2.16). The second order condition is satis￿ed and thus the result is a
pro￿t maximum (ibid., p.316). The second line determines the optimal wage for each ￿rm
w = K(yjH(¢)) implicitly for wages above the reservation wage.
I can calculate for each ￿rm equilibrium pro￿ts ¦(¢) and employment ¸ l(¢) as a function of
y. Using this, an explicit expression for K(y) can be obtained. It makes pro￿ts of ¦(y) =48 Chapter 2
(y ¡ K(y))¸ l(K(y)). Di￿erentiating with respect to y yields ¦0(y) = (1 ¡ K0(y))¸ l(K(y)) + (y ¡
K(y))¸ l0(K(y))K0(y). Using optimality and the envelope theorem, the following result is obtained:
¦0(y) = ¸ l(K(y)). (2.18)
Pro￿ts of the ￿rms are increasing with productivity. If y increases the equilibrium amount of
employees increases since the optimal chosen wage increases. Every worker produces more (be-
cause of the higher ￿rm productivity) and obtains a higher wage. Now, think of an in￿nitesimal
increase in y. From equation (2.17) it follows that, w¸ l0(w)+¸ l(w) = y¸ l0(w). This means that the
optimally chosen wage on the side of the ￿rm, is chosen such that the wage bill for the newly
attracted employees w¸ l0(w) and the additional wage payments to the old stock of employees24
¸ l(w) equal the (value of the) production y¸ l0(w) of the newly attracted employees, a standard
result of monopsony theory (see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.315). The addi-
tional production of the old stock of employees makes up the net pro￿t increase of the ￿rm if y
increases.
Integrating equation (2.18) yields an explicit expression for ¦(y) (see appendix B.3). Using this
and a suitable form of the equilibrium employment equation, I obtain the following expression
for K(y):
K(y) = y ¡ [± + ¸L(1 ¡ ¡(y))]2
Z y
w
1
[± + ¸L(1 ¡ ¡(%))]2d%, (2.19)
where w = max(wR;wmin).
The wage o￿er distribution follows from H(w) = ¡(K¡1(w)). But, in general there is no closed
form expression K¡1(w).
The equilibrium wage o￿er distribution H(w) = ¡(K¡1(w)) uniquely determines the distribution
of paid wages G(w) in equation (2.14). It also determines the equilibrium pro￿t of ￿rms ¦(wjy)
in (2.16) depending on y. Pro￿t is maximized if ￿rms choose the wage according to equation
(2.19) and is given by equation (B.5). Equilibrium unemployment is given by equation (2.8).
The equilibrium relationships of G;H and ¡ constrain the form of the admissible distributions
of G and H. Because densities are nonnegative (¡0(y) ¸ 0), it follows that h(w)[± + ¸L(1 ¡
H(w))] decreases on [w; ¹ w] (see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.353￿.). If h(w)
is decreasing on the complete support, this condition is met. If ¸L is su￿ciently large, h(w) can
also be increasing. The lower bound of the support is given by the reservation wage (minimum
wage). If the lower bounds of y and of w are equal, there is a mass point at w. It can be
shown that the upper bound of the support is ￿nite, that it depends on the distribution of the
24 More precisely, the additional wage payments to the old stock of employees is given by (w+dw)¸ l(w)¡w¸ l(w) =
dw¸ l(w). So, ¸ l(w) are the additional payments to the old stock of employees if the wage increases by one.Chapter 2 49
productivity and that it increases with ¸L if a minimum wage constitutes the lower bound (ibid.,
p.319￿.).
Discussion
Wage dispersion is established as an equilibrium phenomenon in a model with continuous produc-
tivity dispersion. It arises as a result of the interaction of both search frictions and productivity
dispersion. Productivity dispersion itself is not su￿cient for wage dispersion, since in this case
the Diamond (1971)-solution is obtained. On the other side it has already been shown that in-
formational frictions alone with on-the-job search are a su￿cient condition for wage dispersion.
However, the integration of di￿erent productivities across ￿rms seems an important ingredient,
empirically. Second, it has been mentioned before that the homogeneous model implies counter-
factual wage distributions and it is only able to explain part of the variance of wages between
individuals. In this context, the resulting wage distributions depend on the productivity distribu-
tion. If for example a Pareto-distribution for the productivities is assumed, a realistic shape for
the wage distribution can be obtained (see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.321).
In deed, the model is able to generate wage distributions that are in accordance with the data.
This is astonishing, especially since the assumption of homogeneous workers has been retained.
Both ingredients, the frictions and the productivity dispersion determine together the shape of
the wage distribution. This explanation for wage dispersion is richer than the explanation in the
homogeneous model. In this model, more productive ￿rms pay higher wages, make higher pro￿ts
and are bigger than their less productive counterparts. This is con￿rmed by several empirical
studies (see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), p.319).
Since K0(y) > 0 an increasing variance of the distribution of the productivities, increases the
variance of the wage distribution, whereas equilibrium unemployment remains unchanged. A
labor union minimum wage a￿ects also the upper bound of the wage distribution. As in the
homogeneous model, equilibrium unemployment is in general not a￿ected while the monopsony
power of the ￿rms is a￿ected. It might be the case that the minimum wage causes relatively
unproductive ￿rms to leave the market. However, the missing demand of the low productive
￿rms is absorbed by the more productive ￿rms. However, the assumption that there is always a
continuum of ￿rms that demands labor is critical in that context.
Endogenous heterogeneity
The model of Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) assumes a production technology with decreasing
returns to labor. This implies, because of a zero pro￿t condition for the ￿rms, that each ￿rm50 Chapter 2
has only one (normalized) vacancy.25 The model is static. Therefore, equilibrium wage disper-
sion does not arise from on-the-job search, but from the fact that unemployed job seekers can,
depending on their search intensity, sample more than one o￿er from the wage o￿er distribution.
With the possibility to compare job o￿ers, the Burdett and Judd (1983) condition for equilib-
rium price dispersion is met, if a positive share of the individuals (< 1) samples exactly one job
o￿er and the rest samples more than one job o￿er (see Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), p.589f.).
In general the model has three equilibria. One equilibrium corresponds to the Diamond (1971)
solution, where all individuals sample only one o￿er and ￿rms pay individuals their reservation
wage. Another equilibrium is characterized by an equilibrium wage distribution and unemployed
individuals are indi￿erent of sampling either one or two job o￿ers (given the share of individuals
that samples one or two o￿ers).26 Although the model is static, the tradeo￿ for ￿rms is quite
similar as in the dynamic models. A ￿rm that o￿ers a high wage has a high probability to ￿ll its
vacancy while a low wage ￿rm has a low probability. This corresponds to high (low) expected
employment in the dynamic models.
Like in most models with an endogenous and costly information decision, there is a free-rider
problem. If part of the individuals are informed, the ignorant agents pro￿t, too, since wages are
dispersed and with that average wages rise. Partly this e￿ect is internalized, since the informed
agents obtain on average higher wage o￿ers than the ignorant ones. Given the wage distribution
in equilibrium, the expected utility of a well informed agent net of search cost must equal the
expected utility of an ignorant agent (see Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), p.592).
If an endogenous capital decision is introduced in the model and if a zero pro￿t condition is
imposed, a unique connection exists between the capital choice and the chosen wage. This
is the case, since ￿rms pay their employees according to marginal productivity which depends
positively on capital use. So, assuming marginal productivity pay, the problem of simultaneously
choosing capital and wage can be reduced to choosing only the wage. This implies an endogenous
distribution of productivities across ￿rms if a positive share (< 1) of the unemployed samples
two job o￿ers (see Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), p.594f.). An increasing search intensity, i.e.
an increasing share of informed individuals, increases the average capital stock of the ￿rms.
This is the case, since ￿rms react with increasing wages on better informed individuals, which
implies that the corresponding optimal capital stock rises. In an equilibrium with dispersed
wages, unemployed individuals are indi￿erent sampling one or two job o￿ers. A remarkable
result however is that the stable equilibrium with a high share of individuals that samples more
25 In this case the capital intensity is equal to the capital use of a ￿rm. Therefore I use the two terms synonymous.
26 In general there exist two such equilibria with wage dispersion, where one of the equilibria is characterized by
a low share of individuals that samples twice and the other by a high share. The second is a stable equilibrium
while the former is not. (see Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), p.593)Chapter 2 51
than one o￿er, comes relatively close to the result of a social planner (ibid., p.597f.). If search
costs are comparatively low, although the capital choice of ￿rms is made ex-ante, it is close to
the optimal capital choice.
A dynamic version of the model uses a discrete time concept. So, unemployed job seekers can
in principle sample more than one job o￿er at a time. There is no on-the job search and zero
pro￿t for the ￿rms is imposed. The value equations have a similar form as in section 2.3.1.
However, in this case, exogenous job destruction ± destroys also the capital stock the ￿rm uses.
In equilibrium27 the capital distribution across ￿rms is such that unemployed job seekers, given
the share that samples two job o￿ers, are indi￿erent of sampling one or two job o￿ers. The lowest
capital stock is chosen such that unemployed job seekers are indi￿erent between working or not
(the reservation wage). From the value equations one calculates the average probability that a
vacancy is ￿lled and the average unemployment rate. The equilibrium wage o￿er distribution is
given by the distribution of capital and follows from zero pro￿t on the support.
Discussion
The model presented here, is, because of the assumed heterogeneity of ￿rms, richer than the
previous ones in that it allows wage distributions that are more realistic (see Mortensen (2000),
p.289f. and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a), p.992). As far as the explanation of the variance of
the wages is concerned both the model with endogenous and exogenous productivity dispersion
bear the same advantages and disadvantages. However, an endogenous capital decision is a gain,
since, at least in the long run, the capital use is a decision variable of the ￿rm. In models with
endogenous capital decision the crucial determinant of the form of the capital distribution is
the link between capital use and wages. A further positive aspect of the presented model with
endogenous capital decision is the fact that search intensity is also endogenous.
In the model with endogenous capital decision the decision over wage and capital is made si-
multaneously. On the other hand, in exogenous models the causality is by assumption from
technology to wages. As Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) point out, there is empirical evidence that
is in favor of a simultaneous decision or even that wages determine technology (see Acemoglu
(2005)). The model of Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) implies in addition that wage dispersion
does not vary with the age of the individuals. Both the homogeneous model and the model with
exogenous wage dispersion, on the other hand imply that senior workers have changed jobs more
27 In this version, too, there exist several equilibria. If I speak of the equilibrium, I refer to the equilibrium that
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often, which implies both a higher average wage and a lower wage dispersion.28 However, it
seems to be the case that wage dispersion increases with age, which contradicts both theories.
In the model of Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) the rate of new jobs decreases with an increasing
minimum wage. This implies that the unemployment rate increases as well. This is in contrast
to the results of the other models discussed so far.
2.4.3 Heterogeneity on both sides of the market
If trying to explain the variance of paid wages between observationally equivalent workers, ba-
sically two components are required: ￿rst, there are ￿rm e￿ects on the wage and, second, there
is an e￿ect of the degree of frictions on wages. In addition, wages vary considerably between
workers with di￿erent observed characteristics, controlling for ￿rm characteristics and search
frictions. Summing up, three factors are needed to explain empirical wage distributions: hetero-
geneous ￿rms, heterogeneous workers and search frictions (see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den
Berg (2000) and Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)). So far, the presented models explain
wage variation by search frictions (Burdett and Mortensen (1998), by search frictions and het-
erogeneity of the employees (Burdett and Mortensen (1998)), by search frictions and exogenous
technology di￿erences (Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000)), by search frictions and en-
dogenous technology di￿erences (Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)). The model, I present thereafter
integrates the three important factors for the explanation of an empirical wage distribution. The
model is due to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b).
Assumptions
I will present the model in more detail since it deviates considerably from the baseline model
￿ la Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Heterogenous productivity of the individuals is integrated
in the model in the following way. A speci￿c labor market for a more or less homogeneous
employment group is considered (professor, mason, haircutter). All job seekers are assumed
to have comparable characteristics (phd-degree, certi￿cate of apprenticeship) and are therefore
substitutable to a certain degree. However, individuals di￿er in their productivity (e￿ciency
units of labor per time unit) as measured by an index ". Before entering the labor market,
individuals determine their productivity by drawing a value from the continuous productivity
distribution ­(") on an interval ["min;"max] with density !("). It is assumed that unemployed
job seeker of type " obtain a net unemployment income of z(") = "b. w brings the individual the
utility ¥(w) and individuals maximize the present value of their expected utility over an in￿nite
28 This is true if ¸L >> ±.Chapter 2 53
time horizon.29 Leisure does not enter the utility function of the individuals, which implies that
only risk aversion can be responsible for deviations of expected income maximization.
Each ￿rm produces, using a technology (productivity, capital intensity) y, which follows a dis-
tribution function ¡(y) with density °(y) on a bounded support [y; ¹ y] and which is determined
by an ex-ante random draw. A ￿rm maximizes the present value of their expected pro￿ts over
an in￿nite time horizon. It is assumed that the ￿home productivity￿ b exceeds y. Marginal
productivity of an e￿ciency unit of labor is constant given the y-type of the ￿rm. That is, an
individual of type " and a ￿rm of type y produce together an output y".
The sequential process of contacts between employers and employees is similar to that in standard
models. Unemployed job seekers contact ￿rms at rate ¸, while employed job seekers contact ￿rms
at ¸L. The distribution of wage o￿ers di￿ers from standard models. Up to now, contacts were
a random draw of the wage o￿er distribution. In this model it is assumed that each ￿rm of
type y makes wage o￿ers to individuals with a speci￿c probability that is identical over all
"-types. The contact probability for a type-y ￿rm follows a distribution function ª(y) with
density Ã(y). Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) argue that the relative frequency of contacts
for a y-￿rm Ã(y)=°(y) is determined by the search intensity of this ￿rm. There is, however,
no microfoundation for the ratio of Ã(y) and °(y). The wage formation process di￿ers from the
standard model as well. Upon a meeting, both sides have complete information about all relevant
characteristics of the other agent. Therefore, the wage o￿er of the ￿rm conditions on the type "
of the job seeker. In addition, if an employee gets an outside job o￿er from a competing ￿rm, the
employing ￿rm can make a binding countero￿er. Implications of this assumption are detailed in
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a). In a model with endogenous technology dispersion, they show
that job-to-job transitions depend basically on the productivities of the competing ￿rms. Before
showing details of the derivation, I summarize the assumptions of the model. The assumptions
(A0), (A1￿￿’), (A2￿’), (A3’), (A4), (A5￿) and (A6’) are assumed to hold, where:
² (A1￿￿’), as (A1’), but N individuals maximize their utility function ¥(w) and enter and
leave the labor market at rate n. Newcomer enter the labor market as unemployed job
seekers. Individuals di￿er in their productivity " , according to a distribution function
­(") on ["min;"max]. "-type unemployed obtain z = "b. WU(¢) (WL(¢)) are the values of
unemployment and employment, respectively. When a job seeker and a ￿rm meet, the
probability that the productivity of the ￿rm is below y is ª(y).
29 Since the authors give their model a partial market interpretation, the discount factor must not correspond
to the interest rate. This is especially important when estimating the model since the discount rate must be
estimated along with the other parameters. For simplicity, r denotes the discount factor.54 Chapter 2
² (A2￿’), as (A2), but ￿rms di￿er in their productivity y, distributed according to ¡(y) on
[y; ¹ y], with y > b. Upon a meeting the ￿rm observes both the type " and the productivity
y of the ￿rm that employs the individual at the present.
² (A3’), as (A3) but ￿rms condition their wage o￿er w(";y;¢) that is nonnegotiable on the
type " of the individual and on the productivity y of the ￿rm that employs the individual
so far.
² (A5￿): Speci￿c labor market, where r is the discount rate in this market and where a
homogeneous product is produced from heterogeneous agents. A type y ￿rm and a type
" individual produce together the output y" of the homogeneous good. The price of the
produced good is the numØraire.
² (A6’), as (A6), but matches dissolve at rate ± +n , where ± is the job destruction rate and
n is the rate at which individuals leave (and enter) the market.
The model
Let WU(";b;"b) = WU(") be the value of unemployment of an individual of type " and let
WL(";y;w) be the value of employment of the same "-type, depending on the productivity of the
employing ￿rm and the paid wage. The value equation depends not only on the wage that the
￿rm pays but also on the productivity of this ￿rm. This is the case, since the productivity of the
￿rm determines the career opportunities (in the sense of potential wage gains) in this ￿rm. If an
employed individual of type " obtains a wage o￿er from a competing ￿rm, the upper bound of
the wage increase for the individual is determined by the productivity of the employing ￿rm. To
see this, notice that the maximal countero￿er that the employing ￿rm can make is bound by its
productivity. However, because of perfect information, the competing ￿rm will choose its wage
o￿er such that the individual is indi￿erent between changing the ￿rm and not. Job seekers obtain
always exactly their reservation wage upon engagement. For unemployed job seekers, it can be
calculated from WL(";y;wR) = WU("), where wR = wR(";y;z) = wR(";y). The reservation
wage of the unemployed job seekers, like the reservation wage of employed job seekers depends
on the career opportunities in the ￿rm, that makes the o￿er.
If a y0-￿rm with y0 > y makes an o￿er, it chooses the wage such that the individual is indi￿erent
between the value of the highest wage w = "y he can get in his ￿rm without career oppor-
tunities30, and the value of the wage with the positive career opportunities if changing to the
y0-￿rm. Let ww(";y;y0) be the wage that makes the " -individual indi￿erent between the ￿rms
30 Without career opportunities means that the employing ￿rm pays marginal productivity and can therefore
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y;y0. Than: WL(";y;"y) = WL(";y0;ww). If the competing ￿rm has a lower productivity than
the employing ￿rm y0 < y, than the ￿rm is ready to pay at most "y0. The countero￿er that is
able to inhibit the individual from changing the ￿rm is because of the better career opportunities
smaller than "y0 and given by ww(";y0;y), where WL(";y;ww) = WL(";y0;"y0) holds.
Value equations and reservation wages
The value of unemployment can be derived as usual from the No-arbitrage condition, where the
instantaneous income has to be replaced by the instantaneous utility ¥("b). The value of a job
o￿er is given by the value of unemployment since ￿rms o￿er exactly the reservation wage to
the individual. Future utility ￿ows are discounted by the discount rate r plus the instantaneous
mortality rate n. It follows WU(") = 1
1+(r+n)dtf¥("b)dt + ¸dtWU(") + (1 ¡ ¸dt)WU(")g, or:
WU(") =
¥("b)
r + n
.
The value of employment contains several components. If an "-individual that is employed at
wage w in a y-￿rm obtains an o￿er from a competing ￿rm, three possibilities arise. First, if
the productivity y0 from the competing ￿rm is so small that the employing ￿rm could poach
the "-employee from the y0-￿rm for a wage ww(";y0;y) < w, nothing changes. Let the critical
productivity of a competing ￿rm for which ww("; · y;y) = w holds, be · y(";y;w). Than the
probability that the o￿er does not change anything is given by ª(· y). The second possibility is
that · y < y0 < y. That is, the competing ￿rm cannot win the Bertrand-competition, but is able
to o￿er the employee a higher value than it has in the current ￿rm with his current wage. That
is, the employee gets the wage increase ww(";y0;y) ¡ w and his new value of work is given by
WL(";y0;"y0). This happens with probability ª(y)¡ª(· y). The value equation must account for
the expected value of labor over the productivities of the competing ￿rms in this case. Finally,
if the productivity of the competing ￿rm y0 is higher as the productivity of the employing ￿rm
y it wins the Bertrand-competition, the employee changes the ￿rm and its wage changes by the
amount ww(";y;y0)¡w.31 With the corresponding probability (1¡ª(y)) his new value of work
is then WL(";y0;ww(¢)) = WL(";y;"y). The value equation summarizes all these possibilities:
[r + ± + n + ¸L(1 ¡ ª(· y(¢)))]WL(";y;w) = ¥(w) + ±WU(") + (2.20)
¸L[ª(y) ¡ ª(· y(¢))]Eª[WL(";x;"x)j· y < x < y] + ¸L(1 ¡ ª(y))WL(";y;"y).
31 The wage change can be both a wage increase and a wage cut. This depends on the wage the employee has
earned in the old ￿rm and on the productivities of both ￿rms. If for example the employee earns already
marginal productivity in his ￿rm, the wage change is always a wage cut.56 Chapter 2
Evaluating this formula at w = "y, I ￿nd that:
WL(";y;"y) =
¥("y) + ±WU(")
r + ± + n
. (2.21)
This is true, since · y(";y;"y) = y. Using 2.21 for the conditional expectation in 2.20 together
with the conditional distribution ª(xj· y < x < y) =
ª(x)
ª(y)¡ª(· y), using in addition integration
by parts, the fact that WL(";y;w) = WL("; · y;"· y) and the relationship ¸L
³
¥("y)¡¥("· y)
r+±+n
´
=
¸L"
r+±+n
R y
· y ¥0("x)dx, a new expression for the value of work is obtained.
(r + ± + n)WL(";y;w) = ¥(w) + ±WU(") +
¸L"
r + ± + n
Z y
· y
(1 ¡ ª(x))¥0("x)dx (2.22)
The (instantaneous) return to WL(¢) in the capital market must equal the return in the labor
market. The return in the labor market can be decomposed in the instantaneous utility of the
wage minus the loss in case where the job gets lost ¡(±(WL(¢) ¡ WU(¢)) + nWL(¢)) plus the
instantaneous probability to get an o￿er of a competing ￿rm times the expected discounted
utility gain in this case.32 Using that by de￿nition WL(";y;w) = WL("; · y;"· y) and equation
(2.21) on the left hand side of equation (2.22), ¥(w) = ¥("· y) ¡ ¸L"
r+±+n
R y
· y (1 ¡ ª(x))¥0("x)dx
is obtained. If a ￿rm with y0 > y makes an o￿er to an employee, then the employee changes
the ￿rm and obtains the wage ww(";y;y0). Plugging this in the last formula and using that
· y(";y0;ww(¢)) = y; one obtains an implicit characterization of the wage an individual obtains
when changing job.
¥(ww(";y;y0)) = ¥("y) ¡
¸L"
r + ± + n
Z y0
y
(1 ¡ ª(x))¥0("x)dx (2.23)
Analogously, I obtain the reservation wage of the unemployed job seekers at an o￿er from a
y0-￿rm (y0 > b) implicit by using wR(";b;y0) = ww(";b;y0) and · y(";y0;wR(¢)) = b.
¥(wR(";b;y0)) = ¥("b) ¡
¸L"
r + ± + n
Z y0
b
(1 ¡ ª(x))¥0("x)dx (2.24)
Both wages are reservation wages in the sense that they correspond at the minimum wage that
a type y0-￿rm must o￿er a "-individual to induce it to work in this ￿rm. In both cases this
reservation wage depends on the current productivity, either of the employing ￿rm or the home
32 The expected utility gain from a job o￿er can be calculated as the integral over the probability that the
o￿er stems from a ￿rm, whose productivity is above x, where x 2 [· y;y], times the marginal utility of the
highest wage x" this ￿rm can a￿ord to pay. Putting
"
r+±+n under the integral, the integral is the expected
discounted utility gain from a wage o￿er of a ￿rm with productivity y
0 2 [· y;y]. This is true since all ￿rms
with productivity above x 2 [· y;y] can a￿ord to pay at least wage x" and therefore insures at least marginal
utility ¥
0("x) for the individual and since for values x > y the value of employment remains unchanged.Chapter 2 57
productivity. Since a ￿rm with y0 > y o￿ers career opportunities, the wage ww(¢) it pays is lower
than the maximal wage a y-￿rm can a￿ord. The discounted value of the career opportunities is
given by the second addend in equation (2.23). Therewith, the model generates voluntary job-to-
job transitions under wage cuts. The analog holds for the reservation wage of the unemployed,
it is lower than the value of their home production. In addition, the reservation wage does
not depend on the job-o￿er rate ¸ since job o￿ers exactly bring the reservation wage of the
unemployed, which equalizes the value of employment and the value of unemployment. So, a job
o￿er here means no value change (see Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), p.2304).
Paid wages are either the ￿rst wage wR(";b;y0) or a wage that results from a
Bertrand-competition between two ￿rms y;y0, that is ww(";y0;y) mit · y < y0 < y (or
ww(";y;y0), if y0 > y). So there are always three components contained in the wage: individual
productivity, ￿rm productivity and chance. For a CRRA-utility function (as e.g. ¥(w) = lnw)
the reservation wage from equation (2.23) can be decomposed additively in its three
components, i.e. lnww(";y;y0) = ln" + lnww(1;y;y0) = ln" + lny + ¸L
r+±+n
R y0
y
1
x(1 ¡ ª(x))dx
(ibid., p.2305). From this the decomposition of the variance of paid wages can be derived from
which the model has been motivated (see appendix B.4).
varw(lnw) = var"(ln") + vary[E(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy)] + Ey[var(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy)]
The variance of wages can be decomposed in a component that is attributable to individual
productivity di￿erences ("), a component that comes from di￿erent ￿rm productivities (y) and
in a component that comes from labor market frictions (see also appendix B.4).
Equilibrium and wage distributions
Before characterizing the equilibrium, some additional de￿nitions must be made. Let L(";y)
be the share of individuals whose productivity is below " and that are employed in ￿rms with
productivity below y. Then, Ly(y) =
R "max
"min L(";y)d" is the share of individuals that are employed
in ￿rms with productivity below y. Let l(";y) and ly(y) be the corresponding densities. Further
let G(wj";y) be the conditional distribution of paid wages. Equilibrium unemployment follows
from ¸u = (1 ¡ u)(± + n), or
u =
± + n
¸ + ± + n
. (2.25)
This is the usual condition for unemployment, accounting however for the fact that there is
turnover in the population.
The conditional wage distribution in equilibrium is characterized by the following. There are
G(wj";y)l(";y)N(1 ¡ u) employees of type ", who are employed in a type y-￿rm at wage below
w. Employees of this category leave the class either because of job destruction ±, because of58 Chapter 2
death n, or because they obtain an o￿er from a ￿rm, whose productivity is above · y(¢). So,
out￿ows amount to (± +n+¸L(1¡ª(· y)))G(wj";y)l(";y)N(1¡u). In￿ows come from the pool
of unemployed ¸Ã(y)!("), since ￿rms o￿er the reservation wage, which is always acceptable
to the individuals.33 On the other hand, y-￿rms can poach "-individuals to a wage below w
from ￿rms, whose productivity is below · y(";y;w). The expected ￿ow is given by ¸LN(1 ¡
u)Ã(y)
R · y(";y;w)
y l(";x)dx. In equilibrium, using equation (2.25) and canceling out N(1 ¡ u), it
follows:
(± + n + ¸L(1 ¡ ª(· y)))G(wj";y)l(";y) =
"
(± + n)!(") + ¸L
Z · y(";y;w)
y
l(";x)dx
#
Ã(y). (2.26)
Evaluating this equality at w = "y, and using that G("yj";y) = 1 and · y(";y;w) = y, (± +
n+¸L(1¡ª(y)))l(";y) =
h
(± + n)!(") + ¸L
R y
y l(";x)dx
i
Ã(y) is obtained. The solution to this
di￿erential equation is (ibid., p.2341):
l(";y) =
(1 + ·L)Ã(y)
[1 + ·L(1 ¡ ª(y))]2!(") = ly(y)!("), mit ·L =
¸L
± + n
. (2.27)
Using the primitive L(";y) =
ª(y)
1+·L(1¡ª(y))­(") = Ly(y)­(") and l(";y) this is easily checked.34
Using (2.27), equation (2.26) can be solved for G(wj";y). The conditional distribution of wages
for "-individuals in y-￿rms is given by:
G(wj";y) =
µ
1 + ·L(1 ¡ ª(y))
1 + ·L(1 ¡ ª(· y(";y;w)))
¶2
. (2.28)
The equilibrium size of a y-￿rm can be derived by the equilibrium conditions as N
ly(y)
°(y) =
N(1+·L)
[1+·L(1¡ª(y))]2
Ã(y)
°(y). The ￿rst term implies that the size of a ￿rm increases with the productivity
of the ￿rm, since upon meetings they are more often capable of attracting individuals from
competing ￿rms than low productivity ￿rms. The second term re￿ects by assumption the search
intensity of a ￿rm, which can increase or decrease with ￿rm productivity. So, ￿rm size does not
uniquely depend on productivity (ibid., p.2308). Since the random variable " does not depend on
the random vector (y;y0) and since this implies independence between " and y, the conditional
distribution of (y0jy) can be derived. Let y0 < y, then G(ww(";y;y0)j";y) = G("y0j";y) =
­(") ¸ G(y;y0)
­(")Ly(y) = ~ G(y0jy) =
³
1+·L(1¡ª(y))
1+·L(1¡ª(y0))
´2
. This is true since · y(";y0;ww) = y0.
33 This is true because of the assumption y > b.
34 It is remarkable that Ly(y) and ª(y) are associated in the same way as G(w) and H(w) in the homogeneous
model. This can be explained by the fact that ª(¢) is as H(¢) the distribution of wages if entering a job from
unemployment, while Ly(¢) as G(¢) is the distribution of wages in across section after sorting to higher payed
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Discussion
Summarizing, it is to be noticed that the model is able to integrate the three factors that are
empirically important for explaining wage dispersion into a theoretical framework. This work is
a signi￿cant contribution in the direction of a realistic, empirically valid modeling of the labor
market. Obviously this has increased the complexity of the model. However, some simplifying
assumptions were necessary to solve the model. It was assumed that the net income of the
unemployed job seekers is proportional to the "-type of the individual. The assumption can be
justi￿ed by the fact that high productivity individuals are more productive in home production
and that they might have lower search costs. On the side of unemployment bene￿ts, however,
this payment scheme is not very plausible, although it is true that the bene￿ts might condition
on the last wage. But, in frictional markets the wage is not perfectly correlated with the type
of an individual. A further critical assumption is that there is perfect information at a meeting
of the both market sides. On the side of the ￿rms this assumption can be justi￿ed by the fact
that job interviews serve to monitor the productivity of the individual. On the other hand,
the literature has emphasized the argument that jobs have the character of an experience good:
￿that is, the only way to determine the quality of a particular match is to form the match and to
,experience‘ it￿ (Jovanovic (1979), p.973). For the side of the job seekers, too, this assumption
seems not very realistic since probably at a job interview there is little information revealed over
the productivity of the ￿rm. An additional ingredient in the model was the possibility of ￿rms
to make countero￿ers, which enriches the basic model.
An attractive feature of the model is that it provides a rationale for voluntary job-to-job transi-
tions under wage cuts, since this seems to be a phenomenon that is empirically important (see
Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005a) and Pfei￿er (2003) for Germany). On the other hand, (real)
wage cuts for job stayers seem to be empirically important, too (see Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002b), p.2313f. and Pfei￿er (2003), p.40￿.). Of course, this cannot be explained by the model.
A further interesting result is that " and y are distributed independently, which implies that
there is no sorting at least within professional groups. Although it is true that more productive
￿rms prefer employing more productive individuals and although they can attract them if com-
peting with low productive ￿rms, ￿rms can earn positive pro￿ts for each employee. Therefore
in the model, they employ everybody and in equilibrium there is no sorting. The limitation
to professional groups is important, since there is evidence for positive assortative matching in
labor markets (see Van den Berg and van Vuuren (2006)).
The estimation of the model yields the decomposition of the variance in its components. Indi-
vidual heterogeneity explains for the seven occupational groups, that are examined, an in the
quali￿cation increasing part of the wage variation. Taken together, the estimates are signi￿-60 Chapter 2
cantly smaller than 50% the result of the estimation of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) interpret the fact that individual heterogeneity does not explain
much for low-skilled individuals by the conjecture that productivity di￿erences are smaller for
the low-skilled. The di￿erence to the results of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) are argued
as stemming from market frictions, that are attributed wrongly to individual heterogeneity (see
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), p.2297). The estimated e￿ect of search frictions is high and
ranges between 45% and 60%. This documents the need to take search frictions into account. A
further empirical ￿nding is that the contact probability is consistent neither with random match-
ing (Ã(y) = °(y)) nor with balanced matching (Ã(y) = l(y)).35 The already mentioned empirical
result that larger ￿rms pay higher wages is not warranted in the model. Productive ￿rms in fact
pay higher average wages and have a lower turnover. However, lower search e￿orts on behalf of
highly productive ￿rms can nullify that e￿ect. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) show empirically
that the average e￿ect of ￿rm size on wages is positive but a second-order polynomial implies a
bell-shaped distribution. That result can be interpreted as e￿orts on behalf of low-wage ￿rms to
compensate their low wages with high search e￿orts.
Introducing a binding minimum wage has multiple e￿ects. Assume that wmin > y"min. There
is a set of matches that are not pro￿table anymore and are not performed. For workers with
productivity "crit < wmin
y , i.e. workers that are a￿ected by the minimum wage, the speci￿c
unemployment rate is higher. However, those workers that are still employed, earn higher wages.
Let ycrit = wmin
"min denote the productivity boundary, above which all matches are pro￿table. Then
￿rms with y < ycrit have less employees and make lower pro￿ts than in the absence of the
minimum wage. For all other ￿rms there is a number of matches that are in fact pro￿table, but
which require the ￿rms to pay the obligatory minimum wage instead of the reservation wage. This
reduces pro￿ts of the ￿rms but leads to higher average wages for the employees. Summarizing,
in this model, the e￿ects of a binding labor unions minimum wage on employment is negative,
while rents are distributed from ￿rms to workers.36
2.4.4 Production functions and marginal productivity
So far, the models discussed allowed for di￿erences both on the side of the ￿rms and on the
side of the individuals. It maintained, however, the assumption that the productivity of an
35 Similarly, theoretical objections against random matching have been discussed in the literature. Random
matching implies that dividing a ￿rm increases pro￿ts, which is a questionable result (see Burdett and Vish-
wanath (1988), p.1050).
36 In the context of this model, the assumption that union in￿uence on the wage distribution can be modeled as
a minimum wage, is especially plausible. The reason is that the model is designed to be applicable only for a
speci￿c professional group, such that the assumption of one minimum wage seems more reasonable than for
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individual did not depend on the number of individuals employed. Yet, another possibility
to introduce heterogeneity, is the assumption of non-constant marginal productivities. So far,
there are only little attempts in the literature to incorporate this production function view in
the search framework. One such attempt is Ridder and Van den Berg (1997), which draws on
Manning (1993), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1993) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). This
model assumes a non-linear production function with one production factor, only. Introducing
several skill groups and linking them over a production function is analytically very demanding.
To the best knowledge of the author, there are only two models with several production factors
linked over a production function: one is Holzner and Launov (2005) and will be discussed below.
The other is chapter 5 of this thesis.
I start by discussing the model where one production factor is allowed to have non-constant
marginal productivity in a production function, depending on its use. For the presentation, I
refer to Ridder and Van den Berg (1997). Consider the framework as outlined in 2.3.2. As before,
let l(w) be the steady-state number of individuals employed in a ￿rm that pay a wage w, and
let y(l(w)) denote the output depending on the employment l(w). Assume that y is concave
y0(l) > 0;y00(l) < 0 and that y(0) = 0. Assume, in addition, that the job o￿er rate o￿-the-job
and on-the-job are identical ¸ = ¸L.
The reservation wage is given by equation (5.1) and reduces to the monetary value of obtaining
unemployment bene￿ts net of search costs, because the option value of unemployment vanishes
through the equality of job o￿er rates, i.e. wR = z. Equilibrium unemployment is unchanged
and follows from the steady state condition for in￿ows into and out￿ows from unemployment
u = ±
±+¸ since ￿rms do not o￿er wages below the reservation wage. The objective function of
the ￿rms37 is given by
¼(w) = y(l(w)) ¡ wl(w). (2.29)
Concavity of y implies that there is a size l(w) where y0(l(w)) · w. This implies that, at the
upper bound of the wage distribution, we can obtain a mass point. In this case it is present both
in the wage o￿er distribution H(w) and in the distribution of paid wages G(w). It arises since
at the employment level where the wage equals marginal productivity every additional worker
(even when obtained at that wage) would contribute a negative amount to the objective function
and thus there is no incentive to pay a higher wage.38 Still, ￿rms paying a marginal productivity
wage make positive pro￿ts because of the concavity.
37 It is to be noted that the objective function given here is not equal to the expected pro￿t because of the
non-linearity of the production function. It can be justi￿ed, however, by a second order Taylor approximation
(see below and Holzner and Launov (2005)).
38 The incentive to pay a higher wage is the reason why mass points cannot exist in the homogeneous model.
This mechanism is destroyed by decreasing marginal productivity.62 Chapter 2
Depending on the parameters this model has several possible solutions. One solution is an
equilibrium where all ￿rms pay a common wage, which can be either equal to the reservation
wage or equal to marginal productivity and guarantees employment N¸
¸+±.39 The reservation wage
solution is obtained if marginal productivity in the symmetric equilibrium is below or equal to
z, i.e. y0( N¸
¸+±) · z. In this case, it does not pay to deviate: paying a lower wage guarantees zero
employees, whereas paying a higher wage increases the number of employees thereby decreasing
marginal productivity. This makes the contribution of a an additional worker negative. So,
deviating does not pay and this is an equilibrium if pro￿ts are positive. Otherwise, there is no
production. A dispersed equilibrium cannot exist in this case. To see this, recognize, that for
employment to be positive all wages must be above or equal to z. However, assume that z where
the upper bound of the wage distribution (if it is higher, pro￿ts are even lower). Employment in
the continuous part of the wage distribution is given by equation (2.10). Employment at the upper
bound of the wage distribution is higher than in the equal wages equilibrium l(wo) = N¸
± > N¸
¸+±.
Thus marginal productivity is strictly lower than z. Firms paying wage z want to shrink. Thus,
there is no such equilibrium.
Similarly, unique equilibria with dispersed wages or partly dispersed wages are obtained under
the following parameter constellations. If the pro￿t at z for a dispersed equilibrium is higher than
the pro￿t at a common wage equilibrium (which equals marginal productivity) ¹ w = y0( N¸
¸+±) > z,
then an equilibrium with dispersed wages is obtained, since deviating from the common wage to
the reservation wage pays directly. Otherwise if
y
µ
N¸
± + ¸
¶
¡ ¹ w
N¸
± + ¸
> y
µ
N±¸
(± + ¸)2
¶
¡ z
N±¸
(± + ¸)2 (2.30)
the common wage equilibrium is obtained, since deviating does not pay (neither below, nor
above).
Now, consider the dispersed equilibrium. Still, it is possible that there is a dispersed part and a
mass point having a probability mass ° = Prob(w = ¹ w) < 1. Steady-state employment in these
￿rms can be calculated by equating in- and out￿ows.40
¸(N ¡ °l( ¹ w)) = ±l( ¹ w) (2.31)
This yields l( ¹ w) = N¸
±+¸° as employment in one ￿rm that o￿ers the wage at the mass point.
Clearly, the wage at the mass point must correspond to the marginal productivity given the
39 The equal wage employment is given by the employment rate times the number of employees N divided by
the number of ￿rms 1.
40 The equation can be derived by recognizing, that l( ¹ w) per assumption is the employment in one ￿rm that
o￿ers ¹ w and that the measure of ￿rms is 1.Chapter 2 63
employment, i.e. y0( N¸
±+¸°) = ¹ w.41 Paying the mass point or being in the continuous part must
yield identical pro￿ts and thus:
y
µ
N±¸
(± + ¸)2
¶
¡ z
N±¸
(± + ¸)2 = y
µ
N¸
± + ¸°
¶
¡ y0
µ
N¸
± + ¸°
¶
N¸
± + ¸°
. (2.32)
If there is a value between 0 and 1 for ° that solves this equation, then a mass point is obtained.
Otherwise there is no mass point in the wage distribution.
For the general case (unspeci￿ed production), it is not possible to obtain a closed form solution
for H and G. Note however, that the counterfactual shape of the wage density does not get
lost. On the contrary, to compensate for the decreasing pro￿t per worker because of a decreasing
marginal productivity, employment must grow even faster with the wage than in the linear
model.42 Then, equation (2.10) implies that the density is even steeper.
Increasing minimum wages might change the equilibrium obtained and compress the wage dis-
tribution. The probability of obtaining a mass point at the upper bound of the wage distribution
increases. In general, however this does not result in lower employment, since all equilibria but
one yield the same employment. If minimum wages have employment e￿ects however, that means
shifting from an equilibrium with production to an equilibrium where there is no production at
all. Clearly, this is not a very realistic possibility.
An extension of the baseline model to a production function with several skill groups i each of size
qi with
P
qi = N and heterogeneous production technologies as indexed by j is due to Holzner
and Launov (2005). Note that this is the most general model we discuss in this paper: it allows
for di￿erences between ￿rms employing di￿erent technologies and for di￿erences in workers that
vary in productivity a priori and depending on their use. I need to introduce ￿rst some notation.
wij is the wage o￿er a ￿rm of type j o￿ers to an individual of type i. Let Hij be the wage
o￿er distribution for ￿rms that produce with a technology j for skill group i. Ie, Hij(wij) is the
amount of type-j ￿rms that o￿ers a wage below wij for type-i individuals. Hi is the wage o￿er
distribution for skill group i aggregated over all ￿rm types, i.e. the distribution individuals care
about, when looking for a job. Finally, Hj is the I-dimensional wage o￿er distribution of type-j
￿rms to all skill groups. Similarly, li(wij) gives the employment of skill group i in a type j ￿rm
that o￿ers wij, while l(wj) is the I-dimensional employment of all skill groups in this ￿rm.
41 If the wage was higher, ￿rms would want to employ less. If the wage was lower, the usual argument that
increasing the wage by a small amount increases pro￿ts holds.
42 With decreasing marginal productivity, there are two e￿ects that drive the pro￿t per worker down, when
employment is growing: ￿rst, to attract more worker the wage must increase and even with linear production
the pro￿t per worker decreases. Second, with increasing employment the marginal productivity decreases,
driving down the other component of the pro￿t per worker.64 Chapter 2
The reservation wage wR
i for individuals of skill group i is given by equation (5.1) and is indexed
by i. Skill-speci￿c unemployment is given by equality of in- and out￿ows and determined by the
skill-speci￿c friction parameter ¸i.43 In addition, the dynamics for each skill group is similar as
in the standard model, meaning that equation (2.10) holds for each skill group, indexed by the
index i, except for the following modi￿cation. In the denominator (± +¸L(1¡H(w)))2 must be
replaced by (± + ¸L(1 ¡ Hi(wi)))(± + ¸L(1 ¡ Hi(w¡
i ))). The modi￿cation follows from the fact
that Hi is allowed to contain mass points and thus Hi(wi) = Hi(w¡
i ) + °i(wi). If there are no
mass points, the original employment equation is obtained. Recognize that ¸L;± are assumed
identical across skill groups.
Firms with production technology j maximize their expected pro￿t by choosing the wage vector
wj = (w1j;w2j;:::;wIj), j = 1;:::;J i.e.:
¼j = max
wj
E[yj(l(wj)) ¡ w0
jl(wj)]. (2.33)
Using a second order Taylor-Approximation, E[yj(l(wj)) ¡ w0
jl(wj)] can be rewritten as
yj(E(l(wj))) ¡ w0
jE(l(wj)). Note that, due to tractability reasons, it is assumed that ￿rms do
not react on short-run variations in employment, implying that ￿rms specify their wage policy
at the outset and do not change it. Holzner and Launov (2005) assume complementarity
between the production factors (supermodularity) in the production function yj. This
guarantees, provided a continuous distribution, that (type j) ￿rms cover exactly the same
position in the wage o￿er distribution of each skill group.44 As above, if there exists a mass
point, it exists at the upper bound ¹ wij of the skill-speci￿c wage distribution Hij for ￿rms with
technology j. At this point, marginal productivity given the employment at that wage equals
the wage y0
j(lij(wij)) = wij.
It is assumed that ￿rms pro￿ts di￿er according to the technology j employed. In this case, ￿rms
sort according to their pro￿tabilities in the skill-speci￿c wage o￿er distributions meaning that
more pro￿table ￿rms pay higher wages. Thus, the share of ￿rms that o￿ers wages below the
upper bound ¹ wij of a skill-speci￿c wage o￿er distribution of ￿rms of type j equals the share of
￿rms sj with technology j and less pro￿table Hij( ¹ wij) = sj. The resulting skill-speci￿c wage
o￿er distributions Hi have no holes (connected support) and the reservation wage (of skill group
i) is the lower bound of the wage o￿er distribution (of skill group i) as in the standard model.
43 Firms do not o￿er wages below the reservation wage of the individuals. This can be justi￿ed by assuming
for the production function that each skill is essential in production and is implied by the supermodularity
assumption made below.
44 Intuitively this is the case, since under supermodularity in production a ￿rm that has high employment in
each skill group and a ￿rm that has low employment in each skill group together produce more output than
any two ￿rms that produce with any other combination of these employments. Note that this characteristic
carries over to the pro￿ts of the ￿rms.Chapter 2 65
Excluding mass points, Holzner and Launov (2005) are able to derive an analytical form for
the wage o￿er distribution. They show that depending on the degree of homogeneity of the
production function, the model is able to generate increasing or decreasing skill-speci￿c wage
o￿er densities hij.45 That means that they do not require di￿erences in technologies to generate
a well-shaped wage density, as opposed to the models discussed so far. In addition, they show
that for higher wages decreasing densities are more likely.
Introducing a binding minimum wage has the following e￿ects. Assume that a binding minimum
wage is introduced for one skill group only. This compresses the wage distribution for this skill
group from the left. In addition, the complete skill-speci￿c wage distribution Hi is shifted to the
right. This follows from the fact that the upper bound of the skill speci￿c wage o￿er distributions
¹ wij for each technology j depends positively on the lower bound. As long as the skill-speci￿c
wage o￿er distribution does not contain a mass point, the other wage o￿er distributions remain
unchanged and ￿rms still cover the same position in the wage distributions for each skill group.
It is possible however, that the increase of the binding minimum wage leads to a mass point.
Increasing the minimum wage above marginal productivity of the most unpro￿table technology
would make it optimal for the ￿rms to employ less individuals. This is however not allowed for
by the model. It is possible that the minimum wage increases to a level where ￿rms with the
most unpro￿table technology make negative pro￿ts and thus are driven out of the market.
Independently of the precise e￿ects on the wage distribution, employment e￿ects of increasing
a minimum wage are zero, since labor demand as represented by ¸i does not react, even when
￿rms go bankrupt. The reason is that ¸i does not depend on the measure of active ￿rms nor
does it depend on the pro￿tability of the use of a speci￿c skill group (as long as the productivity
of this skill group is high enough to guarantee some employment). Thus, the minimum wage
redistributes rents from ￿rms to workers and might eliminate unpro￿table technologies but does
not increase unemployment. Introducing a binding minimum wage for all skill groups simulta-
neously is similar in its e￿ects, with the modi￿cation that the point where a technology becomes
unpro￿table is attained faster. Clearly, the model allows decomposing wage variation in a part
that is due to di￿erences in skills and into a part that is due to search frictions. It would be
interesting to analyze this empirically. In addition, it could be very interesting to incorporate
skill-biased technical change in this model and to analyze the according changes in the di￿erent
types of wage inequality caused by the skill bias and to see what the model can contribute to
the literature on changing inequality.
45 Intuitively, with increasing returns to scale there is a factor which counteracts the e￿ect of decreasing pro￿ts
per employee from the standard model. To insure constant pro￿ts, this implies that employment must grow
more slowly as compared to the linear production case. A decreasing wage o￿er density guarantees employment
growth to be slowly.66 Chapter 2
Note that the existence of mass points in the wage distribution makes it reasonable to think
about rationing of jobs (see Ridder and Van den Berg (1997)), because there are cases where
pro￿ts at the mass point are higher with lower employment. The model of Holzner and Launov
(2005) does not account for this possibility which must be seen as a drawback. Chapter 5 of this
dissertation removes this drawback, by endogenizing ¸.
2.5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it presents models of the labor market that
give ample consideration to the frictional character of the labor market. A number of models
that explicitly take account of the incompleteness of information and the process of acquiring
information are introduced. In the basic model, an equilibrium wage distribution is derived
for ex-ante homogeneous employees and employers. In extensions to the model, the impact of
di￿erences on the employer and employee sides on the resulting equilibrium wage distribution
are examined. Because heterogeneity of the actors in the labor market is seen as an important
factor, it is sensible to study models that explicitly model heterogeneity on both market sides
and that are still analytically tractable. All these equilibrium search models are seen to be able
to generate residual wage dispersion, which is an important component of wage dispersion as a
whole (see e.g. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and Katz and Autor (1999)). Thus, this models
contribute to our understanding of wage inequality and its changes.
On the other hand, the impact of unions on wages is considered in this paper, since in the German
context their in￿uence is considered especially important. It turns out that the union compression
hypothesis, i.e. the assumption that union wage compression leads to higher unemployment, is
not supported by all models analyzed. I obtain all sorts of employment e￿ects: positive, zero,
and negative ones. For example, in the case of continuous search costs, a minimum wage can
lead to a reduction of unemployment. Where I obtain zero employment e￿ects this stems from
the fact that search frictions guarantee ￿rms a monopsonistic position on the labor market. A
minimum wage then restricts the monopsony power of ￿rms and redistributes rents from ￿rms
to workers. Labor demand e￿ects do not occur or only in the unlikely case where the minimum
wage increases so strong that all matches (for a certain skill group) become unpro￿table. Two
of the proposed models support the union compression hypothesis: the model with endogenous
technology decision, and the model with heterogeneity on both sides of the market. In the
￿rst case the reason is that the measure of ￿rms decreases as the minimum wage increases and
that therefore the contact frequency declines. In the second model, this is the case, since the
minimum wage makes a part of the matches unpro￿table and thus not every meeting does result
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model with search frictions is to endogenize ¸. This is done in Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2007b).
Summarizing, in the search context, no de￿nite answer is available to the question of union
in￿uence on unemployment. In the spirit of Koning, Ridder, and Van den Berg (1995), one could
argue that as long as the minimum wage is not too high, there are no employment e￿ects of
minimum wages and these only redistribute rents. However, considering the labor market as an
ensemble of segmented speci￿c labor markets, as they do, suggests that a too high minimum wage
could make a whole segment unpro￿table. In this case there are pronounced employment e￿ects.
Note that when search frictions or more general monopsonistic structures are important, it can
be desirable to introduce or increase a minimum wage in order to redistribute rents from ￿rms
to workers without incurring the cost of increasing unemployment (see e.g. Manning (2003a)).
In sum, it can be concluded that search approaches o￿er a good alternative and complement to
neo-classical model frameworks. It provides a basis for a better understanding of labor market
mechanisms in a world of imperfect information. It adds to our understanding as far as labor
market dynamics is concerned and as far as the determinants of residual wage dispersion are
concerned. It thereby provides an alternative framework, for evaluating labor market policies,
as for example minimum wages. It turns out from our analysis above that the impact of labor
unions is complex. Further theoretical and empirical work is necessary to decide on the issue of
employment and wage e￿ects of labor unions bargaining power.3 Employment, wages and frictions: The role of
job￿to￿job transitions
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deduces, discusses and tests empirical implications of search theory for the German
labor market and is based on Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2007b).
For a long time, the literature in economics has concentrated on a static perspective of the labor
market. Since Stigler’s seminal paper (1961) on the e￿ect of imperfect information in goods
markets, a huge literature on price dispersion for identical products and the decision problems for
either side of the market has developed. By nature, the process of acquiring information is time-
consuming and therefore dynamic. We conduct an empirical analysis on labor market dynamics
and wages based on this theoretical background, which is now seen as ‘the canonical framework
for the analysis of labor markets’ in parts of the literature (Moscarini (2003)). This paper
attempts to give a comprehensive empirical overview on wages and employment dynamics in the
labor market without a priori restrictions on the data. We investigate di￿erences in transition
rates and in the wage structure over time and across individuals with speci￿c characteristics.
Our results cannot be used to discriminate between competing theories of the labor market in a
strict sense. Nevertheless, for a number of aspects, the results allow to assess whether theoretical
predictions are consistent with the data.
The motivation for considering labor market transitions and wages together builds on equilibrium
search theory (see Mortensen (2003) for an overview). In their seminal work on equilibrium wage
dispersion for homogeneous workers Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that the amount of
frictions determines the extent of wage dispersion for homogeneous workers in a labor market.
Frictions themselves can be measured by labor market transitions. To see this, recognize that
frictions persist because there is imperfect information in the labor market. Individuals do not
know their outside wages and have to acquire this information in a time-consuming process. Once
they have acquired the information, they process it and take the optimal decision based on a
standard optimization problem. This implies, for instance, that individuals climb the wage ladder
slowly, and that wage di￿erentials diminish over time. Since jobs do not last forever, but also
end for reasons beyond the control of ￿rms and workers, the process does not converge to a single
wage, and an equilibrium cross-sectional wage distribution exists.1 This argument identi￿es two
important friction parameters in search theory: the job o￿er rate and the job destruction rate.
1 Note, that the above argument also implies that the distribution of wages in a cross section of workers is not
the same as the distribution of wages in a cross section of newly created jobs.
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The ￿rst can be viewed as re￿ecting informational frictions, being the result of the process of
acquiring information. The second parameter represents the amount of turbulence and shocks in
the economy (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). Because of the importance of frictions
for the wage distribution, we scrutinize the changes in these friction parameters over time and
across demographic groups.
Human capital theory assumes that the wage growth of individuals over time is mainly caused
by the acquisition of human capital while working in a given job. Search theory suggests that the
main source of wage growth over the course of an individual’s career is the wage growth caused
by (voluntary) job￿to￿job transitions. This leads us to examine the wage growth associated with
job￿to￿job transitions. Since it might be the wage-tenure pro￿le instead of the level of wages
which in￿uences the decision to change the job, we also investigate the wage growth of job movers
and stayers (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens
(2004)). Finally, we take a closer look at the determinants of changing the relative position in
the wage distribution to analyze the factors determining the relative success in the labor market
and the importance of job￿to￿job transitions in this respect.
There exists a large empirical literature that deals with labor market frictions, labor market tran-
sitions and the connection between wages and transitions. Such literature strands include the
literature on empirical equilibrium search models (see, e.g., Van den Berg and Ridder (1998),Bon-
temps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b)), the literature
on returns to seniority (see, e.g., Abraham and Farber (1987), Topel (1991) and Dustmann and
Meghir (2005)), the related literature on worker displacement (see, e.g., Fallick (1996), Kletzer
(1998), Burda and Mertens (2001), and the literature on search frictions (see Ridder and Van
den Berg (2003), Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) and Van den Berg and van Vuuren
(2006)). We analyze wage mobility, i.e. changes in the relative wage position of a worker as in
the study by Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) for the US, which has so far been a neglected issue in
the literature for Germany.
Ridder and Van den Berg (2003) comes closest to our approach. They estimate friction parame-
ters for France using two di￿erent methods. One method relies on the relationship between the
cross-sectional distribution and the wage o￿er distribution which is implied by an equilibrium
search model, while the other does not. Using OECD data, they also obtain estimates for Ger-
many. Contrary to our approach, they assume that the job-o￿er rate on the job is identical to
the job-o￿er rate for unemployed. Because of the disaggregate nature of our dataset, clearly,
our results are interesting and complement their results. In addition, we use no constraints for
estimation. Our results for annual transition rates di￿er considerably from theirs. Especially our
estimate of the job arrival rate for the unemployed ¸ and the job arrival rate for the unemployed
¸L) is much higher than theirs. ¸ in our dataset is around 25% and our job-changing rate, which70 Chapter 3
can serve as a lower bound for ¸L is around 8% and therefore around factor 3 higher than the
estimate of Ridder and Van den Berg (2003).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 states the results of search theory, that motivate
our analysis. Section 3 describes the data set used. In section 4, we state some facts about
stocks and ￿ows (normalized as rates), their di￿erences across groups, and their cyclical behavior.
Afterwards, we investigate in some detail the job￿to￿job transitions and their impact on wages
for di￿erent groups. Finally, we estimate determinants of changes in the relative position of the
wage distribution. The last section concludes.
3.2 Theoretical background
Starting with Stigler’s (1961) seminal contribution, the early literature on informational frictions
was concentrating on the search problem of individuals when confronted with di￿erent prices for a
homogeneous product. It was shown that under certain circumstances the search problem can be
interpreted as an optimal stopping problem, where the solution is characterized by a reservation
wage/price (see DeGroot (1970)). The other side of the market was rarely analyzed in detail,
i.e. it remained unclear why price/wage dispersion emerges. The matching literature (see e.g.
Pissarides (2000) as a major contribution to this literature) su￿ers from this shortcoming. On the
one hand, the motivation for the existence of an informational imperfection is argued to come
from heterogeneous prices for homogeneous products. On the other hand, in this literature,
there is generally just one price for homogeneous matches in equilibrium, so that it is di￿cult to
argue why informational frictions exist. In addition, the focus of the matching literature lies on
worker ￿ows and on phenomena related to the business cycle.2 In light of these limitations, we
focus on the equilibrium search literature as an explanation of wage dispersion among potentially
homogeneous workers.
Stigler’s contribution already shows that the amount of information imperfection is related to
the degree of price dispersion for a homogeneous product in the market. Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) formalize the idea in the context of labor markets. Their model resolves the Diamond-
Paradox (1971), which states that under a Poisson-assumption for job o￿ers and wage setting
by ￿rms, a non-degenerate price dispersion for homogeneous workers cannot be an equilibrium.3
Under Diamond’s assumptions, ￿rms have the whole bargaining power over the rent resulting
from the market imperfection. In equilibrium, identical workers with identical reservation wages
2 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this fact.
3 A theoretical paper by Albrecht and Axell (1984) that implies an equilibrium wage distribution with two mass
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are all o￿ered their reservation wage by ￿rms. The crucial di￿erence in the paper by Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) is that workers are allowed to search on￿the￿job for a better￿paying job. This
guarantees that the Burdett and Judd (1983) condition for equilibrium price dispersion is met,
i.e. that one part of the individuals (here: the employed) is able to compare wages. This yields a
trade-o￿ in ￿rms’ wage policy, since a higher wage attracts more workers and causes the ￿rms to
lose fewer workers to competitors. This essential point of the model guarantees the existence of
a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution among identical individuals and ￿rms. In equi-
librium, high-wage ￿rms have higher employment, and make less pro￿ts per employee compared
to low-wage ￿rms.
The amount of wage dispersion observed in this model is directly linked to the possibility of
individuals changing jobs. The more often they change jobs, the faster they climb the wage ladder
towards their marginal productivity. Hence, the market imperfection is weaker and the wage
dispersion is smaller. If jobs never ended, except through job￿to￿job transitions, unemployment
would converge to zero and the wage dispersion to the marginal productivity of the individuals.
So, the second determinant (and a necessary condition) for wage dispersion is the frequency at
which jobs end for reasons not related to the individuals decision to change a job (called ￿job
destruction￿). If they end more often, equilibrium unemployment and therefore the in￿ows into
low-wage ￿rms will rise. Accordingly, the frequency of exogenous job destruction acts to increase
wage dispersion.4
More formally: consider the model as outlined by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Let ¸L denote
the rate at which employees receive o￿ers from competing ￿rms (job o￿er rate). Further, let ±
denote the rate at which jobs end for exogenous reasons. y denotes the marginal productivity and
wR the reservation wage of the individuals. Then the resulting equilibrium wage o￿er distribution
is5
H(w) =
8
> > <
> > :
0 for w < wR
¸L+±
¸L
³
1 ¡
q
y¡w
y¡wR
´
for wR · w < wo
1 for w ¸ wo
(3.1)
Hence, the wage distribution is determined by the two frictional parameters ¸L and ±, the
marginal productivity and the reservation wage. However, what is observed in the data is not
the wage o￿er distribution but the distribution of paid wages. The distribution of paid wages
4 Both statements are only correct under some parameter restrictions. See Van den Berg and Ridder (1993).
5 A derivation of this formula can be found in Garlo￿ (2003).72 Chapter 3
G(w) is determined by the wage o￿er distribution and just the parameters ¸L and ±. The variance
of the actual wage distribution is given by (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1993), p.48￿.)
varG(w) = 1=3(y ¡ wmin)2´(1 ¡ ´)2; (3.2)
where ´ = ±
±+¸L is a frictions indicator often used in the search literature, and wmin is a minimum
wage (when there is not minimum wage then wmin corresponds to wR). This shows more formally
our motivation to deal with labor market dynamics and therefore with the transition rates when
thinking about wages. The above formulas imply that informational frictions are an important
determinant of the observed wage structure.
There are two major objections against this model. First, an important drawback is that the
model assumes homogeneous individuals and ￿rms. It is di￿cult to argue that, even after a
market segmentation, individuals are homogeneous or at least not distinguishable from the point
of view of the ￿rm. For instance, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) ￿nd a strong individual
component in the determinants of wages. Second, the resulting distribution of actual wages
G(w) is skewed to the left.6 This is at odds with observed wage distributions which are typically
skewed to the right. Even after a segmentation of the labor market in (more or less) homogeneous
segments, e.g. in age-education cells as in Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005b), or in age-education-
profession-industry cells as in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), (German and Dutch) wages are
not skewed to the left.7
In reaction to these objections, several extensions have been discussed including exogenous or
endogenous heterogeneity on the side of the ￿rms (see e.g. Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg
(2000), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)), exogenous or endogenous heterogeneity on the side of
the workers (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Moen (1999)) or exogenous heterogeneity
on both sides of the market (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), Teulings and Gautier
(2004)). However, all these models have in common that wages are determined partly by search
frictions. So the fundamental insight of the basic model is robust: there is a close relationship
between labor market dynamics and the wage distribution along the arguments of equilibrium
search theory.
Let us summarize our theoretical section by stating empirical implications of search theory.
6 Intuitively, the fact that both wage distributions have an increasing density means that the trade o￿ between
the number of employees and the pro￿t per employee generated by on the job search is so strong that not only
the employment over all ￿rms increases with the wage, which would also be the case if there was the same
amount of ￿rms o￿ering each wage. But, the e￿ect is so strong that there are even more of these bigger ￿rms
o￿ering the higher wage.
7 On the contrary, Gautier and Teulings (2006) conclude in their application for six OECD countries, including
Germany, that the theoretical prediction of a left skewed wage distribution is in accordance with the data.Chapter 3 73
² There is a close relationship between wages and labor market frictions. Labor market
frictions in the sense of this paper are informational imperfections and, basically, constitute
barriers to mobility. They cause economically motivated labor market transitions not
to take place immediately. Labor market transition rates are indicators of labor market
frictions.
² Transitions between unemployment and employment depend on the job o￿er rate when
unemployed, job￿to￿job transitions depend on the job o￿er rate when employed. Both
rates depend both on macroeconomic conditions (e.g. labor market tightness) and on
individual behavior (e.g. search intensity).
² Transitions from employment to unemployment depend on the exogenous job destruction
rate and therefore on the business cycle.
² The job￿to￿job transition rate depends on the wage earned in the current job because the
probability that an i.i.d. o￿er from the wage o￿er distribution exceeds the current wage
declines with the level of the current wage. By the same argument, the job￿to￿job transition
rate also depends on age, since individuals climb the wage ladder as time progresses.8
² The simple equilibrium search model is a model for homogeneous individuals and therefore
does not make any predictions how the di￿erent rates vary with education, sex, nationality,
marital status, professional status, or sector. However, when interpreting the model as a
model for homogeneous market segments, it is important to take account of these di￿er-
ences. In contrast, the displacement literature (Burda and Mertens (2001)) emphasizes
that individuals, who loose their jobs involuntarily, loose human capital, and experience
wage cuts even if they ￿nd employment again.
² Job￿to￿job transitions are the crucial determinant of wage growth in an individual’s career.
From the point of view of the simple equilibrium search model presented above, they occur
exclusively because of wage gains.
² Average wage gains through job￿to￿job transitions decrease with the earned wage and with
age, since older individuals earn more on average.
² The share of job￿to￿job transitions involving wage gains decreases with age, since the num-
ber of job￿to￿job transitions that are economically motivated in the sense discussed above
decreases, holding other noneconomic reasons that cause job￿to￿job transitions constant.
8 This holds true only if ¸L > ±. In our application, this condition is met (see table C.3).74 Chapter 3
3.3 Data and de￿nitions
The empirical analysis is based on the IAB employment sub-sample (IABS), a large adminis-
trative data set for Germany for the time period 1975 to 2001, see Hamann (2004). The IABS
contains information from two sources. The ￿rst source are the employment statistics based on
the integrated noti￿cation procedure for health insurance, social security, and unemployment
insurance. This way, employers are required to report employment under the social security
system which covers about 80% of all employees. Civil servants, self-employed, helping family,
students, and employees earning less than a certain low threshold income are not covered by the
system. The second source for the IABS are the transfer payments to the unemployed.
The two sources are merged together for a two percent random sample of employees from the
social security records. Therefore, by construction, the data set is representative regarding em-
ployment covered by the social security system but not regarding the stock of unemployment.
The information on timing (daily!) of being in one labor market state (spells) and on the gross
daily wage (rounded to DM/Euro) are exact, except for the wage being censored at the upper
social security threshold. Typical panel data problems like panel mortality or commemoration
error do not arise. In addition, the data set is large (about 21 million observations) and (depend-
ing on the interpretation) representative for all persons who have been employed at least once in
a job that is part of the compulsory noti￿cation procedure during the observed 27 years (more
than 80% of all workers). We observe the three labor market states: employed (E), recipient
of transfer payments (i.e. unemployment bene￿ts, unemployment assistance and income mainte-
nance during participation in training programs, BR), and out of sample (OOS).9 Unfortunately,
none of the two last categories corresponds exactly to the economic concept of unemployment.
The second state is likely to approximate unemployment better than the third one, since every
person being recipient of transfer payments is indeed unemployed from an administrative point
of view.10 On the other hand, there are persons who are registered unemployed but who are
not entitled to receive transfer payments. During this time, these people are not recorded in the
IABS. Thus, they cannot be distinguished from self-employed, civil servants, people being out of
labor force and others (see above) who are at least once employed in a recorded job during the
time period under investigation.
9 In addition, we could distinguish between people being out of sample between two spells of di￿erent states
and between people who are at one point in time not in the data set, but where there is no spell either before
or afterwards (broad de￿nition). As an extreme case, the latter might include persons who are dead, whereas
the former does not. For most analyses, we use the narrow de￿nition of the third state, i.e. only out of sample
spells where there are spells of di￿erent states both before and afterwards. Although then, the state OOS is
not representative any more, this narrow de￿nition seems more appropriate for our analysis.
10 With the exception of participants in a training programme. We basically view them as being unemployed
since the goal of the programme is to improve the reemployment chances in the future.Chapter 3 75
We calculate transition rates between the three states, excluding individuals that have been
employed at least once in East Germany, individuals who had a minor employment after 1998
and workers who had parallel employment spells at least once.
These restrictions reduce our sample to 12.2 millions observations. Annual transition rates are
based on the labor market state on January 1st of each year.11 Transitions from employment to
receiving transfer payments are interpreted as transitions to unemployment,12 since the bene￿t
entitlement period is six months after an employment spell of six months, and it increases
to one year after a two year spell.13 In addition, the correlation between the administrative
unemployment rate and the share of bene￿t recipients in our sample is near one. In contrast,
transitions from unemployment into employment are not that easily approximated by transitions
from receiving transfer payments to employment. Long￿term unemployed, whose bene￿ts are
exhausted, might ￿nd a job, and there might be people shifting from the state receiving transfer
payments to the state out of sample by becoming a civil servant or by becoming self￿employed.
Therefore, in the empirical section, we use di￿erent de￿nitions of unemployment to check for
consistency of the results.
As wage information we use daily gross wages given in the data set, which are censored from
above at the upper social security threshold. Since the censoring threshold is not precise in the
data, we observe wages which are slightly above the social security threshold and a clustering
of wage observations below this threshold. In addition, for data reasons, there exists another
category (wage 400) in the data which indicates censoring. Where we need the wage information,
we censor the wages slightly below the social security threshold and replace the censored value by
a conditional expectation from a Tobit regression. Thus, we assume that log-wages in every cross
section (after conditioning for demographic characteristics) are normally distributed.14 There
is also a lower bound in the wage distribution which stems from the fact that, below a certain
salary threshold, jobs are not subject to social insurance contributions (i.e. the wage distribution
is truncated from below).15 About 0.6% of the employment spells fall into this category. We
11 The yearly structure implies that our sample is a stock sample, which itself implies a length-biased sampling
problem when estimating transition rates. Both short employment and unemployment spells are underrepre-
sented in the data set.
12 The largest group of workers not contained in the data set are civil servants who are typically tenured (´ no
risk of unemployment).
13 However, we have to note that at least for the US, it is known that most new jobs end early. Farber (1999)
￿nds that in the US about one third of all new full-time jobs end in the ￿rst six months, while about two
thirds end within the ￿rst two years.
14 We censor slightly below the threshold because of the clustering around the threshold and since we suspect
that there is no real clustering around the social security threshold (see Fitzenberger and Reize (2002)). In the
case of clustering, Tobit estimates based on the rounded o￿cial daily threshold yield unsatisfactory results,
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replace the censored value for part-time employees and apprentices by a conditional expectation
from Tobit regressions.16 Around 74% of these censored spells involve apprentices, whom we
typically exclude from our analysis of wage mobility. Part-time employment, which accounts for
further 8% of these censored values, is also excluded from most of our analysis on wage mobility.
For bene￿t recipients, we replace the wage by their last in￿ation (´CPI) adjusted wage. For
about 5% of the employment spells, the wages are not available because of data errors (wage 0).
For the analysis of wages, we exclude these spells. There is a second problem with missings in the
wage data. Namely, there are bene￿t recipiency spells which are extrapolated backwards before
the ￿rst employment spell of an individual. Again, we exclude these spells for the analysis of
wages. Finally, there exists a structural break for wages between 1983 and 1984. Since 1984, but
not before, one-time wage payments and non-monetary bene￿ts are covered by the wage variable.
We use a time trend and/or year dummies to control for this institutional change. When using
wage dispersion measures, we calculate them from the cross sections of employees on January
1st.
For the analysis of wage mobility, we construct three skill groups from the education information:
The ￿rst category corresponds to persons who have neither a completed vocational training nor
a university degree (low-skilled). The second category consists of people who have ￿nished a
vocational training degree but have no university degree (medium-skilled). The third group
corresponds to persons who have a university degree or a degree from a technical college (high-
skilled). Note that the education information in the IABS is not always consistent across time
so that we corrected the education information based on the simple rule that a degree obtained
cannot be lost.
3.4 Empirical results
This section ￿rst provides a broad description of stocks and ￿ows as the background for our
subsequent analysis. Then, we investigate job￿to￿job transitions and associated wage changes.
Finally, we analyze the wage distribution and examine determinants of wage mobility. All tables
and ￿gures can be found in the appendix.
15 The data set records such jobs only since 1998 but even before 1998 there are wages below this threshold
which are therefore censored and set to 1 in the data set. This is due to the fact that there are both wage and
working time criteria for a job not to be subject to social insurance contribution.
16 For other employees we suspect that the low wage noti￿cations are incorrect and therefore we set the censored
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3.4.1 Stocks
Figure C.1 and table C.1 describe the stocks in di￿erent labor market states over time and
across di￿erent socio￿demographic groups. Since most ￿ndings are as expected, we only brie￿y
discuss these results. Table C.1 shows a bene￿t recipiency rate of about 7% and a rate of 12% of
individuals being out of sample (narrow de￿nition, see footnote 9). About 81% of the individuals
are employed. Figure C.1 show the development of the bene￿t recipients and people being out
of sample over time. The number of individuals being out of sample shows a hump-shaped trend
over time. This is caused by the sampling design of the data set, see section 3.3.17 Higher
unemployment and institutional changes (such as a prolongation of unemployment claims) are
re￿ected in the higher share of individuals that are registered as bene￿t recipients at the end
of the 90s. The rate of bene￿t recipients shows a stepwise increase, analogous to the widely
discussed ratchet e￿ect for the trend in the unemployment rate (Franz (2006)). Employment
growth is positively correlated with the real (West-German) GDP growth (correlation coe￿cient
0.50), whereas the growth rate of bene￿t recipients is negatively correlated to real GDP growth
(correlation coe￿cient of -0.67). The growth rate of persons being out of sample is weakly
negatively related to real GDP growth (correlation coe￿cient -0.24).18 The rate of bene￿t
recipients in our data set shows a strong positive correlation with the o￿cial unemployment rate
(0.95) and a strong negative correlation with the in￿ation rate.
Table C.1 shows that by far the biggest professional group are clerks (more than 40%), whereas
the smallest group are foreman (less than 2%). Apprentices account for almost 7% of all em-
ployees. Unskilled workers show the highest bene￿t recipiency rate (12.7%). The lowest bene￿t
recipiency rate is found for clerks (4.6%), apprentices (3.8%), and part-time workers who work
less than half of the normal time (1.5%). Foremen have the lowest rate of persons being out
of sample (5.3%), while part-timers that work less than half of normal time have the highest
rate (34.9%). Regarding education, the bene￿t recipiency rate decreases as expected with the
educational level. The rate is 9.4% for persons who do not have any degree and it is 3.6% for
polytechnic and university graduates. Foreigners account for 8% and they show a slightly worse
labor market performance than Germans. As expected, males are overrepresented in the data
compared to females because sampling is based on employment. The bene￿t recipiency rate
among females is slightly lower and the out of sample rate is considerably higher than among
males. Regarding age, the bene￿t recipiency rate increases strongly with age and the out of
sample rate shows a hump shaped pattern between 16 and 61 years.
17 Out of sample observations at a certain point of time in the middle of the observation period are more likely
to be sampled compared to observations close to the boundaries of the observation period.
18 The data for the business cycle are based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2000) until 1991 and own calculations for
GDP growth in West Germany, based on the data available for the West-German ￿L￿nder￿ (www.destatis.de).78 Chapter 3
3.4.2 Flows
There exists a large literature on worker and job ￿ows in the labor market.19 The literature
mainly focuses on the forces behind and on the regularities of worker and job ￿ows, e.g. their
cyclical behavior. Our data allow us to identify worker ￿ows, i.e. job￿to￿job transitions associated
with a change in establishment.
Based on table C.2 about 8% of the previously employed change jobs, about 3% become bene￿t
recipients, and a further 3% move out of sample. About 3% leave the data set (e.g. because
of retirement, death, or business start￿ups), while more than 82% stay with the same employer
or experience recalls. Hence with only about 18% of all workers leaving their current job per
year, the German labor market exhibits higher employment stability than the US labor market
where this number is about 37%. Between one and two percent of the about 90% who remain
employed in two consecutive years have an intervening bene￿t recipiency spell and another one
to two percent have an intervening spell out of sample (not in the table). Once individuals are
bene￿t recipients, they are employed again in the next year at a rate of 24%. Similarly, about
24% return to employment when they are out of sample. About 48% of the bene￿t recipients
are bene￿t recipients in the next year, while about 13% change to the state out of sample and
another 14% leave the data set. Individuals that are out of sample remain in more than 64% of
the cases in this state in the following year, while about 10% become bene￿t recipients (probably
with an intervening employment spell) and 3% leave the data set (with an intervening spell of
either employment or bene￿t recipiency).
Turning to the cyclical behavior of transition rates, ￿gure C.2 shows the percentage of individuals
who changed their job during one year relating to all individuals employed at the beginning of
the year. There is a weak cyclical structure for job￿to￿job transitions and the rate is positively
related to real GDP growth (correlation coe￿cient 0.33), whereas the correlation between the
rate of persons who remain in the same establishment with the business cycle is a bit stronger
(0.41).20 Allowing that last year’s growth might in￿uence today’s job changing rate shows that
after one year the positive correlation is about the same (0.33). Figure C.3 reveals that the
19 For a comprehensive overview, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). A recent paper by Bachmann (2005)
analyzes the cyclical behavior of labor market transition rates in West Germany based on the IABS. His
results di￿er from our results. A major di￿erence lies in the de￿nition of the transition rates. While we
investigate transitions on a year-to-year basis (there is at most one transition per year), Bachmann (2005)
includes multiple transitions in the calculation of transition rates, i.e. individuals with multiple transitions in
a year have a higher implied rate. Our de￿nition focuses on transitions into labor market states which are
sustained for some time, thus not giving strong weight to cases with many transitions during a short amount
of time.
20 Fallick and Fleischman (2001) conclude for the United States, that job￿to￿job transitions are not pro-cyclical.
Our numbers and theirs, however, are not directly comparable, since we relate the ￿ows to the size of total
employment, which might be responsible for the cyclical behavior.Chapter 3 79
transition rate from employment to bene￿t recipiency is strongly counter-cyclical, as con￿rmed
by the negative correlation coe￿cient (-0.86). This negative correlation is weaker if we allow
for a lag, i.e. the transition rate to bene￿t recipiency is correlated with the growth rate of the
previous year (-0.38). After two years the correlation has vanished. This negative correlation
is in accordance with the literature (see e.g. Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for four European
countries and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) for the US). Transitions from bene￿t recipiency to
employment are not strongly related to GDP growth (0.36). The lagged transition rate shows a
weaker positive correlation with GDP growth (0.30), which almost disappears after two years.
The correlation of the business cycle with the out￿ow rate from bene￿t recipiency is almost
zero (0.01).21 It seems that layo￿s and/or quits with a subsequent bene￿t recipiency spell are
counter-cyclical in contrast to hirings being pro-cyclical (all transitions to employment). The
out￿ow rate from employment is counter-cyclical as indicated by a correlation coe￿cient of -0.82,
thus the probability to remain employed is pro-cyclical (see table C.4). The fact that we have
the counter-cyclical structure for job separations is in accordance with the view that a downturn
might have a cleansing e￿ect in the sense that unproductive jobs are destroyed. Note that
job￿to￿job transitions may as well serve as a means to improve match quality, but job￿to￿job
transitions are higher in an upturn compared to a downturn.
Table C.3 shows di￿erences across demographic groups.22 We observe three states and four
transitions for each of the three states, since there is one state that indicates that an individual
has left the data set and that he does not return any more. In addition, for the employed we
also report the transition rate from job to job.
Search theory argues that individuals draw i.i.d. wage o￿ers from some wage o￿er distribution at
a constant rate. When individuals earn higher wages, wage o￿ers exceed their earned wage more
rarely, i.e. the job changing rate decreases with wage. This argument is con￿rmed in table C.3,
which measures the wage position by the tercile of the wage distribution. The risk of becoming
bene￿t recipient or changing to the state out of sample shows similar patterns and declines with
age. Likewise, the frequency at which individuals stay with the same employer strongly increases
with the wage. The transition rate from bene￿t recipiency to employment is highest for low
wages, while the rate of remaining bene￿t recipient is highest for high wages. While individuals
with low wages comparatively often change to the out of sample state, high-wage individuals
21 Here, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) conclude for the out￿ows from unemploy-
ment that they are counter-cyclical. Again, the di￿erences to our results might come from the fact that we
normalize by the number of unemployed, which might be responsible for the weakly pro-cyclical behavior in
our data set.
22 Note that the (weighted) mean of the transition rates for those demographic characteristics which can change
over time is not necessarily equal to the transition rate over all individuals, since we include in our analysis
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often leave the data set completely once they are bene￿t recipients. The transition rates from
out of sample to other states also di￿er considerably.
Table C.3 shows pronounced di￿erences in transition rates across age groups. Economic theory
predicts that older individuals are on average in a better position in the wage distribution so
that they accept wage o￿ers from competitors more rarely. Therefore, we expect that the job
changing rate declines with age. This is con￿rmed by the data.23 Suitably, the frequency with
which individuals stay with the same employer increases from age 26 to age 50 and declines
afterwards. The bene￿t recipiency risk is high for young individuals up to 30 years and for
elderly people from 56 onwards. The risk of moving out of sample is highest for individuals aged
21 to 25 and decreases afterwards, while obviously the probability of leaving the data set is very
high for people aged 56 and older. The transition rate from bene￿t recipiency to employment is
highest for individuals between 21 and 25 and decreases monotonically with age afterwards. The
frequency at which individuals remain unemployed in two consecutive years increases from 44%
for the 21 to 25 age group to 63% for the 51 to 55 age group and then decreases rapidly. The
transition probability to the state out of sample is high until age 35 and decreases afterwards,
while the probability of leaving the data set starts to increase from age 36 onwards. The out￿ow
rate from the state out of sample to employment decreases continuously with age, while the
probability to remain out of sample decreases from age 20 onwards. The in￿ow rate from out of
sample to bene￿t recipiency increases monotonically up to age 60 and the probability to leave
the data set is particularly high for the elderly. Since unemployment￿to￿job transitions are rarer
for older individuals, search frictions seem to be higher for this group, while the job destruction
rate declines at least up to age 50 indicating less frictions.24
Education is an important determinant of economic outcomes. However, simple equilibrium
search theory does not make clear predictions on the e￿ect of education on transition rates. Ta-
ble C.3 shows that the job changing rate increases with educational attainment. While medium-
skilled individuals are most likely to stay with the same employer, high-skilled individuals are
more likely to change jobs. Clearly the bene￿t recipiency risk and the risk of moving out of
sample is highest for low-skilled individuals and decreases with educational attainment. For
bene￿t recipients, the job ￿nding rate increases with education as well. Individuals without any
degree have by far the highest probability to remain unemployed in two consecutive years. If
23 Farber (1999) ￿nds that the job￿to￿job transition rate declines with tenure. This is consistent with our
observation on the behavior of this rate with age if older persons have on average longer tenures, which is
always true if the job o￿er rate for unemployed is higher than the job o￿er rate on the job plus the job
destruction rate.
24 In Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005b), we distinguish transition rates for prime-age working males by age and
education. There are pronounced di￿erences across age and education groups which are mostly in accordance
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individuals are out of sample, their transition rate to employment increases with education, while
the transition rate to bene￿t recipiency decreases with education. Summing up, as expected,
the situation is more favorable for the high-skilled, which means, in terms of search theory, that
there are less frictions for the highly educated.
Regarding gender di￿erences, women stay more rarely with the same employer over two consec-
utive years, while all other transition rates are a bit higher. If women are bene￿t recipients, they
remain less often in this state than men (42% versus 51%), because they move out of sample more
frequently. From out of sample, women remain there more often than men (67% versus 61%)
with all other rates being lower. Germans seem to be better o￿ in the labor market exhibiting
a higher probability to change jobs as well as to remain in the same job and lower probabilities
to move to bene￿t recipiency, out of sample, or to leave the data set. For bene￿t recipients, the
di￿erences are not large, but Germans are more likely to return to employment. In the state out
of sample, foreigners have a lower probability to remain there for another year. They move more
often to the state bene￿t recipiency and disappear more often from the dataset.
Regarding the professional status, especially clerks often change jobs. This might be due to scale
e￿ects of markets, since clerks are the biggest group and since therefore it might be easier to get
in contact with a new job. In contrast, foremen are the least mobile full-time group and they
stay most often with the same employer. Unskilled workers (and home workers) have the highest
bene￿t recipiency risk, while clerks have the lowest full-time risk. Apprentices and part-time
employed most often change to the state out of sample. Part-time employed also leave the data
set fairly often. The highest transition rate from bene￿t recipiency to employment is found for
clerks. Again, this might be due to scale e￿ects.25 Unskilled workers are most likely to remain
unemployed in two consecutive years, while clerks have the lowest probability. Foremen show the
highest propensity to leave the data set and most frequently return from the state out of sample
to employment (besides home-workers), while they remain rarely in this state in two consecutive
years.
Concluding, we ￿nd clear di￿erences in almost all characteristics that we have looked at. Some
di￿erences are consistent with economic theory, whereas others are not. It is important to take
account of these di￿erences. Di￿erences across characteristics indicate di￿erences in the degree
of frictions, which can explain di￿erences in economic outcomes.
25 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2002) ￿nd in their analysis for the UK that scale e￿ects are re￿ected in higher
wages and not in more matches, since the reservation wage of the individuals reacts to a higher job-o￿er rate.82 Chapter 3
3.4.3 Wage changes following job-to-job transitions
This section explores the e￿ect of job￿to￿job transitions on wages. This is important for several
reasons and there exists a large body of literature on the e￿ect of seniority on wages (see e.g.
Dustmann and Meghir (2005)) and on the e￿ect of voluntary and involuntary mobility on wages
(see, e.g. Burda and Mertens (2001)). It is often argued that due to accumulation of speci￿c
human capital wages increase with tenure.26 An alternative view argues that tenure e￿ects are
the result of shifts in the composition of employment. High-wage jobs are more likely to survive,
so that we observe that long tenures and high wages are correlated (sorting bias). Third, from
the search-theoretic perspective, with increasing experience individuals have received on average
more job o￿ers from competing ￿rms, which might lead as well to job￿to￿job changes associated
with wage gains (see Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for a theoretical model) or to higher wages
in the speci￿c ￿rm if ￿rms can counter wage o￿ers from competing ￿rms (see Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002a)).27 So the fact that we observe less job￿to￿job transitions and higher wages as
people age might stem from the fact that they have acquired a lot of speci￿c human capital
which they would loose when changing jobs or from the fact that they simply have higher wages
because of more o￿ers from competing ￿rms, so that on average job o￿ers rarely exceed their
wage. Note that, from this perspective, job￿to￿job transitions are the central source of wage
growth and that they play a critical role in equilibrium search models. Most of the existing
equilibrium search models that derive an endogenous wage distribution depend critically upon
the fact that workers can search on the job.28
Both the e￿ect of seniority on wages and e￿ects of mobility on wages have been discussed
intensively in the literature. The literature on mobility, though, is often motivated from a more
geographical perspective. Regarding the interaction of mobility, human capital, and wages the
literature is more narrow. Examples for studies addressing this problem in a non-structural way
are Antel (1986), Light and McGarry (1998) and Zwick and Kuckulenz (2005). In the following,
we analyze in detail the wage changes associated with a direct job￿to￿job transition, de￿ned as
a transition from one establishment to another within 15 days. In addition, we condition on
the fact that the previous job and the new job last for at least three months.29 Recall that the
average annual job-changing rate lies around 8%. This does not exactly re￿ect the job￿to￿job
26 This argumentation can be traced back to Becker (1964).
27 In addition, there might be a match-speci￿c component that does not result from higher productivity but
from better information about the match (see e.g. Moscarini (2003)).
28 For an exception, see e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) where the decision problem is not sequential, and
Teulings and Gautier (2004).
29 Alternative de￿nitions consider individuals that have changed jobs without long phases of interruption or
simply individuals that are known to have changed the job within a year (analogous to the de￿nition in the
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changes we de￿ne here, since there are individuals who change jobs and return to the previous
employer afterwards (recalls) or individuals who change jobs and then become bene￿t recipients
or move out of sample afterwards. Furthermore, there are individuals who change jobs more
than once within one year and individuals that change jobs with longer phases of interruption.
However, we constrain ourselves to these selection of individuals to avoid that multiple trippers,
as e.g. artists, with huge income swings a￿ect our results.
Overall, we observe about 714,000 direct job￿to￿job transitions over the 27 years and the de-
velopment over time is similar to the normalized measure in ￿gure C.2. Among the 570,000
direct job-to-job transitions within the full-time category (excluding apprentices), 65% of the
individuals gain from a job￿to￿job change, whereas 28% experience wage cuts.30 Average gains
for the 65% that have wage increases are quite high with an average gain of 27% (median 14%)
relative to their previous wage. The average loss of the individuals su￿ering a wage cut is about
16% (median 11%). Among the 225,000 individuals (within the full time category) that have
exactly one job-to-job transition within a year with a break of a maximum of 14 days, about 63%
experience a wage gain, while 28% experience a loss. The average gain among the winners is 29%
(median 18%) compares to an average loss of 14% (median 10%) among the losers. Additional
roughly 34,000 full-time employed individuals have more than one job-to-job transitions (without
long breaks) within a year, but including them does not change the picture. Following the ap-
proach in subsection 3.4.1 and considering all full-time employed individuals that have changed
the employer throughout the year, we observe about 348,000 such individuals, where about 62%
win (33% on average, median 18%) and 30% loose (18% on average, median 13%).31 These
results are broadly consistent with the wage change being a crucial determinant of the decision
to change a job, as purported by search theory. In general, individuals gain considerably from
job￿to￿job transitions. But, even within the category of full-time employees, there remains a
signi￿cant proportion of job changers with wage cuts. This is di￿cult to reconcile with standard
search theory, although more advanced theoretical models are able to explain this (see Jolivet,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) or Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b)).32 The evidence is of course
30 This number is roughly comparable to the numbers that are found by Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006)
using the ECHP. Note, that it is possible that our estimator for the direct wage gains (losses) slightly overes-
timates (underestimates) the real wage changes because the wages are averaged for each spell. It is possible
that the wage at the time when the spell ends is higher than the one reported (or the one at the beginning of
the spell), while the wage at the beginning of the next spell can be lower (or higher) than the one reported.
Major wage changes within a ￿rm however are likely to be reported, because in general they will be linked to
a change in the position. In addition, (major) wage changes within the ￿rm will decrease the probability that
the individual moves.
31 For some of these calculations we use di￿erent de￿nitions of the censored wages to check for consistency (see
appendix C.4). Since the di￿erences are not big, we use in the following the ￿rst wage de￿nition (wage A)
where we replace censored wages by their conditional expectations from Tobit￿estimates.84 Chapter 3
consistent with a sizeable share of workers being displaced (Burda and Mertens (2001)), an issue
we will discuss further below.
Table C.6 shows the di￿erences across movers within categories. If we omit apprentices (and
home-workers and the missing category) from the analysis of transitions within the group of
full-time employees and conditioning on the fact that both the previous and the current job last
at least three months, the share of winners is markedly higher and the share of losers is lower
than for all full-time employed individuals. The share of winners is around 71% and the share
of losers is only 22%, while about 7% do not experience a wage change when changing jobs
(probably in many cases censored values). The average relative gain of the winners decreases
clearly from about 27% (table C.6) to about 20%. So does the average relative loss of the losers
which decreases from around 16% (table C.6) to around 13%. The overall gain amounts to just
under 12%. Among part-timers, who work less than half of the regular time, there are only few
winners, while in the group of more than half part-time employed this is not the case.
Next, we separate job￿to￿job changes by terciles (see table C.7 of the conditional distribution
of the initial wages (on age, education and year) for full-time employed West-German prime-
age males. As predicted by search theory, the share of winners is highest (78%) in the low
wage tercile, and much lower in the upper wage tercile (60%), while the middle wage tercile is
somewhere in between (69%). However, adding the share of individuals without a wage change
shows that di￿erences might be smaller, because in the upper tercile, where censoring is a severe
problem, about 15% do not experience a wage change, while in the other terciles this amounts to
a maximum of 4%.33 The share of losers increases with the wage tercile, while the middle wage
tercile exhibits the highest losses. The average gain of the winners is - as expected - the highest
in the lowest wage tercile (around 26%), while it is 13% or less for the two higher wage terciles.
The average loss of the losers is higher for employees from the upper tercile compared to the two
lower terciles.34 Overall, the evidence is in accordance with search theory.
32 In the ￿rst model, they introduce a new sort of shocks, so called reallocation shocks, which force individuals
to change jobs irrespective of the wage o￿er they get. The basic idea in the second model is that people
change jobs since they have better career opportunities in the new establishment, which makes them accept
wage losses. In the literature, the empirical ￿ndings for the share of individuals who accept wage losses are
quite di￿erent. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) ￿nd a very small number for the Netherlands (about 11%;
OSA-panel) which they interpret as measurement error, while Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) ￿nd a much
larger number (between 36% and 55%, DADS-panel) for France.
33 Job changes for individuals whose wages are censored before will very often result in a censored wage observa-
tion afterwards indicating no wage change, see section 3.3 for the imputation of wages in the case of censoring.
34 If job￿to￿job changes under wage cuts are interpreted as reallocation shocks, as in Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and
Robin (2006), then the higher wage loss for higher wage categories is the wage ladder e￿ect, since after being
reallocated, individuals obtain o￿ers from the same wage o￿er distribution which means that the loss for
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Across age categories, the share of winners for full-time working individuals (excluding appren-
tices) declines from about 79% for the youngest age group (16-20) to about 51% for the oldest
age group (61-62). For the share of losers the trend is reversed. The share of losers increases from
17% for the youngest age group to 31% for the oldest age group. Relative gains are quite high
for the youngest age group and then decline more or less monotonically with age from about 56%
to 12%. The losses lie between 15 and 12%. Controlling for the position in the wage distribution
partly eliminates this e￿ect. It disappears for the high and the middle tercile, while it is still
present for the low-wage tercile (results are omitted here).
Next, we summarize di￿erences through regressions focusing on prime-age (25-54 years) working
males and again conditioning on the fact that both the previous and the current employment
spell last for at least three months. Table C.9 shows how the share of winners and losers varies
by age and education. The share of winners decreases with educational attainment and is lower
for some older age groups.35 The share of losers is lower, the higher the educational attainment,
while there is no clear age e￿ect. But the share of losers is on average lower for older individuals
than for younger individuals. Both the relative gain of winners and the relative loss of the losers
are not signi￿cantly correlated with the share of winners and the share of losers, respectively.
From this, we conclude that age seems to have at least for some age groups a signi￿cant impact on
the motivation for a job￿to￿job change decision, with wage gains losing importance as individuals
age. Table C.10 summarizes the relationship between the relative gain of the winners and the
relative loss of the losers, by age and education. We ￿nd that high-skilled individuals have
signi￿cantly higher gains and lower losses than low-skilled; maybe because voluntary job￿to￿job
changes in this category are more frequent. The medium-skilled do not di￿er signi￿cantly from
the low-skilled in the average gain but have signi￿cantly lower losses. The relative gain of the
winners decreases with age, which is in accordance with search theory, but there is no signi￿cant
age e￿ect on the relative loss. The latter indicates that job￿to￿job changes under wage losses are
not driven by economic reasons. After job displacement, a new random o￿er from the wage o￿er
distribution would imply that the relative loss should increase with age. The share of winners is
positively correlated with the relative gain of the winners, while the share of losers is positively
related to the relative loss of the losers.
Now, we include the tercile position in the conditional wage distribution in the regressions (tables
C.11 and C.12).36 The position in the wage distribution has the expected e￿ect on the shares
and the relative gain/loss and seems to a￿ect the e￿ect of education and age. Based on search
35 The regressions summarizing the correlations are simple OLS regressions with age-education cells as observa-
tion unit. Note that the share of winners is likely to be too low for the upper tercile, see footnote 33.
36 Again, we use simple OLS regression techniques to summarize the correlations. We group individuals within
age-education cells according to the wage tercile before the job change in the conditional wage distribution for
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theory, age should not show an independent e￿ect on the share of winners and in fact and in
fact, controlling for the wage position leaves almost all age dummies insigni￿cant. The average
age e￿ect instead is negative for the share of losers. For the relative gain, as expected, we ￿nd
that it is lower for individuals in higher wage categories and that it is higher for high-skilled
individuals. As before, age has on average a negative e￿ect on the relative gain and almost no
e￿ect on the relative loss.
Furthermore, we examine wage changes after an intervening bene￿t recipiency spell and cate-
gorize their duration into ￿ve intervals (again using the three months condition, see table C.8).
First, most unemployment spells are very short, i.e. shorter than 3 months, or very long, i.e.
longer than a year. The share of winners as compared to their last de￿ated wage decreases with
bene￿t duration. But, the share of winners is similar for the shortest and the longest bene￿t
recipient duration. Accordingly, the share of losers increases with bene￿t duration. Surprisingly,
however, the relative gain of winners is highest for the longest bene￿t recipiency duration, while
being similar and slightly increasing for the other groups. The relative loss of losers, on the other
hand, di￿ers less. Regarding the relative gain of winners, longer search duration seems to slightly
improve the match quality, which again is in accordance with predictions from search theory.
While the average change after a job￿to￿job transition for all individuals decreases with bene￿t
duration, this is not the case for the long-term unemployed. Here, the longer search period leads
to a higher average wage in the job after the bene￿t phase.
Finally, we investigate the wage changes for individuals who changed jobs (within 15 days) and
compare their wage growth in the following four years with individuals without a job￿to￿job
transition in the ￿rst year (table C.13). The results are not clear cut. From 1977 to 1982, the
wage growth for changers is higher than for stayers in the ￿rst year but the di￿erences are small
afterwards. Two years after the job change, there is no di￿erence left. After 1983, however, job
changers are not in a better position anymore. In some years it even seems that job changers
are in a worse position than job stayers, possibly re￿ecting compositional e￿ects.
Summing up, wages seem indeed to play a crucial role for job￿to￿job changes, in accordance with
search theory. On average, almost all changes involve remarkable average wage gains. Notwith-
standing non-monetary motives, job￿to￿job changes appear to advance one’s career through
higher wages. However, a signi￿cant proportion of job￿to￿job changes are associated with wage
losses. While job displacement associated with ￿nding a new job immediately might account for
part of these wage losses, it is unlikely that such a high share of wage losses can be attributed
to this e￿ect alone or to measurement error (as in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998)). We ￿nd
some evidence against the displacement hypothesis. Here, an investment motive based on the
anticipation of later career opportunities as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) or in Burdett and
Coles (2003) provides an alternative explanation which needs to be explored in future research.Chapter 3 87
Furthermore, there are pronounced di￿erences between di￿erent demographic groups (which we
do not discuss here), that are not easily explained by economic theory, and there are di￿erences
between full-time and part-time. Thus, noneconomic factors are likely to in￿uence the decision
to change a job. In accordance with search theory, the frequency and the size of wage gains are
highest for workers in the lower part of the wage distribution conditional upon age, education,
and year.
3.4.4 Wage distribution and wage mobility
This section analyzes the wage distribution for di￿erent groups and the determinants of changes
in the relative wage position. First, ￿gure C.4 and C.6 show the distribution of log-wages in a
cross section of individuals on 1 January 1986 for all full-time employed individuals (including
apprentices, ￿gure C.4) and for clerks only (￿gure C.6). For comparison, ￿gures C.5 and C.7
display the distribution of log-wages for clerks in 1976 and 1996. The distribution of log-wages
does not appear (censored) normal because of the thin left tail. Kolmogorov-Smirnov-tests con-
￿rm this: for each partition of the sample, we reject the hypothesis that log-wages are normally
distributed.
Here, the analysis is restricted to individuals who are employed in two successive years. Our
interest is on career advancements and its determinants, especially job￿to￿job transitions. We
take such employees, de￿ne their position in the wage distribution in the ￿rst year (measured
in deciles) and observe which decile position they hold in the next year, depending on their
characteristics. For each (age-education) group of individuals, a 10x10-Matrix captures the
transitions in the decile position. Then, we aggregate this information in an ordered Probit
model and obtain for each individual one of the three outcomes upward, no change, or downward
mobility in the decile position. If an individual’s wage is censored, we observe the individual in
the decile of the wage distribution where we observe censoring for the ￿rst time coming from
below, i.e. when the sixth decile is the ￿rst censored decile (that is, more than 40% of the wages
are censored, which is often the case for the high-skilled group aged 31-33), all individuals are
observed in this decile. If an individual’s wages are censored in two consecutive years, we will
observe no wage change if the ￿rst censored decile is the same in the two consecutive years (the
most plausible case). In the case where the ￿rst censored decile is lower (higher) than in the
previous year, say the ￿fth, we interpret this as wage cuts (increases) for all censored individuals.
We start with the ordered Probit model in table C.14 based on those individuals who are employed
in two consecutive years. The dependent variable is 1 if an individual moves up by one or more
deciles of the wage distribution, it is 0 if the individual stays in the same decile, and it is -1 if the
individual moves down by one or more deciles. For this analysis, we include only prime-age males
in the age group 25 to 54 years, disaggregated in three year age intervals. Among others, the88 Chapter 3
set of covariates in table C.14 includes the interquartile range in wages, the rate of job changes,
and the stayer rate in employment by age-education cell, as well as a dummy for a job￿to￿job
transition at the individual level (di￿erent employers in the two consecutive years).
The age-education cell with the lowest age and the lowest education level and the year 1975 are
chosen as omitted categories. The probability of climbing the wage ladder decreases signi￿cantly
in age and is higher for the two higher skill levels. This result is in accordance with search theory.
The dummy variable for job￿to￿job transition is also highly signi￿cant and positive, thus job￿
to￿job transitions involve upward wage mobility as predicted by search theory.37 The impact of
the cell-speci￿c variables, the wage dispersion measure (iqr), the transition rate from job￿to￿job,
and the retention rate in employment is di￿cult to predict. On the one hand, it seems plausible
that higher wage dispersion is favorable for upward wage mobility because the return to search
is higher. On the other hand, if wage dispersion is high, this means that search frictions are
large and we observe little (upward) wage mobility. This e￿ect works through a low job￿to￿job
transition rate and a high job destruction rate. Our results support neither of the arguments;
the e￿ect of the wage dispersion measure on mobility is positive but not signi￿cant. The job￿
to￿job transition rate is not signi￿cant, thus rejecting the above argument. The retention rate
in employment (´(1-job destruction rate)) has a small but (weakly) signi￿cant negative e￿ect
on upward wage mobility. With an increasing probability of remaining employed, individuals
seem to be more willing to accept wage cuts which contradicts our argument and which seems
consistent with the investment motive mentioned above.
Table C.15 shows a similar analysis replacing the year dummies with a linear time trend and
allowing for interactions between job￿to￿job changes and age. The e￿ects of age group and
education category are similar in magnitude and signi￿cance. The job change dummy e￿ect is
now somewhat larger and job￿to￿job changes have a smaller e￿ect on the probability for wage
increases as individuals age. This is in accordance with search theory, since older individuals
have on average a better position in the wage distribution, and therefore their propensity for
upward wage mobility through job￿to￿job transitions decreases. As argued before, it might be
that a bigger share of job￿to￿job transitions are not economically motivated as individuals age.
Separate analysis for the di￿erent education groups and for job changers and stayers, the results
do not di￿er much (see tables C.16 and C.17). However, for high-skilled workers we ￿nd that
the e￿ect of age on upward wage mobility is not signi￿cant for the younger age groups and then
negative, which can be due to university graduates entering the labor market later. Further-
more, the e￿ect of age on the propensity for upward wage mobility shows a similar pattern for
37 Of course, the job change indicator is endogenous. However, from a search-theoretic perspective, it is irrelevant
whether the job change takes place because the individual obtains a higher wage o￿er or whether the individual
obtains a higher wage because he changes the job.Chapter 3 89
all education groups and for changers and stayers. It becomes more pronounced with higher
education. For example, in the group of stayers, the coe￿cients for age range from -0.07 (28 to
30 years) to -0.27 (52 to 54 years) for the low-skilled and from -0.09 (28 to 30 years) to -0.83
(52 to 54 years) for the high-skilled. Interestingly, the e￿ect of wage dispersion is positive for
changers and stayers in the two lower education groups, while it is negative for the high-skilled,
however, the latter results might be questionable because of censoring. These results seem to
be o￿setting when pooling the three education groups. For the stayer rate in employment, a
similar pattern is found. While the coe￿cient for changers and stayers is negative for the two
lower education categories, it is smaller or close to zero for the high-skilled. When pooling the
education category, the overall e￿ect is negative. The e￿ect of the job￿to￿job transition rate is
insigni￿cant for all education groups.
Finally, we classify the group of individuals with transitions from unemployment to employment
by the positions of their wage in the contemporaneous wage distribution before and after unem-
ployment (see table C.18). Based on these data, we perform the same analysis as before. The
age pro￿le shows a similar pattern as before for low-skilled and medium-skilled individuals. For
the high-skilled, no such clear pattern is found and only few coe￿cients are signi￿cant. The
wage dispersion measure and the transition rate from employment to bene￿t recipiency are not
signi￿cant (at the ￿ve percent level) in either model.
Summarizing our ￿ndings, job￿to￿job transitions are strongly related to wages. We ￿nd that
age shows a strong negative e￿ect on upward wage mobility. Elderly individuals are less likely to
experience wage gains. The same holds for older individuals changing jobs: they gain less than
their younger counterparts. This is in accordance with job search theory. Furthermore, education
has a strong positive e￿ect on upward wage mobility. A possible explanation could be that the
informational situation is better for the high-skilled. Cell-speci￿c macro variables apparently
do not have the same e￿ect on the three education groups with di￿erent e￿ects for the high-
skilled. The partial correlation of the stayer rate in employment and the upwards wage mobility
is positive for the low-skilled and the medium-skilled. For the high-skilled, this correlation is
negative. Similar results are observed for other macro variables.
3.5 Conclusion
Using equilibrium search theory as the theoretical background, this paper presents a descriptive
empirical analysis exploring labor market dynamics and the wage structure in Germany. We
￿nd considerable di￿erences in labor market transition rates over the business cycle and across
demographic groups, which can partly be explained by search theory. Our analysis also explores
the wage structure and determinants of wage changes. Wage changes following job￿to￿job transi-90 Chapter 3
tions are quite remarkable and most job changes involve wage gains. There exists a considerable
number of individuals who do not gain from job￿to￿job changes, which is unlikely to be explained
solely by the displaced workers, who quickly ￿nd a new job, or by measurement error. Neverthe-
less, this ￿nding contradicts the simple equilibrium search model, as outlined in the theoretical
section.
Further ￿ndings are that, ￿rst, part-time employees gain less from job￿to￿job changes than full-
time employees, which we can not explain easily by economic theory. Second, job￿to￿job changes
in the low-wage group often involve wage losses. We show that wages are neither log-normally
distributed for either group we looked at, nor that the wages for a homogeneous age-education
group are skewed to the left. This can be taken as prima facie evidence against equilibrium search
theory, implying a wage distribution skewed to the right. Regarding upward wage mobility,
age (negative) and job￿to￿job transitions (positive), as well as the interaction between the two
(decreasing with age) show the expected relationship. Also, education e￿ects appear to be in
accordance with theoretical considerations. The e￿ect of cell speci￿c macro variables appear to
vary across the education groups. High-skilled workers di￿er somewhat from the other groups.
Clearly, the non-structural approach taken here does not su￿ce to evaluate a complex set of
theories. Nevertheless, our comprehensive descriptive analysis provides some clear insights. As
a crucial part of equilibrium search theory, job￿to￿job transitions show a close relationship with
wages and the wage distribution, mostly in accordance with theoretical considerations. In con-
trast, job displacement seems to play at most a minor role in explaining this relationship.4 Employment, wages and frictions: Testing
between frictional and neo-classical theories of
unemployment
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deduces antagonistic hypotheses from search theory and from neo-classical theory
and tests them for the German labor market. It is based on Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005b).
It is commonplace in the debate on Germany’s labor market problems to argue that low wage
dispersion as an indicator of low wage ￿exibility is a major reason for the high unemployment rate,
see Sachverst￿ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2005) and
OECD (2006). In international comparison, wage inequality in Germany is small and remained
stable until the late 1990s, see Prasad (2004). According to the Krugman (1994) hypothesis, the
increase of wage inequality in the US and the increase of unemployment in Germany are two sides
of the same coin, namely, the response to the pertinent skill bias in labor demand. Accordingly,
wage rigidities caused by wage bargaining institutions (unions) have prevented wage inequality
to rise in Germany thus resulting in higher unemployment. The rationale for this argument is
that if wages are set above the marginal productivity of workers, ￿rms do not employ some of
the least productive workers.
Given the production technology and the skill bias, human capital theory explains wage di￿eren-
tials by concentrating on the role of individual, productivity-relevant traits (human capital). If
individuals are paid as in a competitive human capital model, we expect that wage di￿erentials
stem only from di￿erences in individual traits. Wages, however, di￿er between observationally
equivalent workers. We call these di￿erences residual wage dispersion and postulate that, if
the human capital approach to wages is correct, the residual wage dispersion is explained by
unobserved productivity di￿erences. From an empirical point of view, one can control for a
part of this residual variation if allowing for e￿ects that come from speci￿c ￿rms (￿high wage
￿rms￿, see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)) or from speci￿c industries. This observation
challenges the neo-classical human capital model which assumes perfect competition and which
allows neither for ￿rm-speci￿c di￿erences nor for industry-speci￿c e￿ects, except for the case that
the unobserved productivity di￿erences of the individuals are correlated with ￿rms or speci￿c
industries.1
1 In the neo-classical framework, high wage ￿rms might have attracted high ability individuals. However,
empirical evidence does not seem to support this. Abowd, Creezy, and Kramarz (2002) and Gruetter and
Lalive (2004) ￿nd that person and ￿rm e￿ects are negatively correlated.
9192 Chapter 4
Search theory o￿ers both an interesting alternative and complement to marginal productivity
theory and human capital theory by focusing on search frictions as an explanation for wage
di￿erences among workers with identical marginal productivity. The basic idea of search theory
is that under imperfect information, there is a match-speci￿c rent because of opportunity costs
of waiting for a better match. Then, the wage is not unique and does not necessarily correspond
to the marginal product. Equally productive workers face di￿erent possible wages (or even a
whole distribution) for which they could work. Under this perspective, the reason why ￿rms pay
di￿erent wages is that search frictions lend them monopsony power, which they can exploit to
di￿erent degrees. On the one hand, there might be high-wage ￿rms that have to pay high wages
in order to assure their high employment. On the other hand, there might be low-wage ￿rms that
employ only a small number of employees since they lose them at a fast rate to their better paying
competitors. Wage decompositions that try to identify the e￿ect of search frictions on the basis
of search equilibrium models attribute a considerable amount of the wage variation to search
frictions.2 Search equilibrium models themselves predict a close association between wages and
labor market transitions. When implementing these models empirically, a lot of identifying and
non-testable assumptions typically have to be imposed on the data (see e.g. Bontemps, Robin,
and Van den Berg (2000), or Van den Berg and Ridder (1993)).
We follow a slightly di￿erent approach here. Starting with the Krugman (1994) hypothesis that
the relatively small wage dispersion in Europe might be the reason for the high unemployment in
European countries, we distinguish two types of wage dispersion. We distinguish wage dispersion
between groups of individuals with the same observable (productivity relevant) characteristics
(￿between wage dispersion￿) and wage dispersion within such groups (￿within wage dispersion￿)
because, from a theoretical point of view, the reasons for the two might di￿er.3 Since in the
empirical application, we are not able to control perfectly for di￿erences in marginal productivity,
we refer to residual wage dispersion as the empirical counterpart of within wage dispersion.
Regarding between wage dispersion, there is empirical evidence for Germany that wages are
compressed across groups of di￿erent human capital endowments (as a proxy for marginal pro-
ductivity) and that this compression has led to high unemployment, especially for the group
of low-skilled (see among others Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006)). Although this view that the
compressed wage structure in European countries has led to high unemployment seems to be the
conventional wisdom among economists, it has not remained unchallenged for various reasons
(see the discussion in chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 2.1).
2 By search equilibrium models, we refer to a class of models based on search frictions which explicitly model
the decision problem of both sides of the labor market and which imply an endogenous wage distribution.
3 Note, that we refer to the empirical counterpart of within wage dispersion as residual wage dispersion.Chapter 4 93
The focus of this paper is on within wage dispersion and its relationship to employment. Here, we
attempt to ￿ll a research gap. Starting from search theory on the one hand and from productivity
theory on the other hand, we discuss competing hypotheses with respect to the relationship be-
tween labor market transitions and within wage dispersion. On the one hand, neo-classical theory
based on marginal productivity determining factor prices predicts that wage dispersion is deter-
mined by individual heterogeneity. Thus, empirically, within wage dispersion re￿ects unobserved
productivity characteristics. When within wage dispersion decreases in response to institutional
changes (such as a rise in union bargaining power or higher levels of public assistance) unem-
ployment increases. On the other hand, search theory predicts an opposite relationship between
the two variables. Here, a small amount of search frictions is responsible for the low within wage
dispersion. At the same time, low search frictions lead to a low unemployment rate.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst attempt in the literature to test between the di￿erent
empirical implications of the two theoretical approaches.4 We use a large administrative labor
market data set for West Germany, the IAB￿Besch￿ftigtenstichprobe (IABS), which covers the
time period 1975 to 1997 and which contains precise information on wages and the timing of
changes in employment status. We de￿ne cells in which individuals are homogeneous with respect
to age and education. Using this dataset, we ￿rst describe labor market transitions and wage
changes following a job￿to￿job change, one of the key determinants in job search models. Then,
we look at the wage structure and ask for the determinants of changes in the relative position in
the wage distribution. Finally, we estimate how the rates at which labor market transitions take
place and unemployment depend on the dispersion of the wage distribution and vice versa. Our
results are more supportive for the search-theoretic hypothesis than for the neo-classical theory
based on marginal productivity determining factor prices, although some implications of the
former hypothesis are rejected. However, one remarkable and stable result in favor of a search-
theoretic view of the labor market persists: we ￿nd that there is no negative relationship between
the unemployment rate and wage dispersion. This result, which is surprising for Germany,
contradicts the hypothesis that labor unions compress wages within each cell, thereby causing
high unemployment.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, we discuss the two competing theories. Then, we
describe the data and we present descriptive evidence on labor market transitions and the wage
structure. As the main part of the empirical analysis, we use competing predictions of the two
theories to test them against each other. The last section concludes and appendix D provides
the precise de￿nition of variables used in the empirical analysis.
4 This idea is also used by our associated paper Fitzenberger, Garlo￿, and Kohn (2003), however, the scope of
the analysis in that paper is much more limited compared to this paper.94 Chapter 4
4.2 Theoretical background
From the neo-classical point of view, wages are equal to the marginal product of labor which
is determined by the human capital endowment of a person and other productivity relevant
characteristics after controlling for di￿erences in physical capital usage. In a competitive market,
there is no room for pure ￿rm (size) or interindustry wage di￿erentials, when controlling for all
productivity relevant individual characteristics, nor is there room for unemployment. However,
when researchers can only control for observed characteristics, unexplained wage di￿erentials
might re￿ect di￿erences in unobserved productivity relevant characteristics.5
Search and Matching theories provide an alternative explanation for within wage dispersion
as the outcome of search frictions and monopsony power of employers. The textbook models
view the competitive model as the limit case of search and matching models when frictions and
monopsony power disappear (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)). However, because of productivity
relevant unobserved characteristics we view the two models as nonnested alternatives in empirical
work.
In addition to accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and frictions, the competitive textbook
model has to be modi￿ed because of the importance of impact of unions on wage setting in
Germany. In a standard wage bargaining model with right￿to￿manage assumption, wages still
correspond to the marginal product of labor. Unions in Germany bargain with employers over a
schedule of minimum wages for di￿erent types of jobs. The so-called ￿to￿the￿worker’s￿advantage￿
principle (￿G￿nstigkeitsprinzip￿) allows ￿rms to pay more but not less than the wage that is
agreed upon by unions’ and the employers’ association. We do not model the objectives of labor
unions explicitly in this paper, but simply assume that unions set binding minimum wages both
in order to increase e￿ective wages paid and to reduce wage inequality.
Separate union contracts exist for di￿erent professional groups and di￿erent industries. We
expect that there is in general more than one binding minimum wage for individuals with identical
observed human capital endowment since they might be employed in di￿erent industries or they
might be grouped into a di￿erent professional group. However, a smaller wage dispersion among
individuals with identical observed human capital endowment can, ceteris paribus, be interpreted
as originating from higher minimum wages set by labor unions.6
5 For example, ability sorting could in principle provide an explanation for ￿rm size wage di￿erentials (see
footnote 1).
6 See Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) for evidence that unions compress wages in Germany. Obviously, this raises
the question why labor unions set wages too high. One possible reason is that at least some of the low wage
employees gain from the minimum wage if they are still employed and paid a higher wage rate. E.g. Pfei￿er
(2003) discusses further reasons for compressed wages within the productivity framework.Chapter 4 95
In the following, we discuss the heterogeneity hypothesis and the friction hypothesis as alternative
theoretical rationales for wage inequality among observationally equivalent workers, which are
not necessarily exclusive. We argue that the two approaches imply simple testable di￿erences in
their predictions for the descriptive relationship between wage inequality and unemployment, as
well as transition rates between di￿erent labor market states in a world with sluggish adjustment.
These theoretical predictions involve the relationship between endogenous outcomes assuming
that the correlations in the data result from plausible economic assumptions about the data
generating process. Note that we do not attempt to estimate structural relationships.
4.2.1 Heterogeneity hypothesis
Basic neo-classical theory assumes that markets are in a competitive equilibrium. If there is
indeed a competitive market for labor, the same e￿ciency unit of labor will be paid the same
wage, irrespectively of where it is employed. Human capital theory argues that the e￿ciency
unit of labor is determined by the amount of (general) human capital that an individual has
acquired. Wage dispersion results from di￿erences in the human capital endowment. Wage
dispersion among identical individuals is hard to explain from this point of view, unless one
acknowledges unobserved productivity relevant characteristics.
Wage dispersion within groups can be explained by ￿rms employing di￿erent capital stocks or
technologies. But this situation should not persist in competitive markets. A second reason for
wage dispersion within groups arises if there is speci￿c human capital. In this case, even if we
are able to measure true human capital7 endowment, the wage is not uniquely determined by
the amount of human capital but can be negotiated between the ￿rm and the worker, since rents
exist due to the speci￿c capital not being of use in other ￿rms (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001),
pp. 193￿.).
Further important sources of residual wage dispersion relate to measurement issues. First, we
might not be able to measure human capital correctly because of data restrictions. Second, there
might be unmeasurable qualities of individuals, like ability, that a￿ect marginal productivity and
that are (partially) observed by the employer.8
Suppose, now, that a union and an employer association agree upon increasing the minimum
wage for a group of observationally equivalent workers. If the minimum wage is binding then
some employees will lose their job. The reason is, that residual wage dispersion is explained by
7 We de￿ne human capital as all individual traits which in￿uence the (marginal) productivity of an individual.
8 Residual wage dispersion can also be the result of compensating wage di￿erentials among observationally
equivalent workers. For the purpose of this paper, they can be treated in the same way as di￿erences in
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unobserved productivity di￿erences and that the minimum wage truncates the distribution of the
marginal productivities at some point. This makes some jobs unpro￿table who were previously
pro￿table.
We also consider the dynamics of the labor market as re￿ected by transition rates between
di￿erent labor market states. Since markets need time to adapt to equilibrium values, it is
realistic to assume that unemployment does not react immediately to a change of the binding
minimum wage. This is implied by the dynamic theory of labor demand with adjustment costs
(Hamermesh (1993)). We expect that, as a reaction to an increase of a binding minimum wage,
more labor contracts will end and ￿ring rates slowly increase. Conversely, we observe fewer
transitions from unemployment to employment since the potential match between employee and
employer will become less pro￿table. Hiring rates are expected to react immediately since jobs
are only ￿lled if they are pro￿table.
We assume that the variation in the data stems from two sources, namely (partly) exogenous
changes in the binding minimum wages and shocks to the distribution of marginal productivity
within groups of workers. The following hypothesis summarizes the empirical implications on
the implied relationship between residual wage dispersion and labor market transition rates.
Heterogeneity Hypothesis: Consider a cell of observationally equivalent workers. When the
residual wage dispersion decreases (because of an increase in the minimum wage or a downward
shift of the distribution of marginal productivities), then the cell-speci￿c unemployment rate
increases, the transition rate from unemployment to employment declines, and the transition
rate from employment to unemployment increases, possibly with a lag. Labor market transition
rates react with a lag because of adjustment costs (dynamic labor demand). There is no clear
relationship between job￿to￿job changes and wage dispersion. Transition rates do not a￿ect
future wage dispersion.
4.2.2 Friction hypothesis
As a benchmark, this section assumes that after controlling for observable productivity rele-
vant characteristics employers consider individuals to be identical in their marginal productivity
(Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)). Furthermore, imperfect in-
formation exists on both sides of the labor market, since there are opportunity costs (of time)
for the employers to search for new employees and for the workers to ￿nd a job. After a match
is formed, there is a rent to be divided between employer and employee (a match-speci￿c rent).
We consider both o￿￿the￿job and on￿the￿job search with possibly di￿erent job arrival rates
(Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001)). We assume that the wage is posted by the employer, as a ￿takeChapter 4 97
it or leave it￿ o￿er for the employee.9 In equilibrium it pays for the ex-ante identical ￿rms to
choose di￿erent strategies and to o￿er di￿erent wages. The reason for this is that in equilibrium
large and small ￿rms coexist. Large ￿rms will pay high wages in order to attract many individuals
working at competing ￿rms and to lose only little sta￿ to competitors. The high employment
comes at the cost of small pro￿ts per employee. Firms that pay low wages, on the contrary, will
have high pro￿ts per employee but only low employment. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show
the existence of a continuous distribution of wages in equilibrium. Residual wage dispersion then
merely re￿ects search frictions rather than di￿erences in productivity.10
To be more precise, the variance of the wage distribution is determined by two frictional deter-
minants (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1993)). The ￿rst determinant is the job o￿er rate for
employed job seekers. It is intuitively clear that the more often individuals are able to change
jobs because of wage di￿erences, the more di￿cult it is for ￿rms to pay low wages since then
they quickly lose their sta￿. This means that the variance of wages decreases with the job o￿er
rate. The second determinant of the variance of wages is the job destruction rate. The higher
this rate, the more frequently employees lose their jobs and become unemployed. Hence, the
search friction is higher and the variance of the wage distribution is larger. This is the case, since
the trade-o￿ for low-wage ￿rms improves through higher in￿ows from unemployment.11 Note,
however, that search frictions themselves also a￿ect the equilibrium unemployment rate, thus
predicting that higher search frictions lead to higher wage dispersion and to higher frictional
unemployment.
Now, assume that a labor union sets a minimum wage truncating the wage distribution at this
point. Thus, the minimum wage constitutes the lower bound of the wage distribution. But, the
whole distribution including the upper bound reacts as well. In the new equilibrium, all ￿rms
still have the same pro￿ts but the level of pro￿ts is lower than before, while employment remains
the same.
9 Other rent sharing mechanisms are explored in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Although this mechanism
might lead to situations where possibly pro￿table matches do not take place, this is ￿consistent with how many
labor economists view the wage setting process￿(ibid., p. 2607).
10 The term search friction summarizes the facts that unemployed individuals cannot ￿nd a job immediately,
that employed individuals cannot change their job immediately, and that jobs can end for exogenous reasons.
11 Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) show that the variance of the cross-sectional wage distribution is increasing in
the job destruction rate and decreasing in the job arrival rate if and only if the ratio between the job o￿er rate
on￿the￿job is less than twice the job destruction rate. We consider this to be a natural condition to hold, since
in Germany job￿to￿job changes occur less frequently than transitions from employment to nonemployment
(see tables C.2 and C.3 in appendix C). Assuming that this condition is satis￿ed in the data allows us to test
empirically between the two theoretical approaches.98 Chapter 4
We assume that the variation in the data is caused by di￿erences and changes in job arrival and
destruction rates e￿ectively re￿ecting changes in labor demand. The empirical implications can
be summarized as follows.
Friction Hypothesis: If the job o￿er rate on￿the￿job increases or the job destruction rate
declines, then the residual wage dispersion decreases and the cell￿speci￿c unemployment rate
declines. There is no clear relationship between the job o￿er rate o￿￿the￿job and wage dispersion,
but unemployment decreases with an increase in the job o￿er rate o￿￿the￿job. Wage dispersion
itself does not a￿ect transition rates. A minimum wage is not a￿ecting the unemployment rate
and the transition rates between unemployment and employment.
4.3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the IAB employment sub-sample, 1975-1997, a large admin-
istrative data set for Germany, see Bender, Haas, and Kloose (2000). Since most data features
correspond for the IABS 1975-1997 and for the IABS-R01 used in the previous chapter 3, we only
state di￿erences. The IABS 1975-1997 is a one percent random sample of employees from the
social security records. The dataset contains about 8 millions observations and is representative
for all persons who have been employed at least once in a job that is part of the compulsory
notifying procedure in the observed 22 years (more than the 80% in a cross section of workers).12
We calculate transition rates between the three states. Transitions from employment to receiv-
ing transfer payments are interpreted as transitions to unemployment,13 since already a short
employment spell results in a renewal of bene￿t entitlement. E.g. after an employment spell
of twelve months, the bene￿t entitlement period is six months. In contrast, transitions from
unemployment into employment are not that easily approximated by transitions from receiving
transfer payments to employment. Long￿term unemployed, whose bene￿ts are exhausted, might
￿nd a job, and there might be people shifting from the state receiving transfer payments to the
state out of sample by becoming a civil servant or by becoming self￿employed. Therefore, in the
empirical section, we use di￿erent de￿nitions of unemployment to investigate the robustness of
the results.
For our empirical analysis, we use only full￿time working men who are between 25 and 54 years
old and who are residents in West Germany. This sample is grouped into cells by age, education,
and year. We de￿ne three education groups: The ￿rst category corresponds to persons who
12 For a more extensive treatment of the data, the reader is referred to chapter 3, section 3.3.
13 The largest group of workers not contained in the dataset are civil servants who are typically tenured (´ no
risk of unemployment).Chapter 4 99
have neither a completed vocational training nor a university degree. The second category are
people who have ￿nished a vocational training but have no university degree. The third group
corresponds to persons who have a university degree or a degree from a university of the applied
sciences (￿Fachhochschule￿).14 We also group the individuals by their age in ten three-years-
intervals (25-27, 28-30, etc.) to proxy for potential experience. For the descriptive analysis, we
use the cells for all 22 years (1975￿1997). For the explicit empirical test of the two hypotheses,
we restrict ourselves to the 17 years 1980-1997, since there are concerns that the transition rates
cannot be estimated consistently for the seventies (see Bender, Haas, and Kloose (2000)). Annual
transition rates are based on the labor market state on January 1st of each year. The within
wage dispersion is calculated for the cross section of workers in each age￿education cell for the 22
(17) years. When wages are censored from above, we replace the censored value by the predicted
value from a Tobit regression (run separately for every age￿education cell in every year) assuming
that log-wages are normally distributed in a cell.
4.4 Empirical analysis
We ￿rst present descriptive evidence on labor market transitions and the wage structure. Then,
we scrutinize the testable predictions of the heterogeneity hypothesis and the friction hypothesis.
4.4.1 Descriptive evidence
First, we calculate the transition rates between the three labor market states and the rate of
job￿to￿job changes for each of the thirty cells by year. Further detailed results can be found in
chapter 3 and appendix C of this thesis.
Several testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between theses rates and age or education
are plausible. Since search e￿ciency increases and mobility costs decrease presumably with
higher education, the friction hypothesis implies that the job changing rate increases with higher
education. Since individuals sort themselves in better paying jobs as time progresses, we expect
that job changing rates decrease with age. As far as the job ￿nding rate is concerned, one might
argue that people who are older have higher reservation wages because they had higher wages
before (see e.g. Christensen (2003)). Again, with higher education the knowledge about job
opportunities improves.15 According to the heterogeneity hypothesis, it is not clear whether
job changes increase with higher education. For older workers, we expect less job changes due
14 Notice that the education information in the IABS-dataset is not always consistent over time so that we
corrected the education information based on the simple rule that a ￿nished degree cannot be lost. For a more
sophisticated correction procedure, see Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and V￿lter (2005).100 Chapter 4
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to a higher level of speci￿c human capital at risk. The same holds true for the transitions
to unemployment since their high dismissal protection (see Franz (2006), chapter 6.2) makes
￿ring them more unlikely. Based on the heterogeneity hypothesis, we expect the reemployment
probability for those who receive transfer payments to decrease in age for institutional reasons
since the length of bene￿t entitlement increases in age.
Table 4.1 summarizes the transitions between the three states and their variation with age and
education using simple OLS-regressions. The reference category consists of employees with lower
education, aged 25-27. Job changes are more frequent for higher educated individuals than for
lower educated individuals and they occur less frequently as individuals get older.16 Likewise,
the probability of remaining employed increases with higher education and with age. Similar to
other studies (see e.g. Lauer (2003)), we observe the highest job stability for individuals with a
vocational training degree, but not for university graduates. The probability of staying at the
same job decreases with higher education and increases with age. The probability for returning
from receiving transfer payments to employment increases with the education level and decreases
with age, while likewise the probability of remaining transfer recipient increases with age and
decreases with higher education. Finally, once out of the sample, individuals return more often to
employment when they hold a vocational training degree and more rarely as university graduate.
This probability ￿rst decreases with age but then shows a minimum at the age of 40 to 45. Finally,
individuals with a vocational degree stay less often out of sample while university graduates stay
more often out of sample.17 The probability of remaining out of sample increases with age and
shows a maximum in the 40s.
We conclude that most ￿ndings discussed so far are consistent with both hypotheses of the labor
market, as put forward above, although the heterogeneity hypothesis does not cover job￿to￿
job transitions. Since job￿to￿job changes are a crucial aspect in equilibrium search theory, we
explore them in more detail. We de￿ned job￿to￿job changes as a change of the employer with
an intervening out￿of￿sample spell lasting not longer than 15 days.18
15 A related argument of why the job ￿nding rate might be higher for high-skilled individuals is given in Moen
(1999). Here the basic idea is that there might be several job applicants for one vacancy and thus queuing for
jobs and that the person with the highest skill will get the job.
16 As a quantitative example, having a university degree as compared to having no degree at all is associated
with a 3.4% higher rate of job change.
17 Reasons might be that a university degree often is a prerequisite for becoming civil servant and that university
graduates more often become self￿employed.
18 We restrict our analysis to direct job￿to￿job changes (new job starts within 15 days after end of old job), since
we are interested in the wage e￿ects of voluntary transitions. For an analysis of wage e￿ects of job￿to￿job
transitions on an annual basis, see Pfei￿er (2003). His main ￿ndings that the wages of job changers are more
dispersed than the wages of job stayers are in accordance with our results.102 Chapter 4
Table 4.2: Job-to-job transitions and wages
total share winners share losers no change
full-time to full-time 282644 0.638 0.289 0.073
part-time 1 to part-time 1 13375 0.643 0.291 0.066
part-time 2 to part-time 2 2217 0.549 0.289 0.162
relative gain relative loss overall
of the winners of the losers wage change
full-time to full-time 0.268 -0.152 0.127
part-time 1 to part-time 1 0.205 -0.143 0.09
part-time 2 to part-time 2 0.268 -0.162 0.101
part-time 1: working hours are more than 50% of regular working hours
part-time 2: working hours are less than or equal to 50% of regular working hours
We consider wages before and after job change, distinguish winners and losers, and calculate the
mean gain or loss from the job￿to￿job change. Table 4.2 shows remarkable gains and losses. On
average, winners earn about 25% more, while losers still earn around 15% less. Almost two thirds
have an e￿ective gain from changing jobs while more than 25% lose. Further results, which are
available upon request, show that the more highly educated show higher average wage increases,
even though the share of winners is smaller. The relative wage gain decreases with age, but at
the same time the share of losers decreases as well. Overall, the high gains and the high share of
winners point to the central role of wage changes in understanding job￿to￿job changes.19 On the
other hand, there is a remarkable share of persons with losses. This result is di￿cult to reconcile
with search theory, unless one acknowledges that workers expecting displacement start searching
early and are willing to accept wage cuts to avoid unemployment. Still, the decreasing gains from
such changes with age can be understood as sorting processes into higher paying jobs. The fact
that relative losses do not increase with age is di￿cult to reconcile with the notion that speci￿c
capital should be more important at a higher age as a proxy for tenure and experience. As far
as the relationship between education and shares of winners/losers as well as relative gains or
losses are concerned, the hypotheses discussed above do not allow to completely rationalize our
￿ndings.
Finally, we investigate all persons in one cell who are employed in two consecutive years. They
were classi￿ed by deciles of the wage distribution each year resulting in a 10 £ 10 transition
matrix for each education-by-age cell and each year. To summarize the information, we analyze
the determinants of changing the relative position in the wage distribution. We estimated an
19 Similarly, Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004) ￿nd that on average occupational mobility is associated with wage
increases.Chapter 4 103
ordered Probit model where the options were moving one or more deciles up, remaining in the
same decile or moving one or more deciles down. Since replacing year dummies by a linear time
trend did not change our results, table D.1 in the appendix only reports the latter results.
Table D.1 shows that upward wage mobility decreases with age and increases with education. As
expected, job￿to￿job changers have a higher probability to move up the wage distribution. As
individuals age, upward wage mobility is considerably less likely, even when changing jobs which
also occurs more rarely. Finally, the interquantile range (iqr) between the eighth and the second
decile (in logs) exhibits a negative impact on upward wage mobility, i.e. the higher the wage
dispersion the lower is the probability of moving up the wage ladder. Still, the ￿ndings, that job
changers have better career opportunities and that older individuals fare worse, are consistent
with the friction hypothesis.
4.4.2 The relationship between transitions and wages
After presenting some basic descriptive evidence, we now turn to a test whether residual wage
dispersion is related to heterogeneity or to labor market frictions. We start by restating the
central ideas of both hypotheses. On the one hand, if wages are basically determined by residual
heterogeneity under the heterogeneity hypothesis, we expect that lower wage dispersion indi-
cates stronger union in￿uence, which results in higher unemployment, higher entry rates into
unemployment, and lower exit rates out of unemployment. On the other hand, the friction hy-
pothesis postulates that wages in one cell are determined by the amount of search frictions. If
wage dispersion is low, then both search frictions and unemployment are low as well. The direct
e￿ect of search frictions works via the job destruction rate which is positively related with wage
dispersion and unemployment. An indirect e￿ect originates from the fact that the job o￿er rate
on￿the￿job (which negatively a￿ects wage dispersion) and o￿￿the￿job (which negatively a￿ects
unemployment) are likely to be positively correlated.
Regarding the heterogeneity hypothesis, the relevant variables can be directly measured. We
regress transition rates and the unemployment rates on a measure of wage dispersion. For the
friction hypothesis, the relevant variables are not observable. First, we do not observe the job
o￿er rate on￿the￿job but only the job￿to￿job transition rate. Under the assumptions of the
search model, individuals change jobs if the wage o￿er exceeds the current wage (see Mortensen
and Neumann (1988)), i.e. the probability of changing a job is given by the product of the
job arrival rate and the probability that the wage o￿er exceeds the current wage. If the wage
o￿er distribution were constant, the transition rate would be proportional to the job o￿er rate.
However, the wage o￿er distribution varies with the job o￿er rate. An increase in the latter shifts
the wage o￿er distribution towards the marginal productivity of the individuals, thus typically
reducing the wage dispersion. In the following, we assume that the direct e￿ect dominates, i.e. an104 Chapter 4
increase in the job o￿er rate results in a higher job￿to￿job transition rate. The second variable
which determines the wage dispersion is the job destruction rate. Again, it is not possible to
distinguish between voluntary quits and job destructions due to exogenous reasons.20 However,
as often done in the literature, the entry rate into unemployment is used to proxy exogenous job
destruction (see e.g. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998)). As a robustness check, we use di￿erent
de￿nitions when calculating the entry rate into unemployment.
As measure of wage dispersion, we use the interquantile range (iqr) between the eighth and the
second decile of log wages. This is a more robust measure compared to the sample variance (or its
Tobit estimate) in a cell because of the censoring in the wage data. For medium and low-skilled
worker, iqr is not a￿ected by censoring for the vast majority of cells. However, for high skilled
workers censoring is quite prevalent at the eighth decile and, therefore, we omit high-skilled
worker from the analysis in this section.21 According to the heterogeneity hypothesis, a smaller
iqr re￿ects a stronger wage compression by the unions. Then, the unemployment rate, either
measured by recipients of transfer payments or by these plus individuals being out of sample, is
high, while we observe few transitions from receiving transfer payments to employment and a lot
of transitions out of employment. Based on the friction hypothesis, we predict that an increase
in job￿to￿job transitions or a reduction in transitions from employment to receiving transfer
payments result in a smaller iqr. Correspondingly, the share of recipients of transfer payments or
the share of recipients of transfer payments plus individuals being out of sample should decline.
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 20 education￿by-age cells which are observed over 17
years. Using ￿xed￿e￿ects estimation techniques, we allow for cell-speci￿c e￿ects in wage disper-
sion, transition rates, and unemployment. It is quite likely that these cell￿speci￿c e￿ects are both
correlated with the dependent variable and the regressor variables, thus precluding estimating a
random￿e￿ects model. However, two reasons for endogeneity are particularly noteworthy since
they might not be addressed completely by estimating a ￿xed￿e￿ects model. First, endogeneity
problems arise from the very fact that each transition from and to employment a￿ects the wage
distribution depending upon the type of selectivity of the transition with respect to the position
in the wage distribution. This is an issue when individuals in a cell are heterogeneous in their
productivity (heterogeneity hypothesis). However, the sign of the empirical correlation between
changes in transition rates and the wage dispersion measure should not di￿er from the sign of
the causal e￿ect because of the likely reaction of unions to changes in employment prospects.22
20 This includes every reason which makes the previous job unpro￿table which is beyond the in￿uence of the
employer or the employee. This precludes, however, the voluntary decision to become unemployed or the
decision of the employer to lay o￿ somebody who is enduringly unproductive.
21 We also performed the analysis including high-skilled workers (the eighth decile relies on our Tobit estimates)
which did not alter the main results. These results are available upon request.Chapter 4 105
A second reason is that the two theories postulate a di￿erent direction of the relationship between
transition rates and wage dispersion.23 In the following, we try to address this by using the time
structure of the data for identi￿cation. The wage dispersion measure refers to one point in
time (1st January each year), while the transitions rates refer to the period from January, 1st
until December, 31st. This means that, when estimating the impact of transition rates on wage
dispersion, we use the rates from year t ¡ 1 to year t to measure the impact on wage dispersion
in year t and vice versa. Even in the absence of this timely structure, the endogeneity, coming
from the direct reverse causation of the theories, is not harmful to our approach because of
the following. Suppose that either the heterogeneity or the friction hypothesis holds. Suppose
further that we empirically reject, for instance, the heterogeneity hypothesis. Then, rejection
implies endogeneity as well as a rejection of the heterogeneity. On the other hand, we cannot
err by accepting the heterogeneity hypothesis because endogeneity is consistent with the friction
hypothesis. The latter implies a di￿erent direction of correlation. To illustrate this argument
with an example: Assume that we regress the job destruction rate on iqr. The heterogeneity
hypothesis predicts a negative sign. Suppose that according to the friction hypothesis the true
sign is positive. Then, it is not possible to ￿nd a negative sign because of the endogeneity from
the friction hypothesis, since this implies a positive correlation between iqr and jdr and therefore
the bias would go into the opposite direction.
To circumvent problems stemming from the fact that both the transition rates and the wage
dispersion measure have bounded support, we use positive monotone transformations of these
variables on the left hand side that are unbounded. That is, we use the transformation liqr =
log(iqr) for the interquantile range, and the transformation tr = log(rate=(1 ¡ rate)) for the
transition rates.
We estimate the model as a ￿xed-e￿ects feasible GLS-model (FEGLS), see Wooldridge (2002,
chapter 10.5.5).24 Consider the following model estimated to test the heterogeneity hypothesis:
trit = ® + ¯iqrit + dt + ci + uit (4.1)
22 Take the following example: Consider a positive productivity shock, then employment prospects will improve
and therefore transition rates into employment increase, it typically follows that wage dispersion increases, as
a ￿rst order e￿ect, for given union contract wages. In response, unions will raise contract wages e￿ectively
reducing wage dispersion. If unions trade o￿ average wages and employment in their utility function, then
both wage dispersion and transition rates into employment (and correspondingly the employment rate) are
still higher in the end compared to the situation before the exogenous increase in transition rates. This follows
from standard textbook models of wage bargaining.
23 Strictly speaking, the heterogeneity hypothesis focuses on ¸ and the friction hypothesis on ¸L. However, they
are likely to be strongly positively correlated.
24 We started with implementing both the standard ￿xed￿e￿ects estimator and the estimator in ￿rst di￿erences.
Typically, both variants seemed ine￿cient since the associated error terms after the ￿xed￿e￿ects and the
￿rst￿di￿erences transformation, respectively, still showed considerably autocorrelation and the precision of
the estimates was quite low. The results for ￿xed e￿ects and ￿rst di￿erences are available upon request.106 Chapter 4
Table 4.3: Heterogeneity hypothesis ￿ FEGLS-regressions of the transition rates on the interquantile
range
Dependent variable Coe￿cient Standard Expected
estimate ¯ error sign
jdr1 (E-BR) 0.0259 0.1198 -
jdr2 (E-BRjOOS) -0.0595 0.0683 -
jdr3 (E-NoE) -0.1265¤ 0.0478 -
jfr1 (BR-E) -1.7274¤ 0.2782 +
jfr2 (BRjOOS-E) -0.8449¤ 0.2159 +
jcr (E-OE) 0.2516¤ 0.0400 0
¤indicates that the coe￿cient is signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level. See appendix D for
the de￿nition of the variables. The results for the year dummies have been suppressed from
the table. The estimation is based on 340 observations. Further explanations are given in
the text. The transition rates are transformed to insure unboundedness. iqr is measured at
the beginning of the respective time period.
for cells i = 1;:::;20 and year t = 1980;::::;1996. iqrit is the interquantile range, trit is the
transformation log(rateit=(1 ¡ rateit)), with rateit being the transition rate from t to t + 1, ®
the intercept, ci the unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed constant over time, and uit
represents the unsystematic error component. In addition, equation (4.1) includes ￿xed year
e￿ects dt to control for business cycle e￿ects.25 Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we
estimate equation (4.1) by ￿xed e￿ects. We then calculate the empirical covariance matrix of
the ￿xed e￿ects residuals. After omitting one equation, since the covariance matrix of the ￿xed-
e￿ect-residuals does not have full rank (see Wooldridge (2002), chapter 10.5.5), the remaining
covariance matrix is used for the GLS transformation. Second, we estimate the transformed
model. Table 4.3 shows the GLS estimates.26
The signs for di￿erent de￿nitions of the job destruction rate (jdr1-jdr3) con￿rm in two out
of three cases the heterogeneity hypothesis. It is signi￿cant, however, only for the broadest
de￿nition of entries into unemployment. From this it is not clear, whether an increasing wage
dispersion indeed reduces transitions from employment to unemployment, as predicted by the
heterogeneity hypothesis. The estimated coe￿cients for both de￿nitions of the job ￿nding rate
(jfr1,jfr2) are signi￿cantly negative and contradict therefore the heterogeneity hypothesis. We
expected that a higher wage dispersion would imply that the unemployed ￿nd jobs faster, since
there are more jobs that ￿t the marginal productivity of the searching individuals. This seems
not to be the case in Germany. The wage dispersion was not expected to have any e￿ects on the
job changing rate (jcr). The data, however, contradict this view as well. The higher the wage
25 See Wilke (2004) for the importance of business cycle e￿ects on transition rates in Germany.
26 Note that estimating equation (4.1) as a system of equations would not result in an e￿ciency gain, since we
use the same regressors in all equations (Wooldridge (2002), chapter 7.3).Chapter 4 107
Table 4.4: Heterogeneity hypothesis ￿ FEGLS-regression of unemployment on the interquantile range
Dependent variable Coe￿cient estimate Expected
(Standard error) sign
u 0.0629 -
(0.0796)
~ u 0.0658 -
(0.0804)
The Estimation is based on 320 observations. See appendix D for the
de￿nition of variables. Further explanations are given in the text.
iqr is measured at the beginning of the respective time period.
u is transformed to insure unboundedness.
dispersion the higher is the job changing rate. Finally, we also explore directly the relationship
between unemployment and wage dispersion, which is the focus of the heterogeneity hypothesis.
For the narrow de￿nition of unemployment (recipients of transfer payments only) u, we ￿nd a
positive sign, but it is not signi￿cant. Also including the state out of sample (variable ~ u) increases
slightly the size of the e￿ect, however, it remains insigni￿cant. For both de￿nitions the sign
contradicts the heterogeneity hypothesis since higher wage dispersion is associated with higher
nonemployment (or with no change in unemployment at all). In light of our previous ￿ndings,
this implies that the negative e￿ect of the wage dispersion on the job ￿nding rate dominates other
e￿ects that drive (equilibrium) unemployment. Thus, the heterogeneity hypothesis is rejected
regarding this important relationship. Though not being signi￿cant, the positive coe￿cient
estimates are in accordance with the friction hypothesis.
Next, considering the friction hypothesis directly, we investigate whether the transition rates
a￿ect the (logarithm of the) interquantile range in the expected direction. Our estimated model
is speci￿ed as
liqrit = ® + ¯ratei;t¡1 + dt + ci + uit, (4.2)
where i = 1;:::;20, and t = 1981;::::;1996. Again, ￿xed year e￿ects are included to control for
business cycle e￿ects. The model is estimated by FEGLS. Table 4.5 contains the results for
estimating equation (4.2) regressing the transformed interquantile range on the transition rates.
The friction hypothesis purports that the job destruction rate (jdr1-jdr3) should have a positive
in￿uence on wage dispersion. This is supported by the data since we ￿nd positive signs which
are always signi￿cant. Obviously, a higher job destruction rate is associated with higher wage
dispersion, from the point of view of the friction hypothesis because higher job destruction in-
creases the monopsony power of the ￿rms via its e￿ect on unemployment. The second prediction
concerns the job changing rate (jcr). Here, an increase in the job￿to￿job transition rate should
reduce wage dispersion. The signs found in the data are well in accordance with this hypoth-108 Chapter 4
Table 4.5: Friction hypothesis ￿ FEGLS-regressions of the interquantile range on the transition rates
Coe￿. estimate jdr1 jdr2 jdr3 jcr jfr1 jfr2
(Stand. error) (E-BR) (E-BRjOOS) (E-NoE) (E-OE) (BR-E) (BRjOOS-E)
0.9106¤
(0.1099)
0.7693¤
(0.0907)
0.6094¤
(0.0887)
liqr -0.0351
(0.1557)
0.1143¤
(0.0214)
0.1946¤
(0.0252)
0.9099¤ -0.1806
(0.1100) (0.1420)
0.9140¤ -0.2849¤ 0.1199¤
(0.1042) (0.1257) (0.0181)
Exp. sign + + + - 0 0
See appendix D for the de￿nition of the variables. Estimation is based on 320 observations. iqr
is log-transformed. We use the transition rates between t ¡ 1 and t as explanatory variables.
esis. However, we ￿nd a signi￿cantly negative e￿ect only when controlling for transitions from
employment to unemployment and for transitions from unemployment to employment. Obvi-
ously, if people change jobs more often wage dispersion decreases or remains unchanged. Finally,
we suspected that the job ￿nding rate (jfr1, jfr2) bears no in￿uence on wage dispersion. This
implication is not con￿rmed. Instead, we ￿nd a positive in￿uence of the job ￿nding rate on
wage dispersion which always proves signi￿cant. When individuals ￿nd jobs faster, this seems
to increase wage dispersion.
As a second evaluation of the friction hypothesis, we regress the (logarithm of the) wage dispersion
measure on the lagged unemployment rate and on the lagged friction indicator, as de￿ned in Van
den Berg and Ridder (1993), i.e. ´ =
jdr
jdr+jcr (using the job￿to￿job transition rate jcr as a proxy
for the job o￿er rate on the job). Various regressions were run using di￿erent de￿nitions of jdr
and u, respectively. Table 4.6 indicates that the coe￿cient of ´ does not show the expected
sign. The friction hypothesis predicts that wage dispersion rises with stronger market frictions
´. Empirically, however, a higher value for ´ is associated with lower wage dispersion. This must
be interpreted as evidence against search theory. Especially, in light of the previous estimation
results this is astonishing, since we ￿nd that both factors in￿uencing ´, that is, jdr and jcr
show the correct sign from the point of view of the friction hypothesis. The results for the two
de￿nitions of unemployment are in favor of search theory. Overall, one should be cautious notChapter 4 109
Table 4.6: Friction hypothesis ￿ FEGLS-regressions of the interquantile range on frictions indicator and
unemployment
Coe￿cient estimate ´ ~ ´ u ~ u
(standard error)
iqr -0.0012 -0.5367¤ 0.1943 0.3842¤
(0.0171) ( 0.1608) (0.1099) (0.1116)
Expected sign + + + +
The Estimation is based on 320 observations. Year dummies are in-
cluded as regressors. See appendix D for the de￿nition of the variables.
iqr is log transformed.
The RHS variables are measured from t ¡ 1 to t .
to overemphasize these results, in particular, since our empirical measure for jcr is only a proxy
for the job o￿er rate on￿the￿job.
Summing up, we conclude that both the heterogeneity hypothesis and the friction hypothesis are
only partly consistent with the data. In a strict sense, both hypotheses are rejected by the data.
However, the friction hypothesis seems to perform better than the heterogeneity hypothesis.
Regarding the starting point of our discussion, namely the relationship between wage dispersion
and unemployment, our results favor search theory and contradict the Krugman hypothesis
regarding residual wage dispersion.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper attempts to discriminate between di￿erent theories on the relationship between un-
employment and residual wage dispersion. We develop two hypotheses which exhibit di￿erent
empirical implications. One view, which we denote heterogeneity hypothesis, is that wages are
determined entirely by marginal productivity so that residual wage dispersion corresponds to
residual productivity dispersion. To account for the institutional setting in Germany, we allow
labor unions to compress wages from below by imposing di￿erent minimum wages for di￿erent
groups of worker. Di￿erences in residual wage dispersion might stem from union in￿uence di￿er-
ing in strength. Accordingly, unemployment results because the minimum wage is higher than
the marginal productivity of the unemployed. The alternative view, which we denote the friction
hypothesis, is based on search theory. It states that after having controlled for age and educa-
tion, residual individual heterogeneity is not su￿ciently strong to account for the considerable
residual wage dispersion. Instead, the residual wage dispersion is determined by the amount
of search frictions. If search frictions are high, we will observe a high wage dispersion because
search frictions lead to monopsony power for the ￿rms resulting in higher wage dispersion. Ac-110 Chapter 4
cordingly, unemployment is not caused by minimum wages set by labor unions, but is a result of
search frictions. Our empirical analysis tests these opposing hypotheses. We obtain panel esti-
mates that are based on the comovement in transition rates, unemployment, and wage dispersion
within age￿education cells. The results are more supportive for the friction hypothesis than for
the heterogeneity hypothesis, although some implications of the former hypothesis are rejected
as well. Especially, regarding the relationship between unemployment and residual wage disper-
sion, the friction hypothesis seems to perform better. Thus, regarding residual wage dispersion,
our results contradict the Krugman hypothesis. A compression of the residual wage dispersion
does not seem to be associated with an increase in unemployment. So far, we have said nothing
concerning the relationship between wage dispersion between cells and unemployment. However,
recognize that, when the Krugman hypothesis between cells is valid, it is likely that we ￿nd
this phenomenon within the cells as well. To see this, note that a wage compression from below
would both reduce the wage dispersion between groups and the wage dispersion within groups
and thus we should ￿nd this relationship both between and within groups
There are a number of critical issues which should be mentioned to put this study into perspective.
First, the two hypotheses are complementary in a broad sense. They become mutually exclusive
in the sense that the heterogeneity hypothesis postulates ’observable’ residual heterogeneity while
the friction hypothesis does not, once productivity related heterogeneity is accounted for. Second,
the data do not perfectly match the data requirements. For instance, it would be interesting
to investigate whether our (imperfect) wage dispersion measure is correlated with the relative
strength of the union membership in a cell. Descriptive evidence in Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005)
suggests that a higher union density in fact reduces within wage dispersion. Third, at this level
of analysis, we cannot use the primitive variables, which search theory is built upon, e.g. the job
o￿er rate while employed instead of the actual rate of job changes. Rather, our analysis operates
at a descriptive level based on observable transition rates. However, this has the advantage that
it does not require the strong assumptions typically invoked to estimate structural models of
search equilibrium.5 A synthesis: Modelling di￿erent types of
unemployment and wage dispersion together
5.1 Introduction
This chapter combines an equilibrium search framework for heterogeneous labor with a produc-
tion function approach and endogenous job o￿er rates to analyze the e￿ects of minimum wages
on employment and wages when unemployment is both frictional and structural. It is based on
Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2007a).
This combination allows us to analyze wage dispersion within and between skill groups in a uni￿ed
framework. We obtain analytical solutions for equilibrium wage distributions for individuals with
identical skills. For a more general class of models we simulate wage distributions often containing
mass points at the upper bound of the distribution. We calculate the e￿ects of minimum wages
on structural unemployment and on the two types of wage dispersion. We ￿nd that labor unions
minimum wages cause structural unemployment when ￿rms labor demand reacts.
￿Structural￿ reasons are often identi￿ed when discussing the high unemployment in European
countries. This is surely correct, because the term is not very well de￿ned and used for very
di￿erent things. Structural in the sense of this paper refers to a situation where unemployment
results from the market power of labor unions, setting wages too high. This type of structural
reason for the high unemployment is not as easily agreed upon. In addition, it is not seen as
being equally important in all European countries. However, a big part of the literature on
unemployment in Europe argues that labor unions in￿uence is an important factor in explaining
the situation, at least in Germany (see, e.g., Krugman (1994), Krueger and Pischke (1998),
Fitzenberger and Franz (2001), Puhani (2003), Blau and Kahn (2002) and Pfei￿er (2003)).1 We
take up that point and model this explicitly.
But, economists would generally agree that even in countries where structural reasons are said
to be very important, frictional unemployment is present. Frictional in the use of this paper
means that individuals look for ￿good￿ jobs and they do not know where the good jobs are
located. This process is time-consuming, generating waiting phases in ￿frictional￿ unemployment
and potential market power for ￿rms. We take up this idea as well and explicitly model frictional
unemployment in this paper.
1 Note, however that there is a literature that is more critical about this explanation, see e.g. Nickell (1997),
Gregg and Manning (1997), Freeman and Schettkat (2000), Beaudry and Green (2003) and M￿ller (2004).
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So far, the interplay between frictional and structural unemployment has largely been ignored in
the micro literature.2 Both strands of the literature are largely parallel and have not inspired each
other. With our approach to commonly model the two types of unemployment in an equilibrium
search context, we ￿ll this research gap. One of the few exceptions in the literature dealing
with both types of unemployment in this context is Koning, Ridder, and Van den Berg (1995).
Contrary to our approach, they assume however, that the labor market consists of a number of
separate submarkets, which do not interact. Structural unemployment in their model means that
in one submarket there is no production at all, because the value of leisure exceeds the (constant)
marginal productivity of the individuals. We avoid this strong assumption in our model, where
heterogeneous agents interact on one labor market.
A big part of the literature on unemployment di￿erentials between the US and Europe focuses on
the diverging experience in unemployment and wage dispersion. Skill-biased technological change
and other factors are said to have increased the demand for high-skilled labor as compared to
low-skilled labor and have therefore altered the wage structure. Numerous studies point to
the fact that wage dispersion between groups increased as a reaction at least in the US (for
overviews, see e.g. Gottschalk (1997), Katz and Autor (1999) or Acemoglu (2002)). Because
wage regressions generally only explain little of the wage variation however (Mortensen (2003)),
recently the literature has become interested in the development of wage di￿erentials within
groups with comparable attributes. These literature has been stimulated by the seminal paper
of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) (BM hereafter). Empirical studies show that ￿rst, much of
the increase in overall inequality is due to an increase in residual inequality (see Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce (1993), Violante (2002)) and that second the development of wage inequality between
di￿erent skill groups and within di￿erent skill groups is not parallel (see, e.g., Katz and Autor
(1999), Fitzenberger (1999)).3 Clearly, this poses the question of understanding the development
of both types of wage dispersion in a uni￿ed framework.
Again, the literature on wage di￿erentials between groups and within groups are largely parallel.4
Our model corresponds to the challenge of understanding the development of wage dispersion
within and between groups in one framework. In addition, it allows to understand the develop-
ment of the unconditional wage distribution as resulting from the interplay of the development
within and between groups as analyzed, e.g. for Germany, in Kohn (2006) or Gernandt and
Pfei￿er (2006).
2 The macro literature, namely the matching-literature does allow for the two types of unemployment. However,
the matching literature does not allow for residual wage inequality.
3 Prasad (2004) argues based on the GSOEP that the developments are parallel for groups de￿ned by education,
experience and tenure. Lemieux (2005) argues that much of the residual wage inequality is data noise and
that its importance is overstated.
4 A notable exception is e.g. Acemoglu (2002).Chapter 5 113
We extend an equilibrium search framework that naturally generates frictional unemployment
and residual wage inequality to allow for wage inequality between groups and structural unem-
ployment. Model building is complicated by the fact that in order to be able to explain di￿erent
unemployment rates for di￿erent skill groups and to generate wage dispersion between groups,
we allow for heterogeneous labor. Under strong assumptions, we obtain analytical solutions
for the wage distributions of the skill groups. These are similar in shape to the Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) solution.5 For more general model settings, we simulate solutions. Endoge-
nous job o￿er rates allow us to introduce labor demand e￿ects in this framework. Comparatively
weak assumptions are required to obtain a unique negative e￿ect of a binding minimum wage on
employment. Analytical results for e￿ects of a binding minimum wage on the wage distribution
and its moments are not easily obtained, since in equilibrium the complete distribution reacts.6
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss some related literature. Second, we present
the model to discuss afterwards an analytical solution and extensions. Then, we give simulation
results and ￿nally introduce a labor union. The last section concludes.
5.2 Literature
There are two separate strands of literature dealing with wage inequality and employment. On
the one hand, there is the labor supply and demand literature. This literature relates the
average wage for a skill group to its employment. Typically, within a labor supply and demand
framework only a small number of skill groups can be distinguished (see Hamermesh (1993)).
The most advanced analyses distinguish up to 3 education and 6 age categories in the empirical
implementation (see, e.g., Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005)). However, the interpretation of the
empirical relationship between average wages and employment is not easy, because aggregation
over presumably heterogeneous workers is problematic (see, Fitzenberger, Garlo￿, and Kohn
(2003)). Further, wages and employment are endogenous quantities with respect to each other
and output e￿ects exist and are endogenous; thus empirical operationalization is di￿cult (see
Fitzenberger (1999)). In addition, even when distinguishing a relative huge number of skill
groups, the residual wage inequality is still considerable (see, Fitzenberger, Garlo￿, and Kohn
(2003)). A part of the literature argues that the residual wage inequality re￿ects unobserved
productivity di￿erences (see, e.g., Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu (2002) and Lemieux (2005)).
An interesting alternative, and the second literature strand that relates wages and employment,
5 When we speak about a BM-type wage distribution, we refer to a wage density that is increasing and where
the wage distribution has no mass points.
6 Recognize that this seems to be a stylized fact of minimum wages, see Koning, Ridder, and Van den Berg
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is o￿ered by the equilibrium search theory. This literature shows that search frictions can cause
both unemployment and wage inequality for identical workers.
Most of the literature on search equilibrium is based on the paper of Burdett and Mortensen
(1998). It is the ￿rst paper that generates frictional unemployment and continuous residual
wage dispersion in a model. The paper has two main shortcomings. First, individuals are
homogeneous with respect to all relevant characteristics, especially in their marginal productivity,
which is in addition assumed constant. Second, most commentators criticize the equilibrium
wage distribution, that the model generates, with the argument that the increasing density is
counterfactual. Part of the critique, however, seems to be a misunderstanding of the model in so
far as it does not generate an unconditional wage distribution. Some part of the literature argues
that the form of the conditional density does not contradict stylized facts (see e.g. Gautier and
Teulings (2006)).
Several attempts have been made to respond to these challenges. Heterogeneity has been incor-
porated in the model both on the side of the individuals and on the side of the ￿rms. On the side
of the ￿rms heterogeneity was integrated as di￿erent productivities that are either exogenous or
endogenous (see Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Mortensen (2000), Bontemps, Robin, and Van
den Berg (2000)). These extensions seem to be capable of producing wage densities that have
a long right tail as required for empirical wage densities (see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den
Berg (2000)). On the side of the workers, heterogeneity has been introduced with respect to
leisure preferences by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) consider
individuals that are di￿erent with respect to their marginal productivities, but assume that the
labor market is completely segmented. Ridder and Van den Berg (1997), building on Manning
(1993) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994), consider the case where marginal productivity of
the individuals varies with the amount of labor employed in a particular ￿rm, i.e. a production
function with one production factor. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) model jointly productive
heterogeneity on the side of the employers and on the side of the employees. Their assumptions
somewhat di￿er from the standard BM-case. Still, they maintain the assumption that marginal
productivity of the individual does not depend on the employment.7
The ￿rst attempt of modelling several skill groups jointly and to link their employment in ￿rms
via a production function in the equilibrium search context is Holzner and Launov (2005). In
addition, they allow for heterogeneous ￿rm productivities. To solve their model they have to
assume supermodularity in production. In addition, their model does not allow for labor demand
e￿ects. Since their model entails several skill groups it generates wage inequality within and
7 For surveys on new developments in the search literature, compare Garlo￿ (2007), Rogerson, Shimer, and
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between groups. In addition, it is able to generate a long right tail for the wage density. Our
model extends their results by allowing for labor demand e￿ects via endogenous job o￿er rates,
by employing di￿erent assumptions for obtaining an analytical solution and by giving simulation
results.
5.3 An equilibrium search model with heterogeneous labor
We consider a labor market, where there is a huge amount of workers of two skill groups (i = 1;2
of masses Ni and ￿rms (of mass 1). Individuals are maximizing their expected lifetime income,
while ￿rms maximize an approximation of expected pro￿ts. The labor market is frictional in
the sense that ￿nding a job requires time, and in the sense that jobs are destroyed from time to
time. This is re￿ected in the job o￿er rates for unemployed individuals (¸i) and for employed
individuals (¸i;L) on the one hand and by the job destruction rate (±i) on the other hand.
5.3.1 Individuals behavior
We now derive the optimal behavior of the individuals. In this environment, the optimal behavior
of the individuals is characterized by an optimal stopping property, i.e. a reservation wage.
Proposition 1: Individual behavior and therefore the reservation wage depends only on the
marginal wage o￿er distributions.
Proof: See appendix E.1.
The reservation wage is given by the wage wi for individuals employed at wage wi (see Mortensen
and Neumann (1988)). For unemployed individuals of the two skill groups (i = 1;2), assuming
that there is no mass point at wi, it is determined by the value equations and given by:8
wi;R = zi + (¸i ¡ ¸i;L)
Z w
o
1
wi;R
1 ¡ Hi(wi)
r + ±i + ¸i;L(1 ¡ Hi(wi))
dwi. (5.1)
wi;R is the reservation wage for an unemployed individual of skill group i, wo
1 is the upper bound
of the respective wage o￿er distribution, zi is the alternative income of the unemployed, i.e.,
unemployment bene￿ts net of search cost, and Hi(wi) is the (marginal) wage o￿er distribution
for skill group i.9
8 Given that individuals care in their decision only about the marginal distributions, the derivation of the
reservation wage is standard and can be found in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
9 This is the distribution from which an individual draws, when it receives a job o￿er according to the respective
job o￿er rate. The probability of drawing a job o￿er paying a wage above wi is (1 ¡ Hi(wi)) irrespectively of
whether or not an individual is employed and where it is employed.116 Chapter 5
The reservation wage completely characterizes the decision of an individual. The unemployed
(employed) individual accepts all job o￿ers that pay wages above wi;R (wi) and rejects otherwise.
Given this optimal behavior, we can describe the employment dynamics for ￿rms. Consider
the collection of ￿rms that pay wages above a wage wi, assuming that at wi there is no mass
point. Let K(wi) ´ Ni ¡Ui ¡Li(wi) be the employment in these ￿rms, where Ui is the number
of unemployed and Li(wi) is the number of employed in ￿rms paying wages below wi. Their
employment evolves according to:
_ Ki(wi) = (¸iUi + ¸L;iLi(wi))(1 ¡ Hi(wi)) ¡ ±iKi(wi). (5.2)
Under stationarity, we have _ Ki(wi) = 0 and from this we can calculate the connection between
the cross-sectional wage distribution Gi(wi) =
Li(wi)
(Ni¡Ui)
10 and the wage o￿er distribution Hi(wi)
11. It is given by:
Gi(wi) =
±iHi(wi)
¸i;L(1 ¡ Hi(wi)) + ±i
. (5.3)
Now, consider skill group i = 1. Imposing stationarity _ K1(w1) = 0 and twice di￿erentiating the
resulting condition with respect to w1 yields:
l0
1(w1)
l1(w1)
=
2¸1;Lh1(w1)
(¸1;L(1 ¡ H1(w1)) + ±1)
. (5.4)
This is the central equation characterizing the dynamics of employment in a ￿rm that o￿ers a
wage w1 depending on the wage strategies of all other ￿rms and the frictions. This dynamics
follows from the optimal behavior of individuals.
We can calculate l1(w1) from L0
1(w1) = l1(w1)h1(w1) as
l1(w1) =
(N1 ¡ U1)±1 (¸1;L + ±1)
(¸1;L(1 ¡ H1(w1)) + ±1)
2 (5.5)
and l0
1(w1) > 0.12 Note that this equation gives an expression for the expected employment or
equilibrium employment depending on the parameters.
Next, we consider optimal behavior of ￿rms.
10 The distribution of wages when randomly sampling an employed individual.
11 The wage distribution when randomly sampling a ￿rm. These are di￿erent because ￿rms di￿er in size.
12 This equation is a special case of equation (5) in Holzner and Launov (2005) for the case of no mass point at
wi. If there is a mass point at wi, we must adopt the more complicated form of them.Chapter 5 117
5.3.2 Firms behavior
Firms maximize the pro￿ts at the expected employment, an approximation of the expected pro￿ts
(see Holzner and Launov (2005)), which are given as
¦(w1;w2) = y(l1(w1);l2(w2)) ¡ w1l1(w1) ¡ w2l2(w2), (5.6)
by choosing an optimal wage-vector w. Recognize that this is similar to saying that ￿rms choose
an optimal employment level, because the wage uniquely determines the employment level (see
equation (5.5)). Recognize that Proposition 1 implies together with the above derivations that
the employment for skill group 1 only depends on the wage for skill group 1 and not on w2. This
justi￿es that we do not need to allow for a dependence of l1 (or equivalently h1;g1) on w2 in the
above pro￿t function and vice versa.13
Firms optimal choice of w1 implies
@¦(w1;w2)
@w1
=
@y()
@l1
@l1
@w1
¡ l1(w1) ¡ w1
@l1()
@w1
= 0
l0
1(w1)
l1(w1)
=
1
³
@y()
@l1 ¡ w1
´ =
1
y0(l1) ¡ w1
(5.7)
a condition describing a connection between the relative change of the employment density of
skill group 1 with w1 and the pro￿t per worker.
5.3.3 Equilibrium
To solve the model, we now equate the conditions (5.7) and (5.4) yielding the following condition
of optimality.
2h1(w1)
µ
@y()
@l1
(H1(w1);H2(w2)) ¡ w1
¶
+ H1(w1) ¡
¸1;L + ±1
¸1;L
= 0 (5.8)
In this equation we have substituted H1(w1) for l1(w1) as arguments in the production function.
We must specify the production function in order to be able to characterize the form of the
solution of this di￿erential equation. Moreover, in this form the equation looks like a partial
di￿erential equation. We will argue below that it is not a partial di￿erential equation but only
13 Notice, that we assume that ￿rms care about expected employment and do not adapt their wage policy on
short run variations in employment.118 Chapter 5
an ordinary one. Assume for the moment a Cobb-Douglas form y = Al
®1
1 l
®2
2 . We can rewrite the
central di￿erential equation as
h1(w1)=
¡H1(w1)+
¸1;L+±1
¸1;L
2
0
B
@®1A
0
@
(N1¡U1)±1(¸1;L+±1)
(¸1;L(1¡H1(w1))+±1)
2
1
A
®1¡10
@
(N2¡U2)±2(¸2;L+±2)
(¸2;L(1¡H2(w2))+±2)
2
1
A
®2
¡w1
1
C
A.
(5.9)
This equation looks very involved. Recognize however, that the solution H1(w1) to this di￿eren-
tial equation does not depend on w2 but on w1 only. If there is a functional connection between
w1 and w2 this holds true. Therefore, we assume that the optimal choice of w1 determines the
optimal choice of w2, i.e. w1 = z(w2) and that, in addition, z0 > 0.
This considerably simpli￿es the problem, since it makes clear that we only have to solve an
ordinary di￿erential equation. We can replace H1(w1) for H2(w2) in the above equation since
￿rms cover the same position in the wage distributions of the two skill groups. Still, the above
equation is su￿ciently involved such that we could not ￿nd a closed form analytical solution for
this non-linear, non-autonomous, ordinary di￿erential equation.
5.4 Solving the model
5.4.1 An analytical solution
For an analytical solution to this problem, we now constrain ourselves to a special case with
parameter restrictions. We discuss some other solution strategies in appendix E.2. Let us ￿rst
assume that the production technology has constant returns to scale, i.e. ®1+®2 = 1.14 Second,
we assume that the ratio of job destruction rate and job o￿er rate on-the-job is identical for both
skill groups:
±1
¸1;L
=
±2
¸2;L
. (5.10)
This means that the average job duration is strictly shorter for one skill group than for the
other or, in other words, that there is higher turnover from both sources for one skill group.
It is conceivable, for example, that high-skilled jobs involve more speci￿c capital which means
that job destruction is more seldom and job-to-job transitions occur less often. For the Dutch
labor market Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) show that this assumption is in accordance with
the data. The empirical ￿ndings of Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) even allow for a stronger
assumption, since they note that it is ￿... important to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in ¸
but not necessarily in ¸L or in ±.￿ (p.1213)
14 For evidence on constant returns to scale, see e.g. Hamermesh (1993).Chapter 5 119
We obtain:
h1(w1) =
¡H1(w1) +
¸1;L+±1
¸1;L
2
Ã
®1A
µ
(N1¡U1)±1(¸1;L+±1)
(¸1;L(1¡H1(w1))+±1)
2
¶®1¡1 µ
(N2¡U2)±2(¸2;L+±2)
(¸2;L(1¡H1(w1))+±2)
2
¶®2
¡ w1
!
.
(5.11)
This di￿erential equation looks nice and can be solved using separation of variables (see appendix
E.3).
We get a closed form solution for the wage distribution of skill group 1 and by symmetry for skill
group 2:
Hi(wi) =
±i + ¸i;L
¸i;L
Ã
1 ¡
2
s
(®iA(¸i;L + ±i)®i¡1(Ni ¡ Ui)®i¡1(¸j;L + ±j)1¡®i(Nj ¡ Uj)1¡®i ¡ wi)
¡
®iA(¸i;L + ±i)®i¡1(Ni ¡ Ui)®i¡1(¸j;L + ±j)1¡®i(Nj ¡ Uj)1¡®i ¡ wR
i
¢
!
i = 1;2. A steady state labor market equilibrium solution to this model is completely character-
ized by H1;H2;wR
1 ;wR
2 , where individuals maximize expected lifetime income and ￿rms maximize
expected pro￿ts. This is the solution to an equilibrium search model with two skill groups which
are linked via a Cobb-Douglas production function, where both ￿rms and individuals behave
rationally with respect to their preferences.15
Of course, the resulting mixture wage distribution of the two skill groups is of special interest,
since it allows to decompose the variance of the wage distribution into a component that is due
to the variance within a skill group (i.e., because of frictions), and to a component that is due
to the variance between skill groups (i.e., because of human capital di￿erences).
Using that H2(w2) = H1(z¡1(w2)), the function z is determined by the above equation. We
obtain
z¡1(w2) = C +
(
¡
®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 ¡ wR
1
¢
¡
(1 ¡ ®1)A(¸2;L + ±2)¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)¡®1(¸1;L + ±1)®1(N1 ¡ U1)®1 ¡ wR
2
¢ w2, (5.12)
where C = ®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1
and
dz¡1(w2)
dw2
> 0.
15 Recognize that di￿erences in marginal productivity of these two skill groups stem from di￿erences in the
equilibrium unemployment rate, from the friction parameters, and from di￿erences in their ® parameter.120 Chapter 5
We checked that the solutions satisfy the original di￿erential equations (i.e., equation (5.11) is
satis￿ed). Recognize that the equilibrium wage distributions cannot contain mass points, since
wages are strictly below marginal productivity (see below).
5.4.2 Properties of the solution
Increasing wage densities
The wage o￿er density from the model is given as:
h1(w1)=
±+¸L
2¸L
2
r
1
(®1A(N1¡U1)®1¡1(N2¡U2)1¡®1¡w1)(®1A(N1¡U1)®1¡1(N2¡U2)1¡®1 ¡wR
1 ).
Taking derivatives yields the following
@h1(w1)
@w1 =
±+¸L
4¸L (®1A(N1¡U1)
®1¡1(N2¡U2)
1¡®1¡w
R
1 )
¡1=2(®1A(N1¡U1)
®1¡1(N2¡U2)
1¡®1¡w1)
¡3=2>0,
which is uniquely positive. If the density of the wage o￿ers is increasing the density of the cross-
sectional wages increases as well
@g1(w1)
@w1 > 0.16 Recall that the equilibrium relationship between
H1 and G1 is given by equation (5.3). So, introducing a production function the way we do it,
does not lead to a wage density with a long right tail. The mixture of the two might come a
bit closer to the desired form, but two skill groups clearly do not su￿ce to generate the required
form (see Holzner and Launov (2005)).
Constant marginal productivity over the wage distribution
One of the reasons, why we get a closed form solution for our special parameter constellation is
that we have a constant marginal productivity across the wage distribution. This brings us more
or less back in the BM-world for each skill group, given it is optimal for the ￿rms to cover the
same position in both wage distributions. This is astonishing, since we have decreasing marginal
productivity in each skill group, as analyzed in Ridder and Van den Berg (1997).
To see why marginal productivity is constant across the wage distribution, observe that the wage
uniquely determines the size of the work force of each ￿rm. For the parameter constellation cho-
sen, the e￿ect of a decreasing marginal productivity when increasing the wage and therefore
employment of one skill group is exactly o￿set by the corresponding e￿ect of the increasing
marginal productivity because the employment of the other skill group increases as well. This
16 When the wage o￿er density increases, that means that there are more ￿rms o￿ering a higher wage. In
addition, ￿rms paying a higher wage are bigger (l
0
1(w1) > 0, see equation (5.5)). This implies that the wage
density is steeper than the wage o￿er density.Chapter 5 121
increase of the other skill group arises because ￿rms take the same position in both wage dis-
tributions. Formally, this follows because the part which contains the wage distribution cancels
out.
@y
@l1
= ®1A
Ã
(N1 ¡ U1)±1 (¸1;L + ±1)
(¸1;L(1 ¡ H2(w2)) + ±1)
2
!®1¡1 Ã
(N2 ¡ U2)±2 (¸2;L + ±2)
(¸2;L(1 ¡ H2(w2)) + ±2)
2
!®2
(5.13)
= ®1A(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1 (¸1;L + ±1)
®1¡1 (N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 (¸2;L + ±2)
1¡®1
Reservation wage, and upper bound as well as moments of the wage distribution
Having at hand the wage distribution and the marginal productivity of the individuals we can
calculate the reservation wage and the upper bound of the wage distribution(s) according to the
following two formulas:
wR
1 = z1 + (¸1 ¡ ¸1;L)
Z wo
1
wR
1
1 ¡ H1(w1)
r + ±1 + ¸1;L(1 ¡ H1(w1))
dw1 (5.14)
and from setting H1(wo
1) = 1:
wo
1 =
@y
@l1
¡ (
@y
@l1
¡ wR
1 )
µ
±1
±1 + ¸1;L
¶2
, (5.15)
which for reasonable parameter choices is close to the but below marginal productivity.
Constraining ourselves to a case, where the lower bound of the wage distribution is not given by
the reservation wage, but by an exogenous restriction, as say a minimum wage, in addition, we
can calculate the moments of the wage distribution according to the following formulas (see Van
den Berg and Ridder (1993)):
EG1(w1) =
¡
y0
1 ¡ mw1
¢
µ
1 ¡
±1
±1 + ¸1;L
¶
+ mw1,
where y0
1 =
@y
@l1 is the marginal productivity and mw1 is the binding minimum wage. Using the
same notation as above, the variance is given by the following formula (ibid.):
varG1(w1) =
1
3
¡
y0
1 ¡ mw1
¢2 ±1
±1 + ¸1;L
µ
1 ¡
±1
±1 + ¸1;L
¶2
=
1
3
¡
y0
1 ¡ mw1
¢2 ¸2
1;L±1
(±1 + ¸1;L)
3.
By symmetry these formulas apply for skill group 2 as well.
A nice feature of the model is that we do not have to invoke the strong assumption that ¸ = ¸L
(the same job o￿er rate for employed and unemployed) which is often made in advanced search
models, see e.g. Ridder and Van den Berg (1997). We allow for unobserved heterogeneity in ¸.122 Chapter 5
That is also the reason why the reservation wage is (considerably) di￿erent from the alternative
income of the unemployed z1.
5.4.3 Simulation results
The general problem which we want to solve is equation (5.11). The problem with this di￿erential
equation is that there is no easy way to solve a non-autonomous, non-linear ordinary di￿erential
equation. Above, we invoke some assumptions which allow for a analytical solution. Deviating
from these assumptions, we assess the solution by trying numerical methods. We argued above
that it is likely that ￿rms cover the same position in the wage distributions for both skill groups
as long as there is no mass point. For all simulations, we maintain this assumption for the
continuous part of the wage distribution.
We start by assessing whether the numerical solution to the variant which we can solve ana-
lytically reproduces the analytical results, which - fortunately - it does.17 As a starting point,
we consider two parameter constellations: a labor market with a high degree of frictions and a
labor market with a low degree of frictions (see, table E.1 in appendix E.3 for the chosen values).
Table 5.1 gives the results for the two parameter constellations.
Table 5.1: Simulation results: Constant returns to scale
Parameter low frictions high frictions
u1 0:091 0:286
u2 0:063 0:118
y
0
1 0:407 0:161
y
0
2 0:593 0:913
wr
1 0:137 0:035
wr
2 0:277 0:467
wo
1 0:404 0:146
wo
2 0:588 0:859
EG1(w1) 0:371 0:116
EG2(w2) 0:535 0:665
varG1(w1) 0:003 0:001
varG2(w2) 0:007 0:025
¦ 0:064 0:231
Clearly, the market with the high degree of frictions has the higher unemployment rates. The
marginal productivity for the low-skilled is higher in the market with a low degree of frictions.
17 For all simulations, we used Mathematica’s routine NDSolve. This routine chooses between di￿erent methods
to ￿nd numerical solutions, most of them being a variant of the Runge-Kutta method. For a description of
Runge-Kutta methods, see e.g. Bronstein, Semendjajew, Musiol, and M￿hlig (2000). For a description of
Mathematica’s NDSolve routine, see http://documents.wolfram.com/mathematica/.Chapter 5 123
This is the case because of the higher ® attached to them and because own employment is much
lower (whereas the employment of the other skill group is not that much lower). The contrary
is true for the marginal productivity of the other skill group, by the same arguments. The
reservation wage is a premium of about 35% (17%) for skill group 1 and 175% (125%) for skill
group 2 in the case of low frictions (high frictions). The lower premium in the frictional case
stems from the fact that market prospects are worse. By the same token, the premium for skill
group 2 is higher. The pro￿t of the ￿rms is higher in the frictional case, since a higher amount
of frictions is associated with a higher degree of monopsony power for the ￿rms.
Next, we analyze the impact of small deviations from the parameter restrictions as given in
table 5.1 on the equilibrium. We ￿nd that altering one of the parameters (¸1;L;¸2;L;±1;±2) by
a small amount immediately destroys the continuous density result in the case where frictions
are low. If we increase ±1 by only 2.5%, we already get a mass point at the top of the wage
distribution for skill group 2. This means that a positive fraction of the ￿rms o￿er and pay the
same wage for skill group 2. The reason for the mass point at the top of the distribution is that
the marginal productivity is not constant across the wage distribution. For skill group 2, in the
continuous part, it decreases with an increasing wage w2 and attains the marginal productivity
at a value wcrit
2 where H2(w
crit;¡
2 ) < 1. Clearly, at this point, further increasing the employment
of skill group 2 is no more valuable. On the contrary, for skill group 1, the marginal productivity
increases in the continuous part as w1 rises. Thus, in the continuous part, the wage density is
less steep than in the baseline case.
In the case of a high degree of frictions the continuous density result is more stable. Increasing
±1 by 25% does not change the fact that we obtain a continuous solution for both skill groups.
This holds true, although the marginal productivity of skill group 2 decreases strongly over the
support of w2 (by about 20%). At the same time, the marginal productivity for skill group 1
increases considerably over the support of w1 (by more than 20%). Thus, the point where further
enhancing employment is no more valuable to the ￿rm exists in this case as well. It appears
however on the right side of the support of w: the high amount of frictions circumvents that this
potential mass point is attained. Another interesting result is obtained for this case: the wage
o￿er density for skill group 1 is hump-shaped. The reason is the following: Recall that there
is a tradeo￿ between pro￿t per worker and employment. High wage ￿rms must have a higher
employment to compensate for the low pro￿ts per worker. The increasing marginal productivity
over the support makes up for a part of the loss through higher wages. This decreases the
employment required to compensate for the higher wage cost. The wage density is less steep
which is achieved through a decreasing wage o￿er density. Similarly, the wage o￿er density for
skill group 1 is steeper than in the case of a constant marginal productivity.124 Chapter 5
5.5 A labor union in an equilibrium search model
5.5.1 Basic setup
So far we have said nothing about unemployment. As with most search models our model has
the characteristic that minimum wages do not change employment as long as they remain under
the marginal productivity of the individuals. To see this, recognize that as long as the in￿ow in
and out￿ow rates out of unemployment are unchanged, equilibrium unemployment is unchanged
in a stationary equilibrium. However, the in￿ow rate is considered exogenous and equal to ±,
while the out￿ow rate is ¸(1 ¡ H1(mw1)). However, since o￿ering wages below the minimum
wage mw1 is illegal and since we assume the minimum wage to be binding, there are no wages
below the minimum wage and thus:18
u1 =
U1
N1
=
±1
(±1 + ¸1)
. (5.16)
The fact that minimum wages a￿ect unemployment only if they are above marginal productivity
is not di￿erent from a competitive model. But, in a competitive model all paid wages correspond
to the marginal productivity of some individual while in the absence of a mass point in our model
all paid wages lie strictly below the marginal productivity. The reason for this is that search
frictions and the assumed wage setting mechanism imply that ￿rms have monopsony power.19
Therefore, a labor union (or the state) that increases a minimum wage compresses the wage
distribution and redistributes rents but does not alter employment.20
Now, imagine that the minimum wage increases above the marginal productivity of the individ-
uals of say skill group 1. In the BM-case, employment would be zero because individuals have
a constant marginal productivity. Here, however it is still optimal to employ some members of
skill group 1, since when employment is lower, marginal productivity increases. To see this, just
raise the minimum wage slightly above the level of the marginal productivity of the workers.
Now, half the number of individuals in skill group 1, i.e. N¤
1 = N1
2 . Under these circumstances
we get a new solution with two continuous wage distributions, where ￿rms make positive pro￿ts.
18 Of course, the same reasoning holds for a non-binding minimum wage. Then, the (common) reservation wage
is the lower bound of the wage distribution.
19 Recognize that even in the presence of a mass point there are no employment e￿ects of increasing a binding
minimum wage as long as the minimum wages touches only the continuous part of the wage distribution. For
an extensive treatment of the e￿ects of monopsony power on labor market outcomes, see Manning (2003a).
20 We consider labor unions here, because in the German context there is - with some exceptions - no minimum
wage by the state. But labor unions contracts in connection with the ￿to-the-workers-advantage principle￿
(￿G￿nstigkeitsprinzip￿) closely resemble minimum wages.Chapter 5 125
We take up this idea in the following and introduce rationing of jobs by endogenizing ¸. Assume
that ¸ is determined by the aggregate search e￿ort of ￿rms.21 Assume further that hiring is
costly to ￿rms and that ￿rms cannot distinguish prior to the search e￿ort whether an individual
is employed or unemployed, implying that ¸i = ¸i;L (see Mortensen (2003)).22 Assume for
simplicity in addition that only hiring in skill group 1 is costly and that hiring costs per worker
contact are linear and given by c.
Consider a ￿rm that pays a wage w1 for skill group 1, where its stationary employment is given
by l1(w1) as given by equation (5.5).23 The ￿rm has to contact enough workers to exactly o￿set
the out￿ows, taking into account the acceptance probability °(w1) of an individual contacted.
The acceptance probability is given by:
°(w1) = u1 + (1 ¡ u1)G1(w1)
for w1 > wR
1 and G1(w1) is given by equation (5.3). For the total amount of worker contacts
necessary to maintain ￿rm size, we obtain:
(¸1(1 ¡ H1(w1)) + ±1)l1(w1)
°(w1)
c1 = ¸1N1c1. (5.17)
Using the number of contacts necessary for maintaining equilibrium employment in the pro￿t
equation, we get:
¦(w1;w2) = y(l1(w1);l2(w2)) ¡ w1l1(w1) ¡ w2l2(w2) ¡ ¸1N1c1. (5.18)
This implies that the ￿rst order conditions in optimally choosing the wage vector w are unchanged
and thus for any parameter constellation that yields a solution with a continuous wage distri-
bution without considering contact costs and which still yield positive (zero) pro￿ts considering
contact costs, the equilibrium is unchanged.
Now, consider, that the contact rate is endogenous. Consider the decision of the ￿rms of contact-
ing an additional worker. As long as the (expected) pro￿ts (per worker contacted) are positive
the ￿rms will increase worker contacts (see Mortensen (2003)), i.e.:
¦(w1;w2)
¸1N1
=
1
¸1N1
(y(l1(w1);l2(w2)) ¡ w1l1(w1) ¡ w2l2(w2)) ¡ c1 = 0. (5.19)
21 It is a common assumption in the search literature that it is the ￿rms search activity that determines ¸ (see
e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b)). It is rarely modelled explicitly, however.
22 See, e.g., Manning (1993), for one of the few attempts to introduce rationing of jobs in a search framework.
23 Recognize that this requires that there is no mass point at w1.126 Chapter 5
Maintaining the assumption that ￿rms cover the same position in the wage distribution of the
two skill groups, and using the fact that we have no mass point at (w1;w2) yields:
1
¸1N1
A
Ã
±1¸1N1
(±1 + ¸1(1 ¡ H1(w1)))
2
!® Ã
±2¸2N2
¸2;L+±2
¸2+±2
(¸2;L(1 ¡ H1(w1)) + ±2)
2
!1¡®
(5.20)
¡w1
±1
(±1 + ¸1(1 ¡ H1(w1)))
2 ¡ w2
±2¸2N2
¸2;L+±2
¸2+±2
1
¸1N1
(¸2;L(1 ¡ H1(w1)) + ±2)
2 = c1.
Following Mortensen (2003), this must hold for every wage that is paid in equilibrium, and we
can write (setting H1(w1) to zero):
N
®¡1
1 A
Ã
±1¸1
(±1 + ¸1)
2
!® Ã
±2¸2N2
¸2;L+±2
¸2+±2
(¸2;L + ±2)
2
!1¡®
¡ z1
±1¸1
(±1 + ¸1)
2 ¡ wR
2
±2¸2N2
¸2;L+±2
¸2+±2
1
N1
(¸2;L + ±2)
2 = c1¸1. (5.21)
Next, we analyze how ¸ that solves the above equation varies with the lower bound of the wage
distribution, be it the reservation wage or the binding minimum wage mw1.
De￿ne:
G(¸1)=N
®¡1
1 A
³
±1¸1
(±1+¸1)2
´®
0
@
±2¸2N2
¸2;L+±2
¸2+±2
(¸2;L+±2)
2
1
A
1¡®
¡z1
±1¸1
(±1+¸1)2 ¡w
R
2
±2¸2N2
¸2;L+±2
¸2+±2
1
N1
(¸2;L+±2)
2 ¡c1¸1=0.
Implicitly di￿erentiating yields:
d¸1
dz1
=
±1¸1
(±1+¸1)2
±2
1¡±1¸1
(±1+¸1)3
0
@®A
³
±1¸1N1
(±1+¸1)2
´®¡1
Ã
±2¸2N2
¸2;L+±2
¸2+±2
(¸2;L+±2)
2
!1¡®
¡ z1
1
A ¡ c1
.
The denominator is negative if, a) ¸1 > ±1 and b)
@y
@l1(¸1) > mw1. Both conditions are likely
to hold, since the ￿rst assumption is simply assuming that the unemployment rate is smaller
than 50% (see equation (5.16)), while the second says that the marginal productivity must
exceed the minimum wage, which is a necessary condition for production. Recognize that for
these arguments to hold we have assumed that there is no mass point at the lower bound z1.
Recognize in addition, that if there is a continuous part in the wage distribution then optimality
implies that if there exists a mass point it must exist at the upper bound. When the wage
distribution shrinks to a single point the above arguments do not apply. In deed, the theoretical
results of Ridder and Van den Berg (1997) suggest that there are many cases where there is a
wage distribution with a continuous part. Our simulation results for all parameter constellations
resulted in wage distributions that are continuous at the lower bound of the distribution.Chapter 5 127
5.5.2 Frictional and structural unemployment
We can now decompose the total unemployment rate in a frictional component, caused by labor
market frictions, and a structural component, caused by a labor unions minimum wage. We
de￿ne frictional unemployment as the unemployment rate in the absence of a minimum wage.
Let z1 be the reservation wage of the individuals and let mw1 > z1 be the binding minimum
wage, then frictional unemployment is given as:
u
f
1 =
±1
(±1 + ¸1(z1))
, (5.22)
while structural unemployment is the di￿erence of total unemployment and frictional unemploy-
ment.
us
1 = u1 ¡ u
f
1 =
±1
(±1 + ¸1(mw1))
¡
±1
(±1 + ¸1(z1))
(5.23)
Because ¸1 decreases with the minimum wage, structural unemployment increases with the
minimum wage.
5.5.3 Wage dispersion
Next, we consider the wage distribution in the case where the labor union sets a minimum wage.
For the above derivations, we had only to assume that the wage distribution has a continuous part,
which we argued is likely to be the case. If we impose parameters that guarantee a solution that
is continuous over the complete support, we can calculate the moments of the wage distributions.
This allows us to calculate comparative static results for changing the minimum wage for these
moments. In order to derive comparative static results, consider now the special case, where the
job o￿er rate is identical across states and skill groups, i.e., ¸1 = ¸2 and ¸i;L = ¸i = ¸, where
as above ¸ is determined by the hiring process for skill group 1.24 In addition, we maintain the
assumption we imposed for the analytical solution, which implies that the destruction rates are
identical across groups, i.e. ±1 = ±2 = ±.
For this case, we obtain a closed form solution for ¸
¸ = ¡± +
2
s
±
c1
µ
N®¡1
1 N1¡®
2 A ¡ z1 ¡ wR
2
N2
N1
¶
.
24 Admittedly, from an economic point of view, the assumption that ¸ is determined by the hiring process for
skill group 1, but also holds for skill group 2 is hard to justify. We use this, however, just as a tractable
benchmark solution.128 Chapter 5
which solves the zero pro￿t condition. We can show easily that the e￿ect of z1 on ¸ is unam-
biguously negative, and we do require neither ¸1 > ±1 nor
@y
@l1(¸1) > z1 to hold, because
@¸
@z1
= ¡
1
2
µ
±
c1
µ
N®¡1
1 N1¡®
2 A ¡ z1 ¡ wR
2
N2
N1
¶¶¡0:5
< 0.
Since the introduction of hiring costs does not change the ￿rst order conditions (s.a.), the pa-
rameter constellation chosen guarantees the existence of continuous solution as long as pro￿ts
are non-negative, i.e. as long as there is production. The wage o￿er distribution is given by:
H1(w1) =
± + ¸
¸
Ã
1 ¡
2
s
(®1A(N1)®1¡1(N2)1¡®1 ¡ w1)
(®1A(N1)®1¡1(N2)1¡®1 ¡ z1)
!
.
To get a sense of the e￿ect of an increasing minimum wage on the wage distribution, we ￿rst
calculate the upper bound of the wage distribution(s).25
From
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Since there is no e￿ect of ¸ on the marginal productivity, we obtain:
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The e￿ect of increasing the minimum wage on the upper bound of the wage distribution(s)
cannot be signed. The reason is that there are two counteracting e￿ects. On the one hand, an
increasing minimum wage shifts the whole distribution, including the upper bound to the right
if ¸ is constant. This e￿ect is captured by the second summand in the above formula. On the
other hand, ¸ decreases as a reaction to the increasing minimum wage and therefore the market
gets less competitive, thereby decreasing the upper bound. This is the ￿rst summand in the
above formula, which is negative because the e￿ect of the minimum wage on the job o￿er rate is
negative.
Next, we analyze the e￿ect of an increasing minimum wage on the expectation of the wage
distribution. The expectation is given by (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1993)):
25 Recognize, that the upper bound of the distribution of wage o￿ers is also the upper bound of the distribution
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which is unambiguously negative. That is, the expectation of w1 increases less than z1. Consid-
ering however @
@z1EG1(w1) causes a non-unique sign.
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Again the non-uniqueness stems from the fact that the direct e￿ect from increasing z1 on the
expectation is positive. However, decreasing ¸ counteracts the direct e￿ect by making the market
less competitive. If ¸ does not react, again, the e￿ect is uniquely positive @
@z1EG1(w1) = ±
±+¸.
For the variance, we have:
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The partial derivative is calculated as:
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which is uniquely negative if ¸ < 2± and thus if the unemployment rate is above 33% and depends
on the parameters otherwise.
The e￿ects on the wage dispersion discussed so far, all concern the wage distribution of skill
group 1. Recognize that when the labor unions increase the minimum wage of skill group 1
it also alters the moments of the wage distribution of skill group 2. This is the case because
as labor demand reacts the marginal productivity for skill group 2 decreases, and therefore the
expectation and the variance change. A second reason for this is that we assume here that the
¸’s are identical and thus also labor demand for skill group 2 reacts. In the absence of the second
factor, i.e. holding ¸2;¸2;L constant, the e￿ect of an increasing minimum wage for skill group 1
on the expectation and on the variance of the wage distribution of skill group 2 is negative. This
implies that the dispersion between skill groups changes as well when the dispersion within skill
groups is changed. Again, the direction of the e￿ect cannot be signed.130 Chapter 5
5.6 Labor unions objectives
So far, we have assumed that the labor unions have the possibility to impose a minimum wage
that is binding. This can be justi￿ed for the German labor market by acknowledging that
negotiated wages have indeed a character of minimum wages (see, e.g., Franz (2006) and Pfei￿er
(2003) for empirical results). Now, we ask the question which minimum wage a labor union
chooses optimally. The trade-o￿ in the above model is as follows: increasing the minimum wage
always decreases employment and can increase the expectation and decrease the variance of the
wage distribution.
Let us start by assuming that the labor union maximizes the wage bill. In order to derive an
analytical form for the objective function, we refer to the above special case, where ¸1 = ¸2,
¸L = ¸ and ±1 = ±2.
WB=(N1¡U1)EG(w1)=N1
¸
±+¸[(y0
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2
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The labor union will choose a minimum wage mw1 that maximizes this sum.
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We obtain the optimal chosen minimum wage mw1 of the labor union as
mw1 =
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Now, consider a labor union that also cares about the income of the unemployed. Its maximiza-
tion problem is:
WU = (N1 ¡ U1)EG(w1) + z1U1 = N1
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which is higher as the corresponding value of the labor union that does not care about the
unemployed if we require that ¸ > ± and that both ¸ and ± are positive. The reason for this
is that in the case where the labor union cares about the unemployed they have still a positive
contribution to the objective function in the case where they are unemployed while in the case
where the labor union does not care about the unemployed, they get a value of zero in the
objective function. This result is astonishing in the light of the results of Insider-Outsider theoryChapter 5 131
(e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (2001)). There, wages are said to be too high because unions care
only about the employed (the insiders) and not about the unemployed (the outsiders). Here, we
demonstrate that, given this reasonable objective functions for unions, the opposite is the case,
because the unions partly internalize the costs from high unemployment. So far, the model we
have introduced excludes wage renegotiations. Note, however, that the model o￿ers scope for
an Insider-Outsider story, because there are (quasi-)rents to be divided between employer and
employee.
5.7 Conclusion
We have constructed an equilibrium search model where two types of labor are linked via a
production function. We introduce labor demand e￿ects in this framework and consider labor
unions behavior and its in￿uence on employment and wage dispersion via a binding minimum
wage. We argue that optimal strategies are such that ￿rms cover the same position in the wage
distribution for both skill groups. We solve the model under this assumption and for particular
parameter constellations and simulate solutions otherwise. Labor unions minimum wages are
higher when the union cares about the unemployed; they generate structural unemployment and
alter the wage distribution. In general, the e￿ect on the wage distribution cannot be signed
unambiguously as far as its moments are concerned, the reason being that the labor demand
e￿ect counteracts the increase in the minimum wage.Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation besch￿ftigt sich mit der Verteilung von L￿hnen und Besch￿ftigung als gle-
ichgewichtige Ergebnisse einer Allokation durch Arbeitsm￿rkte und andere Institutionen. Die
zentrale Bedeutung der Zuteilung von L￿hnen und Besch￿ftigung auf Arbeitsmarktteilnehmer
gr￿ndet sich in modernen Gesellschaften darauf, dass bei weitem der gr￿￿te Teil der privaten
Haushalte wirtschaftlich von Erwerbsarbeit abh￿ngig ist. Arbeitsmarktergebnisse betre￿en na-
hezu alle Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft. Die ￿konomische Theorie hilft zu verstehen und zu er-
kl￿ren, wie eine realisierte Allokation von Besch￿ftigung und Einkommen aus Besch￿ftigung ent-
standen ist. In der traditionellen mikro￿konomischen Analyse des Arbeitsmarktgeschehens gilt
Arbeit aus individueller Sicht als etwas schlechtes, weil daf￿r Freizeit aufgegeben werden muss.
Das verdiente Geld hingegen ist etwas gutes, weil es die Konsumm￿glichkeiten vergr￿￿ert. Kosten
der unfreiwilligen Arbeitslosigkeit bestehen einerseits darin, dass das Ergebnis ine￿zient ist und
eine Verbesserung im Pareto-Sinne m￿glich ist. F￿r einen sozialen Planer, der die Summe der
Nutzen der Individuen maximiert, bestehen die Kosten der Arbeitslosigkeit andererseits darin,
dass die Nutzen zu ungleich verteilt sind. F￿r einen unfreiwillig Arbeitslosen ist, verglichen mit
dem sozialen Optimum, der Grenznutzen der Freizeit zu niedrig, w￿hrend der Grenznutzen des
Konsums zu hoch ist. ˜hnlich verh￿lt es sich mit einer zu ungleichen Verteilung der Einkommen.
Der Grenznutzen des Konsums ist bei niedrigen Einkommen zu hoch und bei hohen Einkommen
zu niedrig. Eine ansonsten folgenlose Umverteilung w￿rde die gesamtgesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt
erh￿hen.
Soziale, psychologische und andere ￿konomische Kosten entstehen durch eine ung￿nstige
Aufteilung von Arbeit und Einkommen auf die Individuen. Beispiele f￿r weitere ￿konomische
Kosten der Arbeitslosigkeit umfassen bspw. m￿gliche Abschreibungen des Humankapitals in
Arbeitslosigkeit. Zus￿tzlich entstehen bei Arbeitslosigkeit auch betr￿chtliche psychologische
Kosten ￿bei den Betro￿enen, die das Gef￿hl haben, nicht mehr gebraucht zu werden￿ (Franz
(2006), S.347). Weitere ￿konomische Kosten einer hohen Einkommensungleichheit k￿nnen auch
darin bestehen, dass Individuen Pr￿ferenzen f￿r Gleichheit haben. Soziale Kosten einer zu
hohen Einkommensungleichheit bestehen beispielsweise darin, dass die Kriminalit￿tsraten hoch
sein k￿nnen und dass sich ein vergleichsweise gro￿er Anteil der Bev￿lkerung im Gef￿ngnis
be￿ndet (Morris and Western (1999)).
Diese Argumente rechtfertigen das ￿berw￿ltigende Interesse, das die sozialwissenschaftliche
Forschung an den internationalen Entwicklungen bei Lohnungleichheit und Arbeitslosigkeit
gezeigt hat. Diese Entwicklungen werden im Folgenden kurz dargestellt. Nachdem die
Lohnunterschiede zwischen hochquali￿zierten und geringquali￿zierten Arbeitnehmern in den
1970er Jahren abgenommen haben, sind diese in den 80er und 90er Jahren in den USA und im
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Vereinigten K￿nigreich dramatisch angestiegen (Katz, Loveman, und Blanch￿ower (1995),
Gottschalk und Smeeding (1997), und Katz und Autor (1999)). Vergleichbare Trends weisen in
diesen L￿ndern auch die Lohnungleichheit insgesamt und die residuale Lohnungleichheit, also
Lohnungleichheit zwischen Individuen mit gleichen beobachteten Charakteristika auf. In
Australien, Kanada und Japan ist in den 80ern und 90ern die Lohnungleichheit ebenfalls leicht
angestiegen. Dieser Anstieg blieb jedoch deutlich hinter dem Anstieg in den vorgenannten
L￿ndern zur￿ck.
In den kontinentaleurop￿ischen L￿ndern war ein solcher Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit im genan-
nten Zeitraum nicht zu beobachten. Dies gilt sowohl f￿r die Lohnungleichheit insgesamt als auch
f￿r die Lohnungleichheit zwischen Hoch- und Geringquali￿zierten und innerhalb dieser Qual-
i￿kationsgruppen (Katz und Autor (1999)). Stattdessen war in der ￿berwiegenden Zahl der
kontinentaleurop￿ischen L￿nder ein teilweise drastischer Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit zu verze-
ichnen (siehe Bean (1994), Saint-Paul (2004) und Blanchard (2006)).
Der ￿berwiegende Teil der ￿konomischen Literatur zur Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit
besch￿ftigt sich eher mit Lohnungleichheit zwischen unterschiedlichen Gruppen als mit
Lohnungleichheit innerhalb von Gruppen vergleichbarer Individuen. Das liegt vermutlich
daran, dass eine Ver￿nderung der Lohnungleichheit zwischen unterschiedlichen
Quali￿kationsgruppen einer ￿konomischen Interpretation leichter zug￿nglich ist, als die
Ver￿nderung der residualen Lohnungleichheit. Jedoch existieren eine Reihe guter Gr￿nde, sich
eingehender mit den Determinanten residualer Lohnungleichheit zu besch￿ftigen. Erstens
zeigen empirische Studien, dass die residuale Lohnvariation einen Gro￿teil der gesamten
Lohnvariation ausmacht.26 Mehr als die H￿lfte der Varianz der L￿hne bleibt also unerkl￿rt.
Hinsichtlich der Ver￿nderung der Lohnungleichheit beschreibt die empirische Literatur
zweitens, dass ein betr￿chtlicher Anteil der Ver￿nderung der Lohnungleichheit auf die
Ver￿nderung der residualen Lohnungleichheit zur￿ckgeht (Juhn, Murphy und Pierce (1993),
Katz und Autor (1999) und Cholezas und Tsakloglou (2007)). Zuletzt ist in der Literatur
darauf hingewiesen worden, dass, obwohl ein Anstieg beider Arten der Lohnungleichheit zu
verzeichnen war, der Anstieg f￿r die beiden Arten nicht parallel verlaufen ist. So zeigen
empirische Studien f￿r die USA und Deutschland, dass die zeitliche Abfolge des Anstieges der
residualen und der quali￿katorischen Lohnungleichheit nicht identisch waren (Juhn, Murphy
und Pierce (1993), Katz und Autor (1999) und Fitzenberger (1999)).
Diese Dissertation besteht aus f￿nf eigenst￿ndigen Forschungspapieren, deren gemeinsamer
Forschungsgegenstand die Determinanten der Lohnungleichheit zwischen Gruppen und
26 Lohnregressionen, die Standardhumankapitalvariablen einschlie￿en, erkl￿ren in der Regel h￿chstens ein Drit-
tel der Lohnvarianz, und auch unter Einschluss von ￿rmenseitigen Variablen erreichen sie kaum 50% (siehe
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innerhalb von Gruppen sowie der Arbeitslosigkeit ist. Zwei der Kapitel sind theoretischer
Natur und nehmen eine suchtheoretische Perspektive des Arbeitsmarktes ein. Daher
besch￿ftigen sich beide Artikel mit residualer Lohndispersion, wobei einer dar￿ber
hinausgehend auch Lohndispersion zwischen Quali￿kationsgruppen betrachtet. Zwei Artikel
sind empirischer Natur und beruhen ebenfalls auf einem suchtheoretischen Hintergrund. Gleich
das erste Kapitel dieser Dissertation ist sowohl theoretischer als auch empirischer Natur und
beruht abweichend von den anderen Kapiteln auf einem neo-klassischen Modellrahmen.27
Lohndispersion zwischen Quali￿kationsgruppen und Arbeitslosigkeit
Das erste Kapitel (Weiss und Garlo￿ (2005)) dieser Dissertation besch￿ftigt sich mit den Determi-
nanten der unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen bei Arbeitslosigkeit und Lohnungleichheit zwischen
Quali￿kationsgruppen in Kontinentaleuropa und den angels￿chsischen L￿ndern. Arbeitsmark-
tinstitutionen werden dabei als entscheidender Faktor zur Erkl￿rung der unterschiedlichen Ent-
wicklungen betrachtet. Dabei besteht der ausschlaggebende institutionelle Unterschied darin,
dass unterschiedliche Konzepte staatlicher Armutsbek￿mpfung zur Anwendung kommen. Dieses
wird theoretisch gezeigt und empirisch untermauert. Staatliche Armutsbek￿mpfung kann un-
terschiedlichen Grundgedanken folgen. Einerseits kann man Armut zeitlos und als absolutes
Konzept betrachten. Arm ist demnach zum Beispiel, wer eine gewisse t￿gliche Kalorienzufuhr
unterschreitet. Die Sozialgesetzgebung in den angels￿chsischen L￿ndern ist an diesem Konzept
orientiert. Daher wird dieses Konzept als das angels￿chsische Konzept bezeichnet. Anderer-
seits kann man Armut als relatives Konzept begreifen und damit Armut zum durchschnittli-
chen Lebensstandard ins Verh￿ltnis setzen. Wiederum im Hinblick auf die Sozialgesetzgebung
wird dieses Konzept als europ￿isches Konzept bezeichnet. Im Papier wird Sozialhilfe, also die
staatliche Einrichtung, die im Falle der Bed￿rftigkeit als letzte Instanz einspringt, als das zentrale
staatliche Instrument zur Armutsvermeidung betrachtet.
Folgende Annahmen werden im Modell getro￿en. Eine neo-klassische Produktionsfunktion f￿r
zwei Quali￿kationsgruppen wird mit einem unelastischen Arbeitsangebot kombiniert. Eine Gew-
erkschaft setzt den Lohn f￿r die Geringquali￿zierten. Zur Armutsvermeidung ist im europ￿ischen
Modell die Sozialhilfe an das Durchschnittseinkommen gekn￿pft, w￿hrend im angels￿chsischen
Modell keine solche Verkn￿pfung existiert. Dann wird technischer Fortschritt in das Modell einge-
f￿hrt, der die Nachfrage nach hochquali￿zierten Arbeitnehmern erh￿ht. Im Allgemeinen steigt
27 In der Literatur wurde der Begri￿ neo-klassisch auch zur Abgrenzung von den sogenannten neo-
institutionalistischen Ans￿tzen verwendet (Boyer and Smith (2001)). Unter dieser Verwendung w￿re diese
komplette Dissertation neo-klassisch. Abweichend davon bezeichnet der Begri￿ neo-klassisch in dieser Disser-
tation Standardmodelle zu Arbeitsangebot, Arbeitsnachfrage und Humankapitalbildung unter vollst￿ndiger
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damit der Lohn, den diese Quali￿kationsgruppe erh￿lt. Daraus ergibt sich ein h￿heres Durch-
schnittseinkommen in der Volkswirtschaft und damit steigt die Sozialhilfe im europ￿ischen Mod-
ell. Das Resultat des Modells ist folgendes: In Europa f￿hrt eine steigende Sozialhilfe dazu, dass
die L￿hne der Geringquali￿zierten steigen, weil sie in Lohnverhandlungen h￿here L￿hne durchset-
zen k￿nnen. Dies wirkt dem urspr￿nglichen E￿ekt einer steigenden Lohnungleichheit entgegen.
Die Lohnungleichheit steigt daher nur geringf￿gig an. Im Gegenzug steigt die Arbeitslosigkeit,
weil der Lohn der Geringquali￿zierten im Verh￿ltnis zu deren Produktivit￿t zu hoch ist. Im an-
gels￿chsischen Modell passiert etwas anderes: W￿hrend die L￿hne der Hochquali￿zierten und das
Durchschnittseinkommen kr￿ftig ansteigen, bleibt die Sozialhilfe davon unber￿hrt. Daher kommt
es zu keiner Korrektur der gestiegenen Lohnungleichheit. Die Arbeitslosigkeit der Geringquali-
￿zierten bleibt ebenfalls unber￿hrt, da ihre L￿hne von den Ver￿nderungen im Hochlohnbereich
unber￿hrt sind.
In der empirischen Analyse wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Durchschnittseinkommen und
Sozialhilfe in 14 OECD L￿ndern betrachtet. In den meisten L￿ndern existieren klare gesetzliche
Regelungen f￿r die Anpassung der Sozialhilfe an das Durchschnittseinkommen. In einigen L￿n-
dern ist dies indessen nicht der Fall. F￿r diese L￿nder werden Regressionsergebnisse zu Rate
gezogen, um den vermuteten Zusammenhang nachzuweisen. Es zeigt sich, dass die Frage, ob die
Sozialhilfe an das Durchschnittseinkommen angekoppelt ist oder nicht, tats￿chlich ein zentraler
Unterschied zwischen den kontinentaleurop￿ischen und den angels￿chsischen L￿ndern ist. Die
Verkn￿pfung zwischen Durchschnittseinkommen und Sozialhilfe existiert in Europa tats￿chlich,
w￿hrend dieser Zusammenhang in den angels￿chsischen L￿ndern nicht existiert.
Der Ansatz weist indes zwei Schwachstellen auf. Erstens ignoriert er weitgehend die Bedeutung
von Gewerkschaften f￿r Besch￿ftigung, obwohl diese von der Literatur als bedeutend eingestuft
wird (z.B. Card (2001)). Zweitens abstrahiert das Modell von residualer Lohnungleichheit.
Weiter oben ist aber schon auf die gro￿e Bedeutung der residualen Lohnungleichheit an sich
und im Zusammenhang mit der Ver￿nderung der Lohnungleichheit hingewiesen worden.
Residuale Lohndispersion und Arbeitslosigkeit
Das zweite Kapitel (Garlo￿ (2007)) dieser Arbeit greift die beiden genannten Kritikpunkte auf
und widmet sich residualer Lohnungleichheit und untersucht den Ein￿uss von Gewerkschaften auf
die Besch￿ftigung. Zugleich wird ein Literatur￿berblick zu suchtheoretischen Ans￿tzen erstellt.
Gleichgewichtige Suchmodelle generieren im Gleichgewicht unterschiedliche L￿hne f￿r Individuen
identischer Grenzproduktivit￿t. Persistente Lohndi￿erenziale werden in diesen Modellen durch
die Existenz unvollst￿ndiger Information, auch als Suchfriktionen bezeichnet, erkl￿rt. Im Grund-
modell, eingef￿hrt von Burdett und Mortensen (1998), gibt es ein eindeutiges Gleichgewicht de-
rart, dass sich Firmen entlang einer stetigen Lohnverteilung f￿r identische Individuen sortieren.136 Zusammenfassung
Individuen sortieren sich nicht unmittelbar in Firmen mit hohen L￿hnen, weil die Suche nach
Information ￿ber L￿hne zeitaufw￿ndig ist. Firmen, die sich zun￿chst nicht unterscheiden, bieten
und bezahlen identischen Arbeitnehmern unterschiedliche L￿hne. Im Hinblick auf den Gewinn
liefern diese unterschiedlichen Strategien n￿mlich optimale Ergebnisse. Hochlohn￿rmen k￿n-
nen viele Arbeitnehmer attrahieren, machen aber geringe Gewinne pro Arbeitnehmer, w￿hrend
Niedriglohn￿rmen nur wenige Arbeitnehmer halten k￿nnen. Pro Arbeitnehmer erzielen sie aber
vergleichsweise hohe Gewinne. Zwei o￿ene Fragen existieren jedoch in diesem Modellrahmen.
Heterogenit￿ten von Arbeitnehmern und Firmen sind wichtige Merkmale im Hinblick auf das Ar-
beitsmarktergebnis. Wie l￿sst sich, erstens, dieser Tatsache in dem (homogenen) Modellrahmen
Rechnung tragen? Das homogene Modell generiert zudem eine Lohndichte, die ￿ber die Lohnver-
teilung steigt. Dies ist mit empirischen Lohnverteilungen nicht in ￿bereinstimmung zu bringen
und wirft, zweitens, die Frage auf, ob Modi￿kationen des Grundmodells Abhilfe scha￿en k￿nnen.
Das Kapitel gibt einen ￿berblick ￿ber Fortentwicklungen der gleichgewichtigen Suchtheorie, die
Heterogenit￿ten auf beiden Marktseiten in den Modellrahmen integrieren. Im speziellen werden
Modellerweiterungen vorgestellt und diskutiert, die unterschiedliche Grenzproduktivit￿ten der
Firmen und Individuen zulassen. Eine Modellerweiterung diskutiert unterschiedliche Reserva-
tionsl￿hne. In allen F￿llen wird die Form der Lohndichte untersucht, die das Modell impliziert.
Zus￿tzlich werden Gewerkschaften in diesen Rahmen integriert. Vereinfachend wird angenom-
men, dass sich der Ein￿uss der Gewerkschaften auf die Lohnsetzung dadurch abbilden l￿sst,
dass sie einen Mindestlohn setzen. Folgende Resultate sind festzuhalten: Zun￿chst sind solche
Modelle, die unterschiedliche Grenzproduktivit￿ten zulassen, in der Lage, rechtsschiefe Einkom-
mensverteilungen zu generieren, welche dann beobachteten Verteilungen ￿hnlich sind. Des Weit-
eren ist nicht eindeutig, welcher Ein￿uss eines Mindestlohn auf die H￿he der Besch￿ftigung
sich aus den betrachteten Modellen ergibt. In einigen Modellvarianten hat der Mindestlohn
keinen Ein￿uss auf die Besch￿ftigungsh￿he. Solche Modellvarianten umfassen das homogene
Modell, ein Modell mit stetiger Produktivit￿tsverteilung der Firmen sowie die Modelle mit
nicht-konstanter Grenzproduktivit￿t. Der Grund f￿r dieses Ergebnis ist darin zu sehen, dass
die gleichgewichtige Lohnverteilung komplett unterhalb der Grenzproduktivit￿t der Individuen
angesiedelt ist. Damit bewirkt ein Mindestlohn eine Umverteilung von Gewinnen von den Firmen
zu den Individuen, ohne indes die Besch￿ftigung zu beeintr￿chtigen. Negative Besch￿ftigungs-
e￿ekte eines bindenden Mindestlohnes ergeben sich in einem Modell, das stetige Heterogenit￿t
auf beiden Seiten des Arbeitsmarktes modelliert. Der Grund ist in diesem Fall, dass ein Teil
der Firmen-Arbeitnehmer-Kombinationen nicht mehr pro￿tabel ist, weil der Mindestlohn den
Output der Kombination ￿bersteigt. Zu guter Letzt zeigen sich in einer Modellvariante mit
homogenen Produktivit￿ten aber unterschiedlichen Reservationsl￿hnen positive Besch￿ftigungs-
e￿ekte von Mindestl￿hnen. Das liegt daran, dass in diesem Falle die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein
zuf￿llig gezogener Lohn aus der Lohnverteilung oberhalb des Reservationslohnes eines zuf￿lligZusammenfassung 137
gezogenen Individuums liegt, h￿her ist. Zus￿tzlich bleibt festzuhalten, dass unabh￿ngig von der
gew￿hlten Modellvariante jeweils die komplette Lohnverteilung auf die ˜nderung eines binden-
den Mindestlohnes reagiert und dass im Allgemeinen ein Anstieg des Durchschnittslohnes und
ein R￿ckgang der Streuung zu verzeichnen sind.
Nachdem im zweiten Kapitel ein Modellrahmen zur Analyse residualer Lohndispersion etabliert
wurde, werden im dritten Kapitel (Fitzenberger und Garlo￿ (2007b)) empirische Vorhersagen der
gleichgewichtigen Suchtheorie untersucht. In der empirischen Umsetzung werden Suchfriktionen
durch Arbeitsmarkt￿berg￿nge gemessen. Wichtige ￿bergangsraten umfassen die ￿berg￿nge von
Besch￿ftigung in Arbeitslosigkeit, ￿berg￿nge von Arbeitslosigkeit in Besch￿ftigung sowie Wechsel
zwischen unterschiedlichen Besch￿ftigungsverh￿ltnissen. Gemeinsam charakterisieren die genan-
nten ￿bergangsraten aus Sicht der Suchtheorie, wie stark der Markt Friktionen unterworfen ist
und wie hoch die daraus resultierende Nachfragemacht der Firmen ist. Mit Hilfe deutscher, ad-
ministrativer Daten werden Arbeitsmarkt￿berg￿nge f￿r unterschiedliche Teilm￿rkte analysiert.
Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass sich Suchfriktionen zwischen den Teilm￿rkten teilweise
erheblich unterscheiden und dass Unterschiede, wie bspw. zwischen Altersgruppen und zwi-
schen unterschiedlichen Positionen in der Lohnverteilung, den Erwartungen aus der Suchtheorie
entsprechen.
Eine entscheidende Voraussetzung f￿r die Existenz gleichgewichtiger Lohnverteilungen unter
Individuen identischer Grenzproduktivit￿t sind Jobwechsel. Aus Sicht der Suchtheorie dienen
Jobwechsel dazu, Lohnzuw￿chse zu erzielen. Aus Sicht der Humankapitaltheorie erkl￿rt sich
Lohnwachstum hingegen durch zunehmende Berufserfahrung, steht also mit der
Mobilit￿tsentscheidung nicht im Zusammenhang. Im dritten Kapitel dieser Arbeit werden
Arbeitsplatzwechsel detailliert analysiert und deren Determinanten und Folgen unter die Lupe
genommen. Es zeigt sich, dass Lohnzuw￿chse ein wichtiges Motiv von Arbeitsplatzwechseln
sind: die meisten Jobwechsler (mehr als zwei Drittel) haben Lohnzuw￿chse und diese sind im
Durchschnitt betr￿chtlich (etwa 20%). Allerdings gibt es einen durchaus bemerkenswerten
Anteil von Jobwechslern (ca. 22%), die im Durchschnitt nicht unerhebliche Einbu￿en (ca. 16%)
hinnehmen m￿ssen. Dies wird dahingehend interpretiert, dass der Lohn zwar ein wichtiges aber
nicht das einzige Motiv f￿r Jobwechsel ist. Dieser Befund stellt eine Herausforderung f￿r den
einfachen suchtheoretischen Ansatz dar. ￿ber die Lohnverteilung hinweg zeigt sich, dass mit
steigendem Lohn sowohl der Anteil der Gewinner wie auch deren relativer Gewinn abnimmt.
F￿r diejenigen Jobwechsler, die den Arbeitsplatz auf dem Umweg ￿ber die Arbeitslosigkeit
wechseln, ergibt sich folgendes Bild. Ausgenommen f￿r Langzeitarbeitslose (>1 Jahr) sinkt der
Anteil der Gewinner ￿ber die Arbeitslosendauer. Dahingegen ist beim relativen Gewinn der
Gewinner keine eindeutige Tendenz zu erkennen. Schlie￿lich werden in dem Papier
Determinanten einer Ver￿nderung in der relativen Position in der Lohnverteilung untersucht.138 Zusammenfassung
Wie erwartet zeigt sich, dass den Jobwechseln dabei eine wichtige Rolle zukommt. Sie sind
dabei umso wichtiger, je j￿nger Individuen sind. Zusammenfassend kann man festhalten, dass
L￿hne, Lohnver￿nderungen und Arbeitsmarkt￿berg￿nge eng zusammenh￿ngen und dass
Arbeitsplatzwechsel eine wichtige Determinante des Lohnwachstums sind.
Im vierten Kapitel (Fitzenberger und Garlo￿ (2005a)) dieser Arbeit werden widerspr￿chliche
Hypothesen f￿r den Zusammenhang zwischen Lohndispersion einerseits und Arbeitsmarktdy-
namik bzw. Arbeitslosigkeit andererseits aufgestellt und getestet. Als theoretische Grundlage
dienen hierbei auf der einen Seite die Suchtheorie und auf der anderen Seite der neo-klassische
Arbeitsmarktansatz. Aus der neo-klassischen Arbeitsmarktsicht ergibt sich der Zusammenhang
zwischen Arbeitslosigkeit und Lohndispersion aus der folgenden ￿berlegung. Arbeitsmarktinsti-
tutionen, wie bspw. gewerkschaftliche Lohnbeein￿ussung, st￿ren das sich aus dem Marktprozess
ergebende Gleichgewicht und f￿hren zu einer zu geringen Spreizung der L￿hne. Insbesondere
L￿hne der Geringquali￿zierten sind oberhalb des marktr￿umenden Niveaus. Dies f￿hrt zu einer
hohen Arbeitslosigkeit.28 Diese Argumentation impliziert einen negativen Zusammenhang zwi-
schen Lohnungleichheit und Arbeitslosigkeit. Im Gegensatz dazu sagen Suchmodelle f￿r homo-
gene Individuen keinen solchen Zusammenhang voraus und implizieren, dass bspw. Mindestl￿hne
keine negativen Besch￿ftigungse￿ekte nach sich ziehen. Suchfriktionen sind daf￿r verantwortlich,
wenn sowohl Lohndispersion als auch Arbeitslosigkeit hoch sind. Hieraus ergibt sich ein positiver
Zusammenhang zwischen Arbeitslosigkeit und Lohndispersion.
Des Weiteren werden im Papier Zusammenh￿nge zwischen Arbeitsmarkt￿berg￿ngen und
Lohndispersion untersucht, die sich aus dem suchtheoretischen Modellrahmen ergeben. Analog
werden ￿hnliche Zusammenh￿nge unter der Annahme von Hysteresis-E￿ekten auch aus Sicht
des neo-klassischen Modellrahmens abgeleitet.
Deutsche, administrative Daten werden dazu verwendet, die abgeleiteten Hypothesen zu testen.
Als Beobachtungseinheit werden dabei Zellen von Individuen mit identischen beobachtbaren
Merkmalen konstruiert. Zur Strati￿kation dienen dabei die Merkmale Alter und Bildung. Um
Probleme mit unbeobachtbarer Heterogenit￿t zu verringern, wird ein verallgemeinerter kle-
inster Quadrate Ansatz mit ￿xen E￿ekten (FEGLS) gew￿hlt. Aufgrund der wechselseitigen
umgekehrten Kausalit￿t, die sich aus der Theorie ergibt, wird die zeitliche Struktur der Daten
zur Identi￿kation verwendet. Leider sind die Resultate in keine Richtung ￿berzeugend. W￿hrend
ein Teil der Resultate die suchbasierte Sicht des Arbeitsmarktes st￿tzt, entspricht ein anderer
Teil der Resultate den Vorhersagen aus der neo-klassischen Sichtweise. Ein robustes Resultat ist
jedoch, dass es keinen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Lohndispersion und Arbeitslosigkeit
28 Dies ist einer der vorherrschenden Erkl￿rungsans￿tze f￿r die hohe Arbeitslosigkeit in Kontinentaleuropa und
ist in der Literatur unter den Begri￿en ￿Krugman-Hypothese￿ (Krugman (1994))) und ￿uni￿ed theory￿ (Blank
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gibt. Innerhalb von Zellen ￿hnlicher Individuen, ist also nicht die ￿unbearable stability￿ (Prasad
(2004)) der Lohnstruktur f￿r die hohe deutsche Arbeitslosigkeit verantwortlich.
Neo-Klassik und Suchtheorie: Eine Synthese?
Im f￿nften und letzten inhaltlichen Kapitel (Fitzenberger und Garlo￿ (2007a)) dieser Disserta-
tion werden die Determinanten von residualer und quali￿katorischer Lohndispersion in einem
gemeinsamen Modellrahmen betrachtet. Zus￿tzlich werden auch friktionelle und strukturelle
Arbeitslosigkeit in demselben Modellrahmen untersucht. Friktionelle Arbeitslosigkeit entsteht
danach durch unvollst￿ndige Information, wohingegen strukturelle Arbeitslosigkeit durch zu hohe
(Mindest-)L￿hne verursacht wird. Im Modell wird ein Suchansatz ￿ la Burdett und Mortensen
(1998) mit einer neo-klassischen Produktionsfunktion f￿r zwei Arbeitsinputs verkn￿pft. Diese
Modellstruktur impliziert ein System zweier partieller Di￿erentialgleichungen. Ist die optimale
Strategie f￿r Firmen dergestalt, dass sie dieselbe Position in der Lohnverteilung beider Arbeits-
inputs einnehmen, so vereinfacht sich das Problem zu einer gew￿hnlichen Di￿erentialgleichung.
Unter bestimmten Einschr￿nkungen des Modells kann eine analytische, stetige Lohnverteilung
ermittelt werden, die keine Massepunkte aufweist. Das optimale Verhalten der Firmen l￿sst sich
dann durch ihre Position in den Lohnverteilungen der beiden Arbeitsinputs beschreiben. Al-
lerdings steigen die Lohndichten f￿r beide Arbeitsinputs mit dem Lohn an. Dies muss gelten,
damit die Besch￿ftigung ￿ber die Lohnverteilung ausreichend schnell ansteigt. Dies wiederum ist
notwendig, um den grundlegenden Mechanismus des Modells sicherzustellen: identische Gewinne
f￿r Hochlohn- und Niedriglohn￿rmen werden erreicht, indem Hochlohn￿rmen eine ￿ausreichend￿
gr￿￿ere Besch￿ftigung aufweisen als Niedriglohn￿rmen.
In einem n￿chsten Schritt werden dann die dem Modell auferlegten Beschr￿nkungen gelockert.
Lohnverteilungen werden f￿r F￿lle simuliert, in denen eine analytische L￿sung nicht verf￿g-
bar ist. Im Allgemeinen zeigen die Simulationen Dichtefunktionen, die am oberen Ende ex-
plodieren: die Lohnverteilung weist Massepunkte auf. Diese Massepunkte be￿nden sich immer
an der Obergrenze der Lohnverteilungen und der zugeh￿rige Lohn entspricht der Grenzproduk-
tivit￿t bei dieser Besch￿ftigung. Es ist einleuchtend, dass an dieser Stelle der Mechanismus von
Suchmodellen nicht mehr funktionieren kann. Zus￿tzliche Arbeitnehmer tragen nicht mehr zum
Gewinn bei und damit entf￿llt der Anreiz, den Lohn weiter zu erh￿hen. Es bleibt allerdings
festzuhalten, dass ein Mindestlohn im stetigen Teil der Lohnverteilung auch in diesem Modell
besch￿ftigungsneutral ist.
In einem weiteren Schritt wird die H￿u￿gkeit, mit der Firmen und Arbeitnehmer in Kontakt kom-
men, im Hinblick auf das Verhalten der Firmen endogenisiert. Die H￿u￿gkeit, mit der Arbeit-
nehmer Jobangebote erhalten, h￿ngt von den Suchanstrengungen der Firmen ab und diese sind
kostentr￿chtig. Unter vergleichsweise schwachen Einschr￿nkungen des allgemeinen Modellrah-140 Zusammenfassung
mens wird gezeigt, dass steigende Mindestl￿hne zu sinkender Arbeitsnachfrage f￿hren, wodurch
die Besch￿ftigung sinkt. Das liegt daran, dass die Suchanstrengungen aus dem Gewinn der
Firmen ￿nanziert werden m￿ssen und steigende Mindestl￿hne zu geringeren Gewinnen f￿hren.
Dadurch sinken auch die Suchanstrengungen. Demnach koexistieren strukturelle und friktionelle
Arbeitslosigkeit in diesem Modell. Beschr￿nkt man das Modell weiter, so k￿nnen die Momente
der Lohnverteilung analytisch bestimmt werden. Jedoch sind die E￿ekte von steigenden Min-
destl￿hnen auf die Momente der Lohnverteilung uneindeutig, weil die komplette Lohnverteilung
auf die Ver￿nderung des Mindestlohnes reagiert. Zuletzt wird die Zielfunktion einer Gewerkschaft
modelliert, die einen Mindestlohn setzen kann. Es zeigt sich, dass Gewerkschaften, die auch das
Einkommen Arbeitsloser betrachten, einen h￿heren Mindestlohn setzen, als Gewerkschaften, die
nur das Einkommen von Besch￿ftigten betrachten. Dies ergibt sich aus der Tatsache, dass im
ersten Fall Arbeitslose noch einen positiven Beitrag zur Zielfunktion erbringen, wohingegen im
zweiten Fall deren Beitrag Null ist.
Ausblick und Politikempfehlungen
Als Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit bleiben insbesondere zwei Erkenntnisse festzuhalten. Zun￿chst zeigt
Kapitel eins, dass Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen wichtig f￿r das Verst￿ndnis von Arbeitsmarktergeb-
nissen sind. Sozialhilfe ist ein wichtiger Faktor zum Verst￿ndnis internationaler Unterschiede bei
der Entwicklung von Lohnungleichheit und Arbeitslosigkeit. Des Weiteren betont diese Arbeit,
dass Suchfriktionen wichtiger Bestandteil der Erkl￿rung des Arbeitsmarktgeschehens sind. Die
Bedeutung von residualer Lohnungleichheit f￿r die Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit insgesamt
wird hervorgehoben. Insbesondere Kapitel drei und vier dieser Arbeit erbringen Belege f￿r die
Bedeutung von Suchfriktionen. Solche Belege umfassen die Tatsache, dass Arbeitsplatzwech-
sel eine so zentrale Rolle f￿r das Lohnwachstum der Individuen einnehmen. Au￿derdem kann
die Tatsache, dass geringe Lohndispersion in Zellen ￿hnlicher Individuen eher mit geringer als
mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit einhergeht, als Beleg f￿r die Bedeutung von Suchfriktionen gewertet
werden.
Die zwei theoretischen Kapitel zwei und f￿nf belegen allerdings, dass die Formalisierung eines
Modellrahmens, der nicht nur Suchfriktionen sondern auch unterschiedliche Arbeitnehmer- und
Arbeitgebertypen und schlie￿lich je nach Einsatz unterschiedliche Grenzproduktivit￿ten von Ar-
beitnehmern zul￿sst, sehr aufw￿ndig ist. Teilweise m￿ssen Simulatiosmethoden zur L￿sung der
Modelle zur Anwendung kommen. Dies wiederum begrenzt den Wert dieser Modelle. Au￿erdem
war die Literatur bisher nicht in der Lage, technischen Wandel oder Globalisierung, in diesen
Modellrahmen zu integrieren. Beide Faktoren gelten indes als unverzichtbar zur Erkl￿rung der
j￿ngeren Ver￿nderungen der Lohnstruktur bzw. der Arbeitslosigkeit. Obwohl die theoretis-
che M￿glichkeit besteht, w￿rden vermutlich nur wenige ￿konomen den Standpunkt vertreten,Zusammenfassung 141
dass in Zeiten beschleunigten Informationsaustausches steigende Suchfriktionen f￿r den Anstieg
der Lohnungleichheit verantwortlich sind und daher Faktoren wie technischer Wandel ignoriert
werden k￿nnen. Jedoch weist Kapitel 5 dieser Arbeit eine Forschungsrichtung auf, die Entwick-
lungspotentiale bietet. In der Tat ist es vorstellbar, dass sich Faktoren wie technischer Wandel
in ein solches Modell integrieren lassen. Es w￿rde sicherlich eine deutliche Bereicherung der
Literatur darstellen, wenn in einer solchen Modellerweiterung die Auswirkungen von technis-
chem Wandel auf unterschiedliche Arten von Arbeitslosigkeit und Lohndispersion sowie deren
Interaktionen untersucht werden k￿nnten. Dazu leistet diese Arbeit einen Beitrag.
Welche praktischen Schlussfolgerungen - f￿r die Politik - k￿nnen aber nun aus dieser Arbeit
gezogen werden? Diese Arbeit kann bspw. etwas zu der aktuellen Diskussion um die Ein-
f￿hrung staatlich garantierter Mindestl￿hne beitragen. Der deutsche Arbeitsminister M￿ntefer-
ing hat sich f￿r eine ￿￿chendeckende Einf￿hrung von Mindestl￿hnen ausgesprochen (Interview
mit BamS, 26.3.2007). Dahingegen warnt der wissenschaftliche Beirat beim Wirtschaftsmin-
isterium vergleichsweise deutlich vor einer Einf￿hrung von Mindestl￿hnen (O￿ener Brief des
Wissenschaftlichen Beirats an Bundesminister Glos zur Mindest- und Kombilohnproblematik,
18.3.2006 ). Der Arbeitsminister scheint vor allem aus moralischen Erw￿gungen gegen zu niedrige
L￿hne zu sein, denn nach seiner Ansicht ￿versto￿en (sie) gegen die Menschenw￿rde￿. Des Weit-
eren f￿hrt er soziale Kosten ins Feld, da zu niedrige L￿hne die ￿soziale Stabilit￿t￿ gef￿hrden.
Der wissenschaftliche Beirat f￿hrt dagegen ￿fatale Auswirkungen￿ auf die Besch￿ftigung und
eine ￿h￿here Arbeitslosigkeit￿ ins Feld. Au￿erdem verweist der Beirat auf Gef￿hrdungen durch
den politischen Prozess. Der in der Dissertation vorgeschlagene Modellrahmen hilft mit, Teile
dieser Argumente zu bewerten. Einiges spricht daf￿r, dass ein Mindestlohn eine Umverteilung
in dem Sinne darstellt, dass L￿hne der Arbeitnehmer erh￿ht werden und dies zu Lasten der
Gewinne der Firmen geht. Dies k￿nnte Menschen vor Armut sch￿tzen und damit die Men-
schenw￿rde garantieren. Andererseits k￿nnte eine sinkende Besch￿ftigung diesem E￿ekt zuwider
laufen. Eine sinkende Besch￿ftigung ist aber weder aus theoretischer Perspektive notwendig zu
erwarten, noch empirisch eindeutig belegt (siehe Neumark und Wascher (2007)). Die anderen
angef￿hrten Argumente lassen sich vor dem gew￿hlten Modellhintergrund indes kaum bewerten.
Eine abschlie￿ende Bewertung ist daher schwierig. Es bleibt aber festzuhalten, dass Mindestl￿hne
vor dem gew￿hlten Rahmen nicht von vorne herein ausscheiden, als probates Mittel um Gewinne
von Firmen zu Arbeitnehmern umzuverteilen und damit L￿hne zu gew￿hrleisten, die nicht gegen
die Menschenw￿rde versto￿en.A Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Empirical evidence
A.1.1 The link between bene￿ts and per-capita income
To con￿rm our main hypothesis, in Section 1.3 we look at the legislation of 14 countries (see
Figure A.1). In addition, here we use an empirical assessment to complement the results of the
legal analysis. For 10 countries the legal situation is clear and con￿rms our crude classi￿cation
in ￿European￿ and ￿Anglo-Saxon￿ countries. In three ￿European￿ countries Belgium, France,
and Spain, bene￿ts are not linked automatically to the average income or wages. Partly the law
itself envisions that there are additional discrete adjustments. This is the case for example in
Belgium. There, the law explicitly allows the king to adjust the bene￿t payments to the develop-
ment of the living standards. As the legal situation allows these countries to be ￿European￿ and
￿Anglo-Saxon￿, we choose the empirical results to uncover the connection between average wages
and bene￿t levels. For various reasons direct data on bene￿t levels are not available: In general,
bene￿t payments depend on individual characteristics (wealth, income, household size, etc.) and
di￿er across regions. Furthermore, in-kind transfers often make up an important part of total
bene￿ts. Therefore, we use data on (real) social expenditures on unemployment per unemployed
from the OECD to approximate the bene￿t payments. We take the social expenditures on unem-
ployment as a proxy for expenditures on bene￿ts and take the number of unemployed individuals
(from the OECD) as a proxy for the number of bene￿t recipients.1 The last row of Figure A.1
reports results from regressions of changes in real social expenditures on unemployment per un-
employed on real GDP per capita changes.2 The in￿uence is signi￿cantly positive and roughly
of the same magnitude for the three countries, where the legal situation is ambiguous. To assess
the quality of our proxy social expenditures for unemployment per unemployed, we run the same
regression for the other countries where we know the administrative rules. Most results are as we
expect. In particular, the relation between GDP p.c. and social expenditures per unemployed
is insigni￿cant in the U.S. and the UK while it is signi￿cant in most European countries.3 The
1 We use social expenditures on unemployment, since a category for bene￿ts alone does not exist so that this
category comes closest to our needs. Using in addition social expenditures on housing and incapacity-related
bene￿ts does not change the principal conclusions. Results are available upon request.
2 It is likely that both real GDP per capita and real social expenditures per unemployed are trended. We use
￿rst di￿erences in order not to run into the problem of a spurious regression.
3 Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal are the exceptions to the rule. For Austria, the Netherlands and
Portugal the results are insigni￿cant. For Italy, the situation is somewhat special. With the so called ￿Scala
Mobile￿, introduced in the 70s, the state intervened directly in the wage formation. This led to a compression
of wages. Then, its stepwise abolition in the 80s has contributed to the reversion of the trend. (see Brunello,
Comi, Lucifora, and Scarpa (2005) and Manacorda (2004))
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Figure A.1: Social security in ￿Anglo-Saxon￿ and in ￿European￿ countries
Source: Cantillon, van Mechelen, Marx, and van den Bosch (2004) and MISSOC (Mu-
tual Information System on Social Protection in the EU Member States and the EEA):
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_protection/index_en.html and own calculation.
¤ means signi￿cant on a 5% con￿dence level.144 Appendix for Chapter 1
purpose of these regressions is modest, however: We use the best information we could assemble.
That is, we use the legal situation for the countries where the situation is unambiguous and use
the regression results for the other countries, where the results are at least in accordance with
our classi￿cation.
A minimum wage that depends on average wages has a similar e￿ect as bene￿ts that depend on
average wages.4 This is the case in France and Spain, where the minimum wage is tied to average
income by law. So, for these two countries there is an additional link between the wage of the
low-skilled and the wage of the high-skilled, even when, as in France, the bene￿ts are not tied to
the average income by law. A minimum wage that is tied to average income also induces adverse
employment e￿ects of skill-biased technological change. Again, for the U.S. and the UK this link
does not exist. In the U.S., the minimum wage has not even been adjusted to consumer prices.
In 2000 the minimum wage was 25% lower in real terms than in 1978 (see Card and DiNardo
(2002), Figure 22). In the UK, a national minimum wage has only been introduced in 1999 and
can therefore not account for changes in inequality and employment in the 1980s and 90s.
A.1.2 Descriptive evidence to proposition 1.4
Proposition 1.4 states that skill-biased technological change leads to rising wage inequality and
rising unemployment in European countries because the relative wage cannot fully adjust to
changes in relative labor demand. Put di￿erently: If the wage dispersion in Europe rises, it
does not rise enough and unemployment rises as well. The unemployment rate should thus be
positively correlated with the skill-premium in Europe. For example, in Germany 1975 - 2004,
the correlation between the unemployment rate of the low-skilled and the skill premium has been
0.703.5 This substantiates the theoretical result in Proposition 1.4.6
For the ￿Anglo-Saxon￿ model, we expect a zero correlation between wage dispersion and unem-
ployment of the low-skilled, since wages of the low-skilled do not react to changes in the wages
of the skilled. If the wage dispersion increases, it increases enough to adjust to changes in rel-
4 See Weiss and Garlo￿ (2005).
5 Unemployment rates by quali￿cation are from Reinberg and Hummel (2002) and Reinberg and Hummel (2005).
The skill premium has been calculated from administrative data where the wage for low-skilled workers is
proxied by the lowest performance group of blue-collar workers (￿Leistungsgruppe 3, Arbeiter￿) and the wage
for skilled workers is proxied by the highest performance group of white-collar workers (￿Leistungsgruppe 2,
Angestellte￿), Source: German Federal Statistical O￿ce. Note however, that some recent studies point to an
increase of the wage inequality by 2001 as well (see Kohn (2006) and Gernandt and Pfei￿er (2006)). One
study argues that the wage inequality in the upper part of the wage distribution in Germany was changing
similar as in the US and that only the development in the lower part of the wage distribution was di￿erent
(see Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch￿nberg (2007)).
6 The ￿nding that higher wage dispersion and unemployment are positively correlated (across age-by-education
cells) in Germany is also found and discussed by Fitzenberger and Garlo￿ (2005b).Appendix for Chapter 1 145
ative labor demand. Unemployment remains unchanged while wage dispersion increases. For
the U.S. 1975 - 2003, the correlation between the unemployment rate of the low-skilled and the
skill premium has been 0.004.7 As we expected, the correlation between the wage premium and
unemployment is zero.8
7 Unemployment rates by educational attainment stem from U.S. Census Bureau (1975 - 2004) and Francesconi,
Orszag, Phelps, and Zoega (1998). Wages stem from the CPS (U.S. Census Bureau, internet release,
www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/incpertoc.html).
8 Unemployment of the low-skilled and wage dispersion are unlikely to contain a trend. While this is obvious for
the unemployment rate at least in an asymptotic sense, it is plausible for wage dispersion, too. Nevertheless,
we performed the same regression in ￿rst di￿erences. Albeit less strongly, the results of a regression of the
unemployment rate of the low-skilled on the wage premium in levels is signi￿cant for Germany (and insigni￿cant
for the United States).B Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Derivation of the reservation wage as a function of the parameters
Consider the derivative
@WL( ¹ w)
@ ¹ w from (2.5). Rewriting (2.5) as
WL( ¹ w) =
¹ w+±WU+¸L
R 1
¹ w WL(w)dH(w)
[r+±+¸L
R 1
¹ w dH(w)] , the resulting derivative is given by
W0
L( ¹ w) =
@WL( ¹ w)
@ ¹ w = 1
r+±+¸L(1¡H( ¹ w)).1 Denote with wo the upper limit of H(w), then integration
by parts yields
R wo
wR(WL(w) ¡ WU)dH(w) = [(WL(w) ¡ WU)H(w)]wo
wR ¡
R wo
wR H(w)W0
L(w)dw.
This leads to:
wR = z + (¸ ¡ ¸L)
·
WL(wo) ¡ WU ¡
Z wo
wR
H(w)W0
L(w)dw
¸
= z + (¸ ¡ ¸L)
·Z wo
wR
(1 ¡ H(w))W0
L(w)dw
¸
= z + (¸ ¡ ¸L)
Z wo
wR
1 ¡ H(w)
r + ± + ¸L(1 ¡ H(w))
dw.
The second row follows by using WL(wo) ¡ WU =
R wo
wR W0
L(w)dw and the above expression for
W0
L(w).
B.2 Derivation of the equilibrium employment at wage w
Starting point for the derivation of (2.10), is the following equation which describes in￿ows and
out￿ows to ￿rms paying wages above w, (¸U + ¸LL(w))(1 ¡ H(w)) = ±(N ¡ U ¡ L(w)).
Di￿erentiating both sides of the equation with respect to the wage, substituting h(w) for H0(w),
using that L0(w) = l(w)h(w), and dividing by h(w) yields:
[± + ¸L(1 ¡ H(w))]l(w) = ¸U + ¸LL(w). (B.1)
Firms maximize expected pro￿ts ¦(w) = (y ¡ w)l(w). The ￿rst-order condition for a pro￿t
maximum yields the following di￿erential equation:
l0(w)
l(w)
=
1
y ¡ w
. (B.2)
This equation holds for all ￿rms that pay wages above wR. With the help of (B.2) l(w) can be
determined explicitly. Integrating both sides
R l0(w)
l(w) dw =
R 1
y¡wdw or logl(w) + d1 = ¡log(y ¡
1 The result is obtained by using the quotient rule and the fact that
¹ w+±WU+¸L
R 1
¹ w WL(w)dH(w)
[r+±+¸L
R 1
¹ w dH(w)] = WL( ¹ w) =
A( ¹ w)
B( ¹ w).
This yields W
0
L( ¹ w) =
A0B¡AB0
B2 =
1
B(A
0 ¡ WL( ¹ w)B
0) =
1
B(1 ¡ ¸LWL( ¹ w)h( ¹ w) + ¸LWL( ¹ w)h( ¹ w)) =
1
B.
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w) + d2 is obtained, where d1 and d2 are integration constants. Letting d = d2 ¡ d1 and
exponentiating both sides yields:
l(w) =
exp(d)
y ¡ w
=
D
y ¡ w
. (B.3)
The integration constant D can be derived through the constraint that (B.1) imposes on the
above equation. Evaluating (B.1) and (B.3) at wR and imposing equality, I obtain l(wR) =
¸U
±+¸L = D
y¡wR or D = ¸U
±+¸L(y ¡ wR). Using D and U in (B.3) provides the solution to the
di￿erential equation: l(w) = ¸±N
(±+¸L)(±+¸) ¢
y¡wR
y¡w .
The equilibrium pro￿ts of a ￿rm that pays a wage from the support of the wage distribution is
given by ¦(w) = (y ¡ w)l(w) =
¸±N(y¡wR)
(±+¸L)(±+¸).
The upper limit of the support of wage distribution wo can be calculated by inserting wo in (B.1)
and in l(w) = ¸±N
(±+¸L)(±+¸)¢
y¡wR
y¡w , and solving for l(wo), respectively. Noting that L(wo) = N¡U,
I obtain
wo = y ¡ (y ¡ wR)
µ
±
± + ¸L
¶2
. (B.4)
as upper limit of the support of the wage distribution and the distribution of paid wages. Note,
that the highest paid wage is below the marginal productivity of the employees.
B.3 Pro￿ts with continuous productivity dispersion
The solution of (2.18) ¦0(y) = ¸ l(K(y)) is obtained when integrating ¦(y) =
R y
y ¦0(%)d% =
A +
R y
y
¸ l(K(%))d%. A is the integration constant and follows from (2.16), when evaluated at
(y,w), where w = maxfwR;wming. Therewith, A = ±
±+¸L
N¡U
M (y¡w). Furthermore, the share of
￿rms that pays wages below K(y) is equal to the share of ￿rms whose productivity is below y:
H(K(y)) = ¡(y). Using (2.15), it is ¸ l(K(y)) = ±
(N¡U)
M
±+¸L
[±+¸L(1¡¡(y))]2 and thus the pro￿t function
becomes:
¦(y) =
±
± + ¸L
N ¡ U
M
(y ¡ w) +
Z y
y
±
(N ¡ U)
M
± + ¸L
[± + ¸L(1 ¡ ¡(%)]2d%
¦(y) =
Z y
w
±
(N ¡ U)(± + ¸L)
M
1
[± + ¸L(1 ¡ ¡(%))]2d%. (B.5)
The second row follows from the fact that ¡(y) = 0 for y 2 [w;y] and thus the integral on
the interval [w;y] in the second row, equals the ￿rst summand in the ￿rst row. This equation
yields the pro￿t of a type y ￿rm depending on the model parameters and on the distribution
of ￿rm productivities. Solving ¦(y) = (y ¡ K(y))¸ l(K(y)) with respect to K(y) = w yields an148 Appendix for Chapter 2
expression for the wage as a function of the productivity y: w = K(y) = y ¡
¦(y)
¸ l(K(y)). Using the
corresponding expressions yields: K(y) = y ¡ [± + ¸L(1 ¡ ¡(y))]2 R y
w
1
[±+¸L(1¡¡(%))]2d%.
B.4 Variance analysis
Start by assuming a utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and consider
a worker who is employed in a ￿rm of type y, then: lnww(";y;y0) = ln" + lnww(1;y;y0).
The conditional (on y) expectation of the log-wage is given by Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002b), p.2310): E(";y0jy)(lnwjy) = E"(ln") + E(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy).2
Using independence of " and (y;y0), the conditional (on y) variance is
given by var(";y0jy)(lnwjy) = var"(ln") + var(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy). Applying
this variance decomposition, the variance of wages can be decomposed in the
variance of the conditional expectation of wages and in the expectation of the
conditional variance varw(lnw) = vary[E(";y0jy)(lnwjy)] + Ey[var(";y0jy)(lnwjy)] =
vary[E"(ln") + E(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy)] + Ey[var"(ln") + var(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy)]. Thus, the
following decomposition of the wage variance is obtained:
varw(lnw) = var"(ln") + vary[E(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy)] + Ey[var(y0jy)(lnww(1;y;y0)jy)].
The ￿rst summand of this formula results from productivity di￿erences among employees. The
second summand re￿ects the e￿ect of di￿erent ￿rm productivities on the variance of paid wages.
The expected wage changes along with y, the productivity of the ￿rm. The variance of the
conditional expectation re￿ects the variance of wages between ￿rms of di￿erent productivities.
Note, that the conditional expectation of the log-wage and thus the variance of the second
summand depends on the joint distribution of y;y0. The third summand re￿ects wage ￿uctuations
for ￿rms and workers whose productivity is identical. Thus, the wage ￿uctuations among identical
individuals in identical ￿rms are contained in this part.3 From the point of view of an individual
it is explained by the luck of receiving a valuable job o￿er that implies pay raises. The extent of
this variance is explained by frictions because frequent job o￿ers lead to a faster adjustment of
wages to the marginal productivity and thus lowers the variance.
2 The indices indicate with respect to which variable the expectation is to be constructed.
3 This is the part of the wage dispersion that is explained by the model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998).C Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Abbreviations
1. Labor market states:
(E) employed,
(BR) recipient of transfer payments (i.e. unemployment bene￿ts, unemployment assistance
and income maintenance during participation in training programs),
(OOS) out of sample.
2. E￿OE is the share of individuals who change jobs between two consecutive years.
3. E￿E is the share of individuals who are employed in the ￿rst year and still (or again)
employed in the second year.
4. BR￿E is the share of individuals who are bene￿t recipients in the ￿rst year and employed
in the second year.
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C.2 Average stocks and transitions rates across demographic groups
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Figure C.1: Total number of bene￿t recipients and individuals that are temporarily not in the data setAppendix for Chapter 3 151
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Figure C.2: Job-to-job transitions as percentage of employment
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Figure C.3: Transition rate from employment to bene￿t recipiency152 Appendix for Chapter 3
Table C.1: Stocks across di￿erent characteristics
Characteristic Employed Bene￿t Out of Bene￿t Out of Total
recipient sample recipient sample
rate rate
All 298449 25692 44317 0.070 0.120 368458
Sectors
Farming, energy, mining 8082 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Manufacturing 23325 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Producer durable good prod. 60056 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Consumer goods production 21575 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Food/stimulants industry 9396 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Construction 21162 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Commerce 41430 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Tra￿c/telecommunication 13034 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Services (business) 30312 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Services (household) 11994 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Services (society) 37497 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Social security/local auth. 19700 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Missing 887 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Professional status
Apprentices 19982 888 2704 0.038 0.115 23574
Clerks 121197 6602 14934 0.046 0.105 142733
Skilled workers/craftsmeno 62408 5823 5823 0.079 0.079 74054
Unskilled workerso 57857 9870 10159 0.127 0.130 77886
Masters/foremen 5665 300 335 0.048 0.053 6300
Home workers 386 46 85 0.089 0.164 517
Part-time workers(a) 4903 116 2696 0.015 0.349 7715
Part-time workers(b) 25966 2034 7542 0.057 0.212 35542
Missing 83 14 38 0.104 0.281 135
Education
Category 1(c) 71880 8489 9512 0.094 0.106 89881
Category 2(d) 178697 12566 19968 0.059 0.095 211231
Category 3(e) 3440 189 1364 0.039 0.273 4993
Category 4(f) 6882 369 1603 0.042 0.181 8854
Polytechnic 8435 380 1696 0.036 0.161 10511
University 11237 550 3417 0.036 0.225 15204
Unknown 17809 3134 6731 0.113 0.243 27674
Missing 68 12 27 0.112 0.252 107
Nationality
Foreigner 23836 3047 4227 0.098 0.136 31110
German 271257 21852 39541 0.066 0.119 332650
Missing 3355 793 550 0.169 0.117 4698
Sex
Female 116579 9293 21642 0.061 0.133 147764
Male 181869 16399 22675 0.071 0.095 218877
Age
< 16 years (j) 10094 717 1789 0.057 0.142 12600Appendix for Chapter 3 153
Characteristic Employed Bene￿t Out of Bene￿t Out of Total
recipient sample recipient sample
rate rate
16-20 years 16455 770 1162 0.042 0.063 18387
21-25 years 31227 3078 6349 0.076 0.156 40654
26-30 years 35794 3250 9330 0.067 0.193 48374
31-35 years 36722 2924 8020 0.061 0.168 47666
36-40 years 35706 2451 6140 0.055 0.139 44297
41-45 years 35580 2287 4366 0.054 0.103 42233
46-50 years 32625 2287 2803 0.061 0.074 37715
51-55 years 28268 2758 1832 0.084 0.056 32858
56-60 years 18778 4230 1356 0.174 0.056 24364
61-62 years 1110 310 134 0.199 0.086 1554
> 62 years (k) 16089 630 1036 0.035 0.058 17755
(o)Unskilled and Skilled re￿ect the position an individual holds in his current (if em-
ployed) or previous (if bene￿t recipient) job, while low-skilled, medium-skilled, and
high-skilled refer to educational attainment.
(a)Working less than half of normal time
(b)Working more than half of normal time
(c)No vocational training degree, no High School Diploma
(d)Vocational training degree, no High School Diploma
(e)No vocational training degree, High School Diploma
(f)Vocational training degree, High School Diploma
(h)In Euro per day
(i)Top coding category for part of the employees
(j)...when entering the labor market
(k)...when leaving the labor market
Table C.2: Transition rates for all employees
E-OE E-SE E-BR E-OOS E-LS
7.72 82.97 3.09 3.04 3.18
BR-E BR-BR BR-OOS BR-LS
23.92 47.64 12.76 15.68
OOS-E OOS-BR OOS-OOS OOS-LS
24.49 7.96 64.06 3.49
E: employed, OE: other employer than in the previous year,
SE: same employer as in previous year, BR: bene￿t recipient,
OOS: out of sample, LS: last spell (vanishes from the data set)
All transition rates in percent154 Appendix for Chapter 3
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eTable C.4: Correlation of real GDP growth with transition rates
Correlation between ...and real GDP growth Standard deviation
transition rate from ... (correlation coe￿cient)
job to other job 0.326 0.217
job to other job (t+1) 0.328 0.222
job to same job 0.413 0.209
job to BR -0.856 0.119
job to BR (t+1) -0.379 0.218
job to other states -0.819 0.132
BR to employment 0.357 0.214
BR to employment (t+1) 0.303 0.224
BR to other states 0.009 0.230
BR: Bene￿t recipiency state as de￿ned in the data section.
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C.3 Wage distributions for di￿erent groups and years
Log-wage distribution for:
Figure C.4: full-time employed individuals (in-
cluding apprentices) in 1986
Figure C.5: clerks in 1976
Figure C.6: clerks in 1986 Figure C.7: clerks in 1996158 Appendix for Chapter 3
C.4 Results from direct job￿to￿job changes for di￿erent wage de￿nitions
In the dataset about 5% of the wage observations are censored, and the censoring probabilities
di￿er strongly over the characteristics in the dataset. The way how we treat this censored
values might strongly a￿ect our results. Therefore we use di￿erent procedures to cope with the
censored values. For the ￿rst wage de￿nition (A) we performed separate Tobit-regressions for
the censoring above and below. For full-time employees (excluding apprentices, home workers
and the missing category) we used Tobit-regressions to predict the conditional expectation for
(de￿ated) wages that were censored from above within the group of full-time employed for each
year. Other censored values were omitted from our analysis. We performed Tobit-regressions
for part-time employees and apprentices to predict values that were censored from below and
replaced the censored values with their conditional expectations. For the second de￿nition (B) we
did the same, but we used data from the o￿cial statistics for the mean of the wage distribution
to predict conditional expectations. For the third de￿nition (C) we replaced all censored values
by the censoring thresholds. Finally, for the fourth de￿nition (D) we excluded all censored values
from the analysis.
Table C.5: Wage changes after job￿to￿job transitions for di￿erent wage de￿nitions
Observations Share winners Share losers No change
Wage A 324009 70.7 22.2 7.1
Wage B 324009 70.7 22.2 7.1
Wage C 324258 71.2 24.5 4.3
Wage D 288414 72.7 23.5 3.8
Relative gain of Relative loss of Average wage
the winners (in %) the losers (in %) change (in %)
Wage A 20.5 -13.1 11.6
Wage B 20.5 -13.1 11.6
Wage C 19.4 -10.7 11.2
Wage D 20.0 -11.6 11.9
There are some more observations in the C variable since, for wage C, we do not omit full-time employed individ-
uals, whose wage is censored from below. No change means that the wage is exactly the same before and after
the job￿to￿job transition. Wage A: Tobit estimates for upper and lower bound. Wage B: Tobit estimates, based
on the annual income data of the o￿cial statistics. Wage C: Censored values are replaced by their censoring
threshold. Wage D: Censored values are excluded from our analysis.
As one can see in table C.5, results do not di￿er by much. The maximum di￿erence in the share
of winners and the share of losers is less than 2 percentage point. The average gain di￿ers by
a maximum of about 1 percentage point, while average losses di￿er by less than 2 percentage
points.Appendix for Chapter 3 159
Table C.6: Transitions within working-time categories
Obs. Share winners Share losers No change
Full-time 2 to full-time 2 324009 70.7 22.10 7.1
Part-time 1 to part-time 1 20073 68.2 24.6 7.3
Part-time 2 to part-time 2 2995 53.3 27.9 18.8
Relative gain Relative loss Average
of the winners (%) of the losers (%) wage change (%)
Full-time 2 to full-time 2 20.4 -13.0 11.6
Part-time 1 to part-time 1 15.9 -11.4 8.0
Part-time 2 to part-time 2 24.9 -19.4 7.9
Full-time 2: Within the group of full-time employed, excluding apprentices.
Part-time 1: Working hours are more than 50% of regular working hours.
Part-time 2: Working hours are less than or equal to 50% of regular working hours.
Table C.7: Transitions within wage categories
Observations Share winners Share losers No change
Tercile 1 54270 77.8 18.9 3.3
Tercile 2 41990 68.8 27.0 4.2
Tercile 3 48642 60.6 24.3 15.1
Relative gain Relative loss Average
of the winners (in %) of the losers (in %) wage change (in %)
Tercile 1 26.0 -10.6 18.2
Tercile 2 13.5 -11.1 6.2
Tercile 3 11.7 -16.2 3.1
Table C.8: Transitions within unemployment categories
Obs. Share winners Share losers No change
Unemployed > 3 months 28634 52.6 44.6 2.9
Unemployed > 3 · 6 months 20735 51.7 45.6 2.6
Unemployed > 6 · 9 months 12181 49.9 47.7 23.0
Unemployed > 9 · 12 months 6713 47.1 50.8 2.1
Unemployed > 12 months 25706 54.0 44.8 1.2
Relative gain Relative loss Average
of the winners (%) of the losers (%) wage change (%)
Unemployed > 3 months 35.7 -28.5 6.1
Unemployed > 3 · 6 months 32.5 -27.0 4.5
Unemployed > 6 · 9 months 34.3 -27.6 3.9
Unemployed > 9 · 12 months 35.4 -28.8 2.0
Unemployed > 12 months 51.7 -31.2 13.9160 Appendix for Chapter 3
Table C.9: Share of winners and losers after job￿to￿job transitions by category
Variable Winners Losers
Medium-skilled -0.010 -0.013
(0.015) (0.011)
High-skilled -0.073¤¤¤ -0.101¤¤¤
(0.016) (0.011)
28-30 years -0.003 -0.021
(0.028) (0.020)
31-33 years -0.037 -0.015
(0.028) (0.020)
34-36 years -0.049¤ -0.029
(0.028) (0.020)
37-39 years -0.056¤¤ -0.042¤¤
(0.028) (0.020)
40-42 years -0.031 -0.032
(0.028) (0.020)
43-45 years -0.084¤¤¤ -0.036¤
(0.028) (0.020)
46-48 years -0.078¤¤¤ -0.032
(0.029) (0.021)
49-51 years -0.030 -0.051¤¤
(0.029) (0.021)
52-54 years -0.019 -0.037¤
(0.029) (0.021)
Time 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Relative gain/loss -0.016 -0.028
(0.018) (0.063)
Intercept -1.689 -0.899
(1.861) (1.391)
N 615 586
R2 0.070 0.146
Â2
(13) 46.3 100.2
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
OLS regressions on age-education-year cells as observation unit.Appendix for Chapter 3 161
Table C.10: Relative gain or loss after job￿to￿job transitions by category
Variable Winners Losers
Medium-skilled 0.005 -0.015¤¤¤
(0.005) (0.004)
High-skilled 0.035¤¤¤ -0.045¤¤¤
(0.007) (0.005)
28-30 years -0.030¤¤ -0.005
(0.010) (0.007)
31-33 years -0.046¤¤¤ -0.005
(0.010) (0.007)
34-36 years -0.076¤¤¤ 0.002
(0.010) (0.007)
37-39 years -0.078¤¤¤ -0.003
(0.010) (0.007)
40-42 years -0.085¤¤¤ -0.004
(0.010) (0.008)
43-45 years -0.091¤¤¤ -0.001
(0.011) (0.008)
46-48 years -0.109¤¤¤ 0.015¤
(0.011) (0.008)
49-51 years -0.110¤¤¤ 0.005
(0.011) (0.008)
52-54 years -0.125¤¤¤ 0.014¤
(0.011) (0.008)
Share of winners/losers 0.022¤¤ 0.033¤¤¤
(0.012) (0.011)
Intercept 0.224¤¤¤ -0.120¤¤¤
(0.011) (0.006)
N 553 497
R2 0.377 0.206
Â2
(12) 334.6 128.9
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
OLS regressions on age-education-year cells as observation unit.162 Appendix for Chapter 3
Table C.11: Share of winners and losers after job￿to￿job transitions by category, controlling for the
position in the wage distribution
Variable Winners Losers
Tercile 2 -0.071¤¤¤ 0.077¤¤¤
(0.008) (0.007)
Tercile 3 -0.170¤¤¤ 0.087¤¤¤
(0.008) (0.007)
Medium-skilled -0.007 -0.035¤¤¤
(0.007) (0.006
High-skilled 0.040¤¤¤ -0.074¤¤¤
(0.008) (0.008)
28-30 years 0.006 -0.028¤¤
(0.013) (0.011)
31-33 years -0.005 -0.037¤¤¤
(0.013) (0.011)
34-36 years -0.006 0.042¤¤¤
(0.013) (0.012)
37-39 years -0.008 -0.042¤¤¤
(0.013) (0.012)
40-42 years 0.011 -0.014
(0.014) (0.012)
43-45 years -0.000 -0.013
(0.014) (0.012)
46-48 years 0.015 -0.004
(0.014) (0.013)
49-51 years 0.032¤¤ -0.031¤¤
(0.014) (0.013)
52-54 years 0.037 0.017
(0.015) (0.013)
Relative gain/loss 0.026 0.008
(0.016) (0.039)
Intercept 0.765¤¤¤ 0.251¤¤¤
(0.012) (0.011)
N 2177 2043
R2 0.209 0.141
Â2
(14) 575.2 335.4
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
OLS regressions on age-education-wage tercile-year cells as observa-
tion unit.Appendix for Chapter 3 163
Table C.12: Relative gain or loss after job￿to￿job transitions by category, controlling for the position
in the wage distribution
Variable Winners Losers
Tercile 2 -0.138¤¤¤ -0.005
(0.011) (0.004)
Tercile 3 -0.164¤¤¤ -0.052¤¤¤
(0.012) (0.004)
Medium-skilled 0.007 -0.012¤¤¤
(0.010) (0.004)
High-skilled 0.076¤¤ -0.039¤¤¤
(0.011) (0.004)
28-30 years -0.026 0.000
(0.018) (0.006)
31-33 years -0.037¤¤ 0.001
(0.018) (0.006)
34-36 years -0.061¤¤¤ -0.001
(0.018) (0.007)
37-39 years -0.064¤¤¤ -0.001
(0.018) (0.007)
40-42 years -0.066¤¤¤ -0.003
(0.018) (0.007)
43-45 years -0.035¤ -0.006
(0.019) (0.007)
46-48 years -0.074¤¤¤ 0.011
(0.019) (0.007)
49-51 years -0.082¤¤¤ 0.006
(0.019) (0.007)
52-54 years -0.095¤¤¤ 0.015¤¤
(0.020) (0.007)
Share of winners/losers 0.048 0.002
(0.029) (0.012)
Intercept 0.274¤¤¤ -0.098¤¤¤
(0.027) (0.006)
N 2177 2043
R2 0.162 0.145
Â2
(14) 420.9 346.5
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
OLS regressions on age-education-wage tercile-year cells as observa-
tion unit.164 Appendix for Chapter 3
Table C.13: Wage growth for job changers and stayers
1977 1978 1979 1980
Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers
Year 0.052 0.124 0.051 0.100 0.043 0.088 0.021 0.057
Year+1 0.048 0.043 0.039 0.027 0.043 0.005 0.017 0.000
Year+2 0.028 0.022 0.007 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.016 0.008
Year+3 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.005 0.006 0.041 0.036
Year+4 -0.008 -0.007 0.002 0.004 0.038 0.034 0.028 0.025
1981 1982 1983 1984
Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers
Year 0.020 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.068 0.058 0.060 0.052
Year+1 0.029 0.010 0.064 0.039 0.056 0.030 0.080 0.051
Year+2 0.052 0.038 0.043 0.029 0.064 0.049 0.056 0.040
Year+3 0.032 0.027 0.052 0.048 0.042 0.040 0.027 0.022
Year+4 0.049 0.047 0.039 0.039 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.014
1985 1986 1987 1988
Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers
Year 0.083 0.077 0.075 0.072 0.060 0.052 0.055 0.045
Year+1 0.072 0.042 0.056 0.026 0.052 0.020 0.074 0.041
Year+2 0.041 0.023 0.038 0.018 0.059 0.038 0.058 0.038
Year+3 0.023 0.016 0.042 0.037 0.041 0.036 0.027 0.021
Year+4 0.038 0.035 0.037 0.034 0.022 0.020 0.006 0.004
1989 1990 1991 1992
Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers
Year 0.078 0.070 0.077 0.069 0.041 0.054 0.042 0.035
Year+1 0.073 0.040 0.040 0.025 0.039 0.009 0.031 0.004
Year+2 0.035 0.023 0.031 0.007 0.025 0.002 0.058 0.029
Year+3 0.014 0.006 0.009 -0.000 0.040 0.027 0.025 0.010
Year+4 0.001 -0.001 0.031 0.025 0.014 0.009 0.006 0.003
1993 1994 1995 1996
Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers Stayers Changers
Year 0.033 0.023 0.066 0.048 0.041 0.028 0.036 0.020
Year+1 0.064 0.031 0.042 0.013 0.036 0.006 0.0557 0.022
Year+2 0.038 0.012 0.031 0.005 0.051 0.020 0.062 0.030
Year+3 0.015 0.004 0.033 0.019 0.042 0.028 0.025 0.006
Year+4 0.024 0.018 0.032 0.027 0.012 0.005 0.014 0.011Appendix for Chapter 3 165
C.5 Decile transitions
Table C.14: Decile transitions, all employees
Variable Coe￿cient (Std. err.)
28-30 years -0.044¤ (0.025)
31-33 years -0.128¤¤¤ (0.026)
34-36 years -0.202¤¤¤ (0.035)
37-39 years -0.269¤¤¤ (0.038)
40-42 years -0.325¤¤¤ (0.040)
43-45 years -0.367¤¤¤ (0.040)
46-48 years -0.393¤¤¤ (0.041)
49-51 years -0.432¤¤¤ (0.053)
52-54 years -0.458¤¤¤ (0.047)
1976 -0.134¤¤¤ (0.051)
1977 -0.172¤¤¤ (0.044)
1978 -0.176¤¤¤ (0.058)
1979 -0.143¤¤¤ (0.049)
1980 -0.212¤¤¤ (0.061)
1981 -0.131¤¤¤ (0.051)
1982 -0.163¤¤¤ (0.052)
1983 -0.263¤¤¤ (0.072)
1984 -0.170¤¤¤ (0.050)
1985 -0.154¤¤¤ (0.045)
1986 -0.172¤¤ (0.073)
1988 -0.225¤¤¤ (0.077)
1989 -0.125¤¤¤ (0.047)
1990 -0.158¤¤¤ (0.054)
1994 -0.122¤¤¤ (0.046)
1996 -0.107¤¤¤ (0.036)
1998 -0.102¤¤ (0.052)
2000 -0.214¤¤¤ (0.061)
Medium-skilled 0.238¤¤¤ (0.065)
High-skilled 0.223¤¤¤ (0.044)
Job change dummy 0.285¤¤¤ (0.008)
Interquantile range/1000 0.275 (0.714)
E-E/10000 -0.356¤ (0.197)166 Appendix for Chapter 3
Variable Coe￿cient (Std. err.)
E-OE/10000 -0.292 (2.309)
_cut1 -1.286¤¤¤ (0.069)
_cut2 0.371¤¤¤ (0.068)
N 1749847
Log-likelihood -1660653
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
Standard Errors are robust with respect to correlations within age-
education cells. Abbreviations, see above section C.1. Some insigni￿cant
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Table C.15: Decile transitions with interactions, all employees
Variable Coe￿cient (Std. err.)
28-30 years -0.048¤ (0.026)
31-33 years -0.137¤¤¤ (0.025)
34-36 years -0.204¤¤¤ (0.027)
37-39 years -0.270¤¤¤ (0.029)
40-42 years -0.327¤¤¤ (0.029)
43-45 years -0.373¤¤¤ (0.034)
46-48 years -0.394¤¤¤ (0.041)
49-51 years -0.431¤¤¤ (0.049)
52-54 years -0.449¤¤¤ (0.050)
Time 0.002 (0.001)
Medium-skilled 0.190¤¤¤ (0.057)
High-skilled 0.207¤¤¤ (0.037)
Job change dummy 0.336¤¤¤ (0.019)
Job change x 28-30 years -0.011 (0.025)
Job change x 31-33 years -0.029 (0.020)
Job change x 34-36 years -0.109¤¤¤ (0.022)
Job change x 37-39 years -0.162¤¤¤ (0.024)
Job change x 40-42 years -0.167¤¤¤ (0.029)
Job change x 43-45 years -0.160¤¤¤ (0.033)
Job change x 46-48 years -0.212¤¤¤ (0.033)
Job change x 49-51 years -0.197¤¤¤ (0.026)
Job change x 52-54 years -0.198¤¤¤ (0.020)
Interquantile range/1000 0.738 (0.698)
E-E/10000 -0.299¤¤ (0.132)
_cut1 2.513 (2.306)
_cut2 4.166¤ (2.338)
N 1749847
Log-likelihood -1663725
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
Standard Errors are robust with respect to correlations within age-
education cells. Abbreviations, see above section C.1.168 Appendix for Chapter 3
Table C.16: Decile transitions for changers
Variable Education Education Education
category 1 category 2 category 3
28-30 years -0.103¤¤¤ -0.059¤¤¤ -0.013
(0.010)) (0.011) (0.099)
31-33 years -0.205¤¤¤ -0.140¤¤¤ -0.165
(0.017) (0.019) (0.173)
34-36 years -0.228¤¤¤ -0.258¤¤¤ -0.364¤
(0.020) (0.023) (0.200)
37-39 years -0.316¤¤¤ -0.355¤¤¤ -0.473¤¤
(0.026) (0.028) (0.211)
40-42 years -0.311¤¤¤ -0.410¤¤¤ -0.573¤¤¤
(0.032) (0.030) (0.202)
43-45 years -0.405¤¤¤ -0.468¤¤¤ -0.592¤¤¤
(0.033) (0.030) (0.196)
46-48 years -0.472¤¤¤ -0.545¤¤¤ -0.679¤¤¤
(0.036) (0.030) (0.180)
49-51 years -0.466¤¤¤ -0.583¤¤¤ 0.651¤¤¤
(0.040) (0.032) (0.174)
52-54 years -0.481¤¤¤ -0.612¤¤¤ -0.659¤¤¤
(0.044) (0.030) (0.153)
Interquantile range/1000 12.753¤¤ 2.656¤¤¤ -1.977¤
(5.751) (0.212) (1.159)
E-OE/10000 -1.684 0.259¤ 3.456¤
(1.414) (0.157) (2.074)
E-E/10000 -0.134¤¤ -0.044¤¤ -0.497
(0.064) (0.017) (0.388)
_cut1 -0.705¤¤ -1.047¤¤¤ -2.019¤¤¤
(0.274) (0.085) (0.213)
_cut2 0.264 0.028 -0.339
(0.277) (0.057) (0.301)
N 9322 86839 20061
Log-likelihood -9824 -89799 -17750
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
Standard Errors are robust with respect to correlations within age-
education cells. Abbreviations, see above section C.1.Appendix for Chapter 3 169
Table C.17: Decile transitions for stayers
Variable Education Education Education
category 1 category 2 category 3
28-30 years -0.075¤¤¤ -0.043¤¤¤ -0.095
(0.008) (0.009) (0.162)
31-33 years -0.114¤¤¤ -0.137¤¤¤ -0.314
(0.014) (0.014) (0.267)
34-36 years -0.125¤¤¤ -0.219¤¤¤ -0.527¤
(0.016) (0.018) (0.269)
37-39 years -0.154¤¤¤ -0.299¤¤¤ -0.655¤¤¤
(0.020) (0.023) (0.248)
40-42 years -0.168¤¤¤ -0.378¤¤¤ -0.766¤¤¤
(0.025) (0.025) (0.231)
43-45 years -0.198¤¤¤ -0.495¤¤¤ -0.789¤¤¤
(0.027) (0.027) (0.211)
46-48 years -0.209¤¤¤ -0.552¤¤¤ -0.843¤¤¤
(0.032) (0.030) (0.191)
49-51 years -0.218¤¤¤ -0.615¤¤¤ -0.825¤¤¤
(0.034) (0.036) (0.193)
52-54 years -0.279¤¤¤ -0.645¤¤¤ -0.834¤¤¤
(0.036) (0.039) (0.174)
Interquantile range/1000 7.796 3.697¤¤¤ -4.324¤¤
(4.759) (0.394) (1.892)
E-OE/10000 -1.165 0.071 1.073
(1.044) (0.186) (2.589)
E-E/10000 -0.137¤¤¤ -0.072¤¤¤ -0.063
(0.053) (0.017) (0.438)
_cut1 -0.855¤¤¤ -1.579¤¤¤ -2.615¤¤¤
(0.154) (0.098) (0.289)
_cut2 0.547¤¤¤ 0.122¤ -0.332
(0.163) (0.073) (0.354)
N 217376 1230733 185516
Log-likelihood -222682 -1154455 -138390
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
Standard Errors are robust with respect to correlations within age-
education cells. Abbreviations, see above section C.1.170 Appendix for Chapter 3
Table C.18: Decile transitions for unemployed
Variable Education Education Education
category 1 category 2 category 3
28-30 years -0.038¤¤ -0.081¤¤¤ 0.292¤¤¤
(0.015) (0.019) (0.024)
31-33 years -0.003 -0.162¤¤¤ 0.351¤¤¤
(0.023) (0.036) (0.040)
34-36 years -0.182¤¤¤ -0.230¤¤¤ 0.080
(0.037) (0.051) (0.077)
37-39 years -0.115¤¤¤ -0.230¤¤¤ -0.113¤¤¤
(0.040) (0.055) (0.041)
40-42 years -0.145¤¤¤ -0.287¤¤¤ -0.092¤¤¤
(0.049) (0.064) (0.025)
43-45 years -0.120¤¤¤ -0.375¤¤¤ -0.137¤¤¤
(0.044) (0.074) (0.050)
46-48 years -0.133¤¤¤ -0.369¤¤¤ -0.236¤¤¤
(0.045) (0.080) (0.038)
49-51 years -0.147¤¤¤ -0.429¤¤¤ -0.129¤¤¤
(0.052) (0.084) (0.037)
52-54 years -0.207¤¤¤ -0.328¤¤¤ -0.207¤¤¤
(0.060) (0.088) (0.038)
Interquantile range/1000 -12.647 -0.889¤ -1.730
(13.120) (0.481) (1.433)
BR-E/1000 12.969 1.558 9.339
(6.691) (1.132) (10.853)
_cut1 -0.843¤¤¤ -0.774¤¤¤ -0.608¤¤¤
(0.301) (0.099) (0.083)
_cut2 0.106 0.212¤¤¤ 0.545¤¤¤
(0.289) (0.051) (0.067)
N 1933 11964 1434
Log-likelihood -2032 -12171 -1496
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
Standard Errors are robust with respect to correlations within age-
education cells. Abbreviations, see above section C.1.D Appendix for Chapter 4
De￿nition of Variables used in Empirical Analysis
1. jdr refers to the job destruction rate and has three di￿erent versions:
jdr1 (E￿BR) is the rate of persons that are employed (E) in one year and who receive
bene￿ts (BR) in the next year.
jdr2 (E￿BRjOOS) is the rate of individuals who are employed in the ￿rst year and receive
bene￿ts or are out of sample (OOS, conditional on returning) in the following year.
jdr3 (E￿NoE) includes in the second year also individuals that do not return to the labor
market.
2. jfr refers to the job ￿nding rate and has two di￿erent versions:
jfr1 (BR￿E) is the rate of individuals that receive bene￿ts in one year and who are
employed in the next year.
jfr2 (BRjOOS￿E) comprises both bene￿t recipients and individuals that are temporarily
not in the dataset (i.e. conditional on returning) in the ￿rst year.
3. jcr (E￿OE) is the share of individuals that has changed jobs between two consecutive years.
4. When rates are used as left hand side variable in regressions, they are transformed as follows
tr = log(rate=(1 ¡ rate))
to insure that the variable is unbounded.
5. The wage dispersion measure iqr is the di￿erence between the log of the eighth decile and the
second decile. For the purpose of the regression, on the left hand side, we take the log of the
di￿erence, i.e.
liqr = log(iqr);
to ensure that the variable is unbounded.
6. The unemployment rate u in the narrow de￿nition is de￿ned as
u =
BR
E + BR + OOS
;
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and, in the broad de￿nition, ~ u is given by
~ u =
BR + OOS
E + BR + OOS
:
As a left hand side variable, we use the transformation u = log(u=(1 ¡ u)).
7. The narrow frictions indicator is calculated as
´ =
jdr1
jdr1 + jcr
;
while the broad de￿nition is given by
~ ´ =
jdr3
jdr3 + jcr
:
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Table D.1: Changes in the relative position of the wage distribution
Variable Coe￿cient (Std. Err.)
28-30 years -0.1492¤¤ (0.036)
31-33 years -0.2148¤¤ (0.039)
34-36 years -0.2663¤¤ (0.039)
37-39 years -0.3084¤¤ (0.039)
40-42 years -0.3877¤¤ (0.041)
43-45 years -0.4211¤¤ (0.044)
46-48 years -0.4530¤¤ (0.049)
49-51 years -0.4786¤¤ (0.057)
52-54 years -0.5242¤¤ (0.054)
time 0.0040 (0.003)
Medium-skilled 0.2756¤¤ (0.048)
High-skilled 0.2540¤¤ (0.038)
Job change dummy 0.3388¤¤ (0.010)
Job change x 28-30 years 0.0002 (0.027)
Job change x 31-33 years -0.0335¤¤ (0.016)
Job change x 34-36 years -0.0507¤¤ (0.011)
Job change x 37-39 years -0.0819¤¤ (0.014)
Job change x 40-42 years -0.1344¤¤ (0.012)
Job change x 43-45 years -0.1014¤¤ (0.019)
Job change x 46-48 years -0.1252¤¤ (0.015)
Job change x 49-51 years -0.1140¤¤ (0.015)
Job change x 52-54 years -0.1277¤¤ (0.02)
iqr/1000 -0.4190 (1.127)
E-E/10000 -0.7428¤¤ (0.154)
_cut1 6.8558 (5.552)
_cut2 8.4212 (5.554)
N 991041
Log-likelihood -966348.106
Â2
(24) 25642.882
Signi￿cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
Standard errors are robust with respect to correlations within groups (panel adjusted).
Abbreviations, see appendix D.E Appendix for Chapter 5
E.1 Proof of proposition 1
Sampling one ￿rm at random is a random draw (w1;w2) from the wage o￿er distribution H,
and H(w1;w2) is the probability that the wages w1 and w2 are below these speci￿c values (More
precisely that the random variables W1 <= w1 and W2 <= w2). Sampling one worker from each
skill group at random, instead implies two random draws from the two marginal distributions of
paid wages G1(w1) and G2(w2). If an individual samples a ￿rm and decides whether to accept
the wage o￿er (w1;w2) he or she only cares about one of these wages, implying that the decision
is based upon the marginal.
The marginal distributions H1(w1);L1(w1) are given by integrating out the other wage variable:
H1(w1) =
Z w1
0
h1(w1)dw1 =
Z w1
0
·Z 1
0
h(w1;w2)dw2
¸
dw1 =
Z 1
0
h2(w2)Hw1jw2(w1jw2)dw2
L1(w1)
(N1 ¡ U1)
= G1(w1) =
Z w1
0
Z 1
0
g(w1;w2)dw2dw1
The interpretation of the joint wage density g(w1;w2) is simply the probability of drawing
one worker of each skill group at random, i.e. the product of the two marginals g(w1;w2) =
g1(w1)g2(w2). The marginal distributions of paid wages G1(w1);G2(w2) themselves follow from
H1(w1);H2(w2) and from the dynamics of employment following from the individual e￿orts to
look for a higher paying jobs (from the marginal wage o￿er distribution) and from job destruction
(see equation 5.3).
Concerning the strategies of the ￿rms, there are three possibilities:
² Deterministic strategy: Fixing a wage for skill group i determines the optimal wage for
skill group j 6= i. Then, sampling a ￿rm at random yields a random draw (w1;w2) and
H(w1;w2) = H1(w1) = H2(w2). (analogous to Holzner and Launov (2005))
² Independent strategy: Fixing a wage for skill group i does not in￿uence the optimal wage
for skill group j 6= i. Then, sampling a ￿rm at random yields a random draw (w1;w2) and
H(w1;w2) = H1(w1)H2(w2).
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² Mixed strategy: Conditional on paying a wage w1 for skill group 1 there exists a wage dis-
tribution for skill group 2. This distribution however is di￿erent from the marginals. Then,
sampling a ￿rm at random yields a random draw (w1;w2) and H(w1;w2) 6= H1(w1)H2(w2).
In the paper, we argue that it is likely that we obtain a deterministic strategy.
E.2 Solution strategies
One solution possibility is to assume that the wage for one skill group is ￿xed exogenously. In
this case, individuals of this skill group evenly distribute across ￿rms. For the other skill group,
we can then apply the results of Ridder and Van den Berg (1997). That is, for some parameter
constellations we obtain BM-type solutions, for some we obtain a wage distribution with mass
point and for some we obtain only a mass point.
Another solution possibility is to assume that the labor market for one of the skill groups (for
example of the high-skilled, (i.e. i = 2) is competitively organized, meaning marginal productiv-
ity pay. Assume that ®1;®2 < 1. Now, assume that we start from a BM-type solution for the
non-competitive skill group (i = 1). This can only be an equilibrium, when labor of skill group
2 distributes over ￿rms in a way that exactly o￿sets the di￿erences in marginal productivity
resulting from the di￿erent sizes in skill group 1. More formally it must hold that
@y
@l2
= ®2Al
®1
1 l
®2¡1
2 = ®2A
Ã
(N1 ¡ U1)±1(¸1;L + ±1)
(±1 + ¸1;L(1 ¡ H1(w1)))
2
!®1
l
®2¡1
2 = w2 (E.1)
is identical for every paid wage w1 and the according employment of skill group 2. The fact that
￿rms make identical pro￿ts implies an equilibrium.1
E.3 Solving the di￿erential equation
Taking the homogeneous part of the di￿erential equation (equation 5.11), we write the equation
as:
h1(w1)
H1(w1)
= ¡
1
2(®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 ¡ w1)
(E.2)
1 It is not clear how this equilibrium would arise, because all ￿rms pay identical wages and therefore the
distribution of employment over ￿rms is arbitrary. But there is no reason to deviate once this equilibrium is
achieved. The above equation follows from the FOC of the pro￿t function with respect to l2.176 Appendix for Chapter 5
Then integrating both sides and exponentiating yields
H1(w1) = A2
2
q
(®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 ¡ w1) (E.3)
where A2 is an integration constant to be determined by an initial condition.
A particular solution is given, when setting h1(w1) = 0 in (5.11), H1(w1) =
±1+¸1;L
¸1;L yielding the
following:
H1(w1) = A2
2
q
(®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 ¡ w1) +
±1 + ¸1;L
¸1;L
Using that H1(wR
1 ) = 0 ￿nally helps determining the integration constant:
A2 = ¡
±1 + ¸1;L
¸1;L
1
2
q¡
®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 ¡ wR
1
¢ (E.4)
Thus, the solution for the wage distribution of skill group 1 becomes:
H1(w1) =
±1 + ¸1;L
¸1;L
Ã
1 ¡
2
s
(®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 ¡ w1)
¡
®1A(¸1;L + ±1)®1¡1(N1 ¡ U1)®1¡1(¸2;L + ±2)1¡®1(N2 ¡ U2)1¡®1 ¡ wR
1
¢
!
E.4 Simulation parameters
In magnitude the friction parameter (±;¸) we choose are comparable with the estimation results
of equilibrium search models for the Dutch and for the German labor market (see Van den Berg
and Ridder (1998), Launov and Wolf (2005)).Appendix for Chapter 5 177
Table E.1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Low frictions High frictions
±1 0:004 0:008
¸1 0:04 0:02
¸1;L 0:03 0:015
N1 1 3
®1 0:6 0:3
±2 0:008 0:016
¸2 0:12 0:08
¸2;L 0:06 0:03
N2 1 1
®2 0:4 0:7
A 1 1
r 0:02 0:04
z1 0:1 0:03
z2 0:1 0:2178 Bibliography
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